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AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1977 USSR CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCrION: THE 1977 USSR CONSTITUTION IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In October 1977 the Soviet state unveiled a new national con-
stitution for the fourth time in the sixty years of its existence.'
Each of these basic laws marks the transition from one era to the
next in the development of Soviet society. Taken together, they
provide a compendium of the achievements and aspirations of that
ever-changing society.
The 1918 constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative So-
cialist Republic (RSFSR),2 the first Soviet constitution adopted,
documented the irreversible demise of tsarism in Russia and the
violent advent of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This revolu-
tionary document was in turn replaced by the 1924 USSR Consti-
tution.3 The latter document provided a constitutional founda-
tion for the newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), and at the same time paved the way for a socialist recon-
struction of the country's entire social, economic, and political sys-
tem. The 1924 constitution was, in effect, the constitution of a
'The official Russian language text of the 1977 USSR Constitution was pub-
lished in the official journal of the USSR Supreme Soviet. See Konstitutsiia
(Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR (Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR), 41 VED.
VEnx. Soy. SSSR item 617 (1977), [hereinafter cited as Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi
Zakon) SSSR]. The Russian language text of the new constitution was also pub-
lished in the Soviet Union's two national daily newspapers. See Izvestiia, Oct. 8,
1977, at 3, col. 1; Pravda, Oct. 8, 1977, at 3, col. 1.
In the United States there are three widely available English language trans-
lations of the 1977 USSR Constitution. See Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, XXIX CURRuNT DIcEST OF THE SovIET PRESs [C.D.S.P.]
No. 41, at 1-3 (1977); NovosTr PREss AGENCY PuBmsNG HousE, CoNsTrrutnON
(FUNDAmENTAL LAW) OF =n USSR (1977) (copies on fie with the author and the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review); Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the
USSR, 4 REV. SocuaasT L. 57 (1978). From the standpoint of clarity and accuracy
of translation, the author recommends both the Novosti Press and the Review of
Socialist Law translations. The C.D.S.P. version is replete with inaccurate trans-
lations of Russian terms into English. This may be the most readily accessible trans-
lation, however, since it has been reproduced without changes in two books recently
published by American authors. See W. BuTan, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM:
LE:ILATION AND DOcuMENTATION 3 (1978); R. SaArLEr, T m NEw SovIET CoN-
sTITUnoN OF 1977, at 73 (1978).
Quotations from the constitution used in this Article are translations from the
Russian by the author. As a result, they do not always correspond exactly to the
English language versions mentioned above.
2 For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the first
Soviet constitution, see E. CEmR, A HISTORY OF SOVIET RussA (1951); W.
CmEm.ci, THE RussuN REvOLUTON, 1917-1921 (1935); R. DANIms, RED
OCTOBER: THE BoLsnE= REVOLUTION OF 1917, at 208-13 (1967); L. TRoTsKY,
THE HISTORY OF THE RussIAuN REvOLUTIoN (1936); A. ULAm, THE UNFINs
REVOLUnON (1960); G. VERNADSKY, A ISTOnY OF RussrA 339-40 (rev. ed. 1961);
B. WOLFE, THREE WHO MADE A REVOLUTION (1948).
3 See E. CAlm, A HISTORY OF SOVIET RUssIA: THE INTEaREGNUm 1923-24
(1955); L. TROTSKY, supra note 2; B. Wor_=E, supra note 2.
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state at the stage of transition from capitalism to socialism; it was
also the last Soviet basic law to be masterminded by the founder of
the Soviet state, Vladimir Lenin. This constitution guided the
development of the Soviet state during the next twelve years.
A short time after the completion of the 1924 constitution,
Lenin died, and after considerable struggle among the leaders of
the Bolshevik Party the baton of Soviet political power passed to
Joseph Stalin. By 1936 the effects of Stalin's rule were clearly
imprinted on the Soviet Union: the collectivization of Soviet
peasants was nearing completion; the Soviet government had
unveiled a massive industrialization program; and the backbone of
capitalist resistance in Russia had been broken. It was against this
background that "Stalin's Constitution" of 1936 was adopted.4 This
document proclaimed the irreversible victory of socialism in the
USSR and laid the foundation for the construction of a state of
advanced socialism. Even though Stalin died in 1953, the constitu-
tion that bore his name continued to guide the development of the
Soviet state for the next twenty-four years. While accepting the
basic premise of the 1936 Soviet constitution, however, the post-
Stalin Soviet rulers soon began the process of political exorcism
that was intended to purge the 1936 constitution of all of the un-
desirable relics of the cult of Stalin's personality. Provisions of
the constitution of 1936 were amended to the point of saturation.5
Finally, in 1977 a new basic law for the USSR was adopted.
The new constitution declares that the Soviet Union is a "state
of all the people," and that the social, economic, and political re-
lationships in the USSR have matured into those of advanced so-
cialism.6 Following the tradition of the past constitutions, the
1977 Soviet basic law promises to catapult the Soviet society directly
4 See R. CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR 90-91 (1968); R. SHAPEr, supra note
1, at 3-4; A. ULAm, STAINq: ThE MAN AiD o His ERA (1973). See also J. ARM-
sTRoNG, THE POLITICS OF TOTA1ITAHIANISm 78 (1962); E. CAn, SOCLALISM IN ONE
COUNTRY 1924-1926 (1958); C. FRmDRicH & Z. BnzzNsxi, ToTrtaTArrAx DICTA-
TOnsHip AND AurocrAcy 117 (1956).
5 Between 1937 and 1974 the USSR Constitution of 1936 was amended 250
times, affecting seventy-three of the original 146 articles. For example, article 22
dealing with the territorial division of the RSFSR was amended fifteen times; article
23, which listed the constituent regions of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
was amended ten times; articles 77 and 78, which listed the all-union (federal)
ministries and union-republican ministries, respectively, were amended thirty times
each; article 70, which established the composition of the USSR Council of Ministers
was amended twenty times. For details on other amendments, see SOVETSxOE
KoNsTrruTsioNm.oE PRAvo (Soviet Constitutional Law) 81-85 (S. Rusinova & V.
Bianzhin, eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as SovIET CoNsTrrmroNA. LAw]. See also
R. SHAR. T, supra note 1, at 4-5.
6 KoNsTTtsHA (Constitution) art. 1 (USSR).
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into communism,7 that is, into a free association of workers in which
there will be no governmental influence and no state constitution.
To the western student of Soviet constitutional law, however,
the adoption of the long-awaited 8 USSR Constitution of 1977 will
go down in history as the greatest non-event of the decade. Despite
all official proclamations to the contrary, the new document does
not break any new ground in Soviet law. It creates no meaningful
new expectations in the minds of the ordinary Soviet citizens, and
it fails to promulgate a new developmental policy for Soviet so-
ciety. Nevertheless, a deliberate effort was made to involve a cross
7 See id. preamble, paras. 11, 12.
8 It took nearly 15 years to draft the new Soviet constitution. The original
Constitutional Drafting Commission, consisting of 97 members, was set up in 1962
by a decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU). By 1966, the size of the commission had decreased to 75 members. It
further decreased to 54 by the early part of 1977, but in April 1977 21 new members
were added, bringing the size up to the 1966 level. See R. SHAur=T, supra note 1,
at 1-4, 26. The original chairman of the commission was Nikita Sergeevich
Khrushchev, who was replaced as chairman in 1964 by Leonid Brezhnev. Decree of
Dec. 11, 1964 "On the Election of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev as Chairman of the
Constitutional Commission," USSR Supreme Soviet, reprinted in KONsTrruTsnrA
OBsEcHENARoDNoCo GOsDAIISTVA (THE CONSTITUTION OF r STATE OF ALL THE
PEoPLE) 15 (M. Smirtiukov & K. Bogoliubov eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as CoN-
STITUTION OF THE STATE OF ALL THE PEOPLE].I
Prior to the formation of the Constitutional Drafting Commission in 1962, Soviet
constitutional scholars not only had called for the adoption of a new basic law, but
had put forward many proposals for it. For a comprehensive bibliography on pre-
1962 Soviet movements for a new constitution, see R. SHAPJET, supra note 1, at 58
n.6. Thus, the formal and informal processes which culminated in the adoption of
the 1977 constitution date back more than 20 years.
By contrast, the process that led to the adoption of the 1936 constitution was
relatively brief. A constitutional drafting commission was set up in 1935 and
charged with the specific task of drafting a document to replace the 1924 constitu-
tion. By the middle of 1936 the commission produced a draft constitution and
submitted it for nationwide discussion during the summer and fall of that year.
After minor editorial amendments to the draft, it was adopted on December 5, 1936.
See sources cited in note 4 supra.
The process of adopting the 1977 constitution was as follows. The Constitu-
tional Drafting Commission secretly submitted Its completed draft to the Central
Committee of the CPSU at an undisclosed date. The Plenum of the Central Com-
mittee of the CPSU discussed the draft constitution and adopted it "in principle" on
May 24, 1977, with minor amendments. See Pravda, May 25, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
The Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU recommended the draft constitu-
tion, as adopted, to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. After discussing
the draft, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet approved It, with minor
amendments, on May 27, 1977. See Pravda, May 28, 1977, at 1, col. 3. Thereafter
the Presidium authorized the publication of the draft constitution, as approved, and
called for a national debate. Following this general discussion, suggestions for
changes were submitted to the Constitutional Drafting Commission, which sifted
through them and sent its recommendations to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet. The Presidium Integrated some of the changes into the draft that was sub-
sequently submitted to a specially convened session of the USSR Supreme Soviet for
action. Upon adoption in final form by that body, the new constitution was pro-
mulgated into law by a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet. For a general discus-
sion of the political forces that were at work during the various stages of the adop-
tion process, see R. SHA T, supra note 1, at 26-31 (1978).
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section of the Soviet population in the last stages of its adoption.,
The impact of this citizen involvement is questionable.
The political intrigue that surrounded the protracted process of
adoption of the new document seemed at many points to suggest to
outside observers that some major reforms in the area of Soviet
constitutionalism were in the making. As it turned out, the 1977
constitution is noteworthy more for what it did not do than for
what it did.
For support of this conclusion one need only examine the anti-
cipated reforms that have not been incorporated into the new con-
9 The national debate over the provisions of the draft constitution lasted more
than four months. During this time it was estimated that over 140 million people
took part in the general discussion. (This figure represents 80% of the adult popula-
tion of the USSR as of 1977. See J. ScHEBEB, H USSR FACTs & FioutEs ANNUAL
134 (1978).) The draft constitution was discussed not only in the pages of promi-
bent Soviet law journals, and in various law schools, but also by the several union-
republican supreme soviets, by trade-union organizations, and by other social organi-
zations. The Constitutional Drafting Commission received 400,000 suggested
amendments to individual provisions of the draft constitution; based on these
suggestions the Commission made 150 amendments to the text. See L. Brezhnev,
Report to the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Draft Constitution of the USSR," Oct.
4, 1977, reprinted in CoNsTrvnoN OF T STATE OF ALL H PEOPLE, supra note 8,
at 82-3.
In his September 27, 1977 report to the Constitutional Drafting Commission,
Leonid Brezhnev pointed out that most of the suggested amendments were rejected
for one of the following four reasons: they duplicated provisions of current statutory
law; they called for inclusion in the constitution of details that were best left to
statutes; they called for inclusion in the constitution of provisions concerning matters
that were best left to the discretion of agencies called upon to implement the laws
in question; or, finally, they were substantively unacceptable under Soviet law.
L. Brezhnev, "Report to the Session of the Constitutional Drafting Commission,"
Sept. 27, 1977, reprinted in id. 73-74. For a general report on the types of sug-
gested amendments received by the Constitutional Drafting Commission, see
Zacedanie Konstitutsionnoi Kommissii (Session of the Constitutional Commission),
Pravda, September 28, 1977, at 1, col 3.
Even after the national debate had ended, some changes were made in the
course of the final discussion of the draft constitution by the special session of the
USSR Supreme Soviet. For a general review of these last-minute amendments, see
Editorial Article, 12 SovETsKoE GosuDAsTvo i PuAvo (Soviet State and Law) 5-11
(1977) [hereinafter Soy. Cos. i PRAvo].
In addition to these group discussions, individual Soviet jurists were encouraged
to send their opinions of the draft to the Constitutional Drafting Commission. Some
of these individually submitted opinions are published in Obsuzhdenie Proekta
Konstitutsii SSSR (Discussion of the Draft Constitution of the USSR-Individual
Commentaries), 8 Sov. Gos. r PRAvo 14-20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Discussion
of the Draft Constitution I. This was the first part of a two-part publication. The
second part, hereinafter cited as Discussion of the Draft Constitution I1, appeared as
Discussion of the Draft Constitution of the USSR, 9 Soy. Cos. i PRAvo 3 (1977)].
During the discussion by members of the Moscow State University Law School
community, an unidentified speaker suggested that a provision be added to the new
constitution that would make it a constitutional duty for all Soviet citizens to know
(znat') the provisions of the USSR Constitution and to observe conscientiously all
Soviet laws. See Discussion of the Draft Constitution II, supra at 6. The first part
of the suggestion obviously was not adopted, probably because of the enormous
enforcement problem that it would have posed.
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stitution.10 To the dismay of many Soviet constitutionalists, the
new constitution does not significantly alter the political structure
of the government. It does not confer upon the USSR Supreme
Court the power of constitutional review of federal or state legisla-
tion, and it does not grant to the court the authority to render an
advisory opinion, either sua sponte or at the request of the USSR
Supreme Soviet or its presidium, on a bill pending before the
legislature.' Despite official Soviet rhetoric about the emergence
of a new concept of "one Soviet people," 12 the new constitution
does not eliminate the federal system of government in the USSR.13
Although it expands the rights of the union republics 14 vis-t-vis
the federal government, and proclaims the USSR to be a free union
of sovereign states,15 the new constitution fails to grant any formal
procedural standing to the various union republics in the processes
leading to either the adoption or amendment of the federal con-
stitution.' 6 This failure to involve the states in the constitutional
amendment processes has the practical effect of perpetuating the
long-standing role of the federal legislature as a continuing consti-
As a result of editorial refinement, the sheer bulk of the draft was reduced from
13,000 to 9,000 words.
1oVarious Soviet constitutional scholars have in the past proposed specific re-
forms of the Soviet system. For example, some have called for the creation of a
special supreme constitutional council to review sub-constitutional acts for conform-
ance with the USSR Constitution. In the view of these writers, such an organ
would operate under the general supervision of the USSR Supreme Soviet. See V.
KOTOK, KONSTUTSIONNAIA ZAxoNNosT' KoNsTrrTsioNNx NADzoR i KoNsTruTlssoN-
Ni KONTROe" v SSSR (Constitutional Legality, Constitutional Supervision, and Con-
stitutional Control) 104-09 (1971); I. KUZNETSOV, KONTROL' ZA. XoNsTrruTsioNNosT'iu
AxTov Vysmxn ORGANOV VLASr, I UPRAVLENUA V SOTSTUMIsTCHESKYKH SMANAKH
Evnopy (Control Over the Constitutionality of Acts of Supreme Organs of Power
and Administration in European Socialist States) 96 (1973); M. SHAMr, KOMPE-
TENTS SSSR x SoiuzNoi RESPUBimK (The Jurisdiction of the USSR and the Union
Republic) 216-18 (1968); B. SHCHETENIN, RPOBLEMY TEORIn SoVETSxKoGo Cosu-
DARSTVENNOcO PRAvA (Theoretical Problems of Soviet State Law) 167-68 (1969).
Another leading Soviet constitutional scholar, Professor V. M. Savitslii, strongly
condemns the elimination of the power of constitutional review that was originally
vested in the USSR Supreme Court in 1924. See note 390 infra. He urges the
restoration of this right not to the Supreme Court, however, but to a body analogous
to the supreme constitutional council referred to above, modeled on the Yugoslavian
and Rumanian examples. See Discussion of the Draft Constitution 1, supra note 9,
at 18, 18 n.3.
" See text accompanying notes 188-90 infra.
12See KoNsnTurrsnA (Constitution) preamble, para. 7 (USSR).
3 See text accompanying notes 270-99 infra.
14 The union republics roughly correspond to the states of the United States.
See text accompanying notes 278-83 infra. For a discussion of the federal structure
of the USSR, see A. ULAM, THE Russm, b POLrrcAL SYsTEm 68-75 (1974).
15 See KoNsTrrUTsuA (Constitution) preamble, para. 7 (USSR).
16 See text accompanying notes 287-88 infra. For a discussion of the steps in-
volved in drafting the 1977 Soviet constitution, see notes 8-9 supra.
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tutional convention. 17 Finally, while instituting the notion of a
national referendum for the first time in Soviet constitutional his-
tory, the new constitution dilutes the effect of such innovation by
vesting in the USSR Supreme Soviet the exclusive power to deter-
mine what issues may be put to a vote in national referenda.'8
Turning to other areas of much-longed-for reform of Soviet
law, it is disappointing to note that the new constitution does not
eliminate the much vilified notions of personal property and col-
lective-farm property, and it fails to eliminate or even to curb the
use of garden plots by collective-farm households. 19 It does not
equalize wages or pension benefits among all workers. To the
utter disappointment of Soviet civil-rights activists the new consti-
tution fails to recognize the concept of inalienable human rights;
instead, it steadfastly adheres to the notion of enumerated positive
human rights.
For those who had fought to secure constitutional recognition
of the institution of state arbitrazh,20 it was disappointing to note
that the new federal constitution does not grant to the organs of
state arbitrazh the right of legislative initiative that has long been
enjoyed by the USSR Supreme Court, as well as by the Procurator
General of the USSR.21  Despite the existence of well-publicized
studies which show that the comrades' courts today handle over
17Article 174 provides that the constitution may be amended upon approval of
not less than two-thirds of the deputies of each of the two chambers of the USSR
Supreme Soviet. The decision of the Supreme Soviet to amend the constitution is
final; it is not subject to ratification by the union republics. In other words, a bill
to amend the constitution may be introduced and voted on In the same manner as
an ordinary statute. See text accompanying notes 316-22 infra. This arrangement
in effect turns each ordinary session of the Supreme Soviet into a potential constitu-
tional convention.
18 See text accompanying note 322 infra.
19 Personal property and garden plots cultivated by members of collective farms
are often viewed as vestiges of pre-socialist society. Thus, whereas the various
forms of socialist ownership are described in articles 10 through 12 of the constitu-
tion, the non-socialist forms are separately described in article 13. It is expected
that under full communism all of these forms of ownership will blend into one-
communist ownership. See Program of the CPSU 70-72, 22d Congress of the CPSU,
Oct. 31, 1961 (Foreign Language Publishing House Edition, Moscow 1961). See
also J. ARMSTRONG, IDEOLOGY, PoLrmcs, AN GOVmNMENTr IN THE SOVIET UNION
149-51, 225-26 (1974); M. FAINsoD, How RussiA is RuLD 447-55 (1958).
20 The state arbitrazh is a special system of tribunals set up to arbitrate disputes
between economic enterprises. These arbitration tribunals differ markedly from the
regular courts.
21 For a description of the institution of the procuracy, see notes 431-46 &
accompanying text.
A suggestion to grant such a right was made by Professor T. E. Abova during
the discussion of the draft constitution by members of the Moscow State University
Law School community. See Discussion of the Draft Constitution II, supra note 9,
at 23.
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thirty-three per cent of all disputes in the USSR, the drafters of the
new constitution bluntly refused to grant constitutional status to
these "courts of the future." 22  The two popular but radical sug-
gestions of Professor M. A. Fedotov of the Moscow State University
Law School to grant all Soviet citizens "the constitutional right to be
fully and objectively informed of all major domestic and interna-
tional newsworthy events," as well as "the constitutional right of So-
viet citizens freely to express their opinions in all the means of pub-
lic information, i.e. radio, press and television" 23 were neglected
by the drafters of the new constitution.
Furthermore, despite numerous suggestions by Soviet citizens
to the contrary,24 the new constitution does not expand the scope
of the procurator's supervisory jurisdiction to include statutes en-
acted by the Supreme Soviets of the union republics and the au-
tonomous republics; decrees and orders promulgated by the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviets of the union republics and the
autonomous republics; orders issued by the USSR Council of
Ministers or by the councils of ministers of the union republics;
decisions of the local soviets; or the conformance of the union re-
publican constitutions with the federal constitution. In the course
of the discussion of the draft constitution, Dr. Savitskii noted that
as long as the procurator's supervisory jurisdiction does not cover
the above areas of Soviet governmental activity, it would be inac-
curate to refer to procuratorial supervision in the USSR as "su-
preme." 25
Finally, it may be noted that the new constitution continues to
leave open the possibility, at least in theory, of a reversal of a ruling
of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court by the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet. Despite the expansion of the constitutional
rights of citizens, especially in the areas of due process of law, the
new constitution fails to advance the point in the criminal process
at which criminal defendants become entitled to the presence of
counsel. 26
22 A suggestion to grant constitutional status to the comrades' courts was made
by Iu. M. Tkachevskif. See id. 6.
23 See id. 24.
24 See id. 30.
2 5 See Discussion of the Draft Constitution I, supra note 9, at 14. See also
sources cited by Professor V. M. Savitskii in id. 19 n.5.
2 6 Under present Soviet law, with very few exceptions, a criminal defendant's
right to counsel attaches only upon the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
Proposals to advance the stage at which such a right may attach so far have gone
unheeded by Soviet law reformers. For general discussions of the right to counsel
under modem Soviet law, see AnvoxrunA v SSSR (The Advokatura in the USSR)
(V. Chkhikvadze ed. 1971); Luryi, The Right of Counsel in Ordinary Criminal
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Despite its failure to break new ground in Soviet law, the new
constitution does make certain cosmetic changes in the system
created by the 1936 constitution. For the purpose of this analysis,
these changes have been divided into five general categories, as
follows.
First are the changes in the official designations of some existing
Soviet institutions. Among these are the change in the name of the
organs of state power from "soviets of workers' deputies" to "soviets
of people's deputies"; 27 the reclassification of the status of Soviet
society from a "socialist state" to an "advanced socialist state"; 28
and the characterization of the essence of Soviet political authority,
formerly a "dictatorship of the proletariat," 29 as a "state of all the
people." 30
Second are the organizational and structural changes in the
constitution itself, including the insertion, for the first time, of
chapters on the political system,31 foreign affairs,32 social develop-
ment and culture,3 3 national defense,34 and Soviet citizenship; 35
the expansion of the provision regarding the role of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the Soviet constitutional sys-
Cases in the USSR, 20 LAw In EASTERN EURoPE 105 (1977); Osakwe, Due Process
of Law and Civil Rights Cases in the Soviet Union, 20 LAw IN EASTMN EURoPE
179, 200-02 (1977); Osakwe, Due Process of Law Under Contemporary Soviet
Criminal Procedure, 50 Tur. L. BEv. 266, 293-315 (1976).27 See, e.g., KONSTTUTsUA (Constitution) art. 2 (USSR). For a discussion of
the functions of these and other governmental bodies in the USSR, see A. ULAM,
supra note 4. These changes in the designations of these organs of state power
seem to follow the tradition of the past constitutions: the 1918 RSFSR Constitution
referred to these organs as "soviets of workers', peasants' and red army deputies,"
KoNsTrrTrsu. (Constitution) arts. 1, 3, 7 (RSFSR 1918); the 1936 USSR Constitu-
tion changed the name to "soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies," KoNsnTvrsm
(Constitution) arts. 2, 3, 94-101 (USSR 1936). Each change in the name of these
organs was intended to reflect substantive changes in the political power balance
within the Soviet society. For an analysis of the implications of these name changes,
see Discussion of the Draft Constitution I, supra note 9, at 15.
28 Id. preamble, paras. 5, 11.
2 9 
KONsTThyJIA (Constitution) art. 2 (USSR 1936).
3 OKoNsTrruTsu& (Constitution) art. 1 (USSR). It has been argued by Soviet
officials and commentators that all of these changes have substantive connotations
and that it would be wrong to refer to them as merely cosmetic.
31Id. arts. 1-9. See text accompanying notes 98-134 infra.
32 KoNs=rrTsuA (Constitution) arts. 28-30 (USSR). See text accompanying
notes 145-54 infra.
S
3 KoNsnrruTsuiA (Constitution) arts. 19-27 (USSR). See text accompanying
notes 135-44 infra.
3
4 KoNs'rrrrsnA (Constitution) arts. 31-32 (USSR). See text accompanying
note 155 infra.
3 5 KoNsT snA (Constitution) arts. 33-38 (USSR). See text accompanying
notes 173-252 infra.
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tern; 31 the inclusion of a preamble; 37 and the overall increase in
the number of provisions from 146 articles to an all-time high of
174 articles.
The third category comprises institutions of statutory law that,
for the first time, have been accorded constitutional recognition.
These include the institutions of advocatura; 38 state arbitrazh;39
social defenders and social accusers; 40 the USSR People's Control
Committee; 41 and the right of social organizations to initiate legis-
lation.4
2
In the fourth category are newly created institutions (unknown
under either prior statutory law or constitutions). Noteworthy
among these are the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the
USSR; 43 the institution of the national referendum; 4 and the
expansion of the powers of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet 45 to include the authority to form the National Defense
Council of the USSR and approve its membership.
4 6
Category five embraces provisions that alter the terms and eligi-
bility requirements of certain state officeholders. The terms of
office of deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the supreme soviets
of the union republics, and the supreme soviets of the autonomous
republics are increased from four years to five.47 The terms of
deputies of the local soviets are increased from two years to two ;ind
one-half.48 The USSR Procurator General's term of office is re-
duced from seven years to five.49 The age of eligibility for election
36 KONSTrTrJsUA (Constitution) art. 6 (USSR).
37Id. preamble. See text accompanying notes 91-97 infra.
38KoNsrrTs (Constitution) art. 6 (USSR).
39Id. art. 113. See note 20 supra.
40 KONsTITuTsIrA (Constitution) art. 162 (USSR). See note 424 infra & ac-
companying text.
41KONST='rSUAL (Constitution) art. 126 (USSR). See text accompanying notes
358-59 infra.
4 2
KON 1JmU (Constitution) art. 113 (USSR).
43Id. arts. 132-33. See text accompanying note 369 infra.
44 KoNsTnrTsn:A (Constitution) art. 5 (USSR). See text accompanying note
322 infra.
45KoNsTrrusn: (Constitution) art. 121(1)-121(18) (USSR). See text ac-
companying notes 333-47 infra.
46 KONSTITUTSIIA. (Constitution) art. 121(14) (USSR). See text accompanying
note 344 infra.
47 KoNsTrsrrrsnA (Constitution) art. 90 (USSR).
48 Id.
49 Id. art. 167.
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to the USSR Supreme Soviet is lowered from twenty-three to twenty-
one. 0 Finally, the eligibility age for election to the soviets of
peoples' deputies is lowered from twenty-one to eighteen.5 1
In addition to these ornamental changes, there are noteworthy
incremental amendments to the section of the constitution dealing
with the basic rights of citizens. New rights are created and old ones
are expanded, but generally this has been accomplished merely by
elevating to the constitutional level rights that previously had been
recognized under Soviet statutory law. All in all, the 1977 Soviet
constitution is more of a codification of Soviet law of the 1970's
than anything else. Its provisions are so exhaustive that it could
readily serve as a full table of contents of contemporary Soviet law.
A Pravda editorial described the 1977 constitution as a "concen-
trated summation of the entire sixty years of the Soviet state." 62
That is exactly what it is-a passive summation rather than an active
reform. The constitution was drafted with the expectation that it
would serve as the cornerstone of an effort to systematize all branches
of Soviet law; this task was mandated by the Twenty-fifth Congress
of the CPSU. 3
It is inconceivable that the Soviet government required twenty
years to produce a document that is merely a synthesis of Soviet
governmental practices since 1958. Rather, it is more likely that
some of the major reforms that may have been contemplated during
the tenure of the late Nikita Khrushchev as chairman of the Consti-
tutional Drafting Commission 5 4 were abandoned by Khrushchev's
5o Id. art. 96.
51 Id. See text accompanying notes 435-36 infra.
52 Editorial, Gosudarstvo i Pravo, Rozhdennye Velikim Oktiabrem (State and
Law as Created by the Great October Socialist Revolution), 11 Soy. Gos. i Pnsuvo
3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Soviet State and Law].
1
5
3In the portion of its final resolution dealing with the development of science,
the 25th Congress of the CPSU (February 24 to March 5, 1976) called for the in-
tensification of research in both the social and natural sciences. In the area of social
sciences (which includes law as a humanitarian discipline) the resolution called for
comprehensive systematization as well as further theoretical analysis of legal norms.
See Resolution of the 25th Congress of the C-P.S.U., "Major Tendencies in the
Development of the National Economy of the USSR during 1976-1980," March 3,
1976 (adopted by unanimous vote), reprinted in MATrnAxS OF am 25TH CoNGEpss
OF T E CPSU: FEBRuARY 24-MARcH 5, 1976, at 213-15 (1977).
It is expected that with the adoption of a new USSR constitution each of the
fifteen constituent union republics of the USSR will be required to adopt a new
state constitution of its own. The process of replacing the state constitutions has
already begun. The RSFSR became the first union republic to adopt a new consti-
tution on April 12, 1978. The official Russian language text of the new RSFSR
Constitution is published in Pravda, April 13, 1978, at 1, col 1. An English language
translation may be found in 4 REv. Soo mAsT L. 259 (1978).
54 See note 9 supra.
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successors. In all respects the 1977 constitution bears the imprint of
the cautious pragmatism that has come to characterize the Brezhnev
regime.a
5
The failure of the new constitution to break new ground in
Soviet law raises three interrelated questions of interest to the
western student of Soviet law. Why did the government of the
Soviet Union choose to replace the 1936 constitution with a new
one when all of the changes that were introduced by the new docu-
ment could have been adequately handled through a series of
amendments to the relevant provisions of the existing basic law?
What factors led to the choice of 1977 as the year in which to
unveil a new federal constitution? Did the new constitution pur-
port to break with the traditions of earlier Soviet constitutions?
The answer to the first question was provided by Comrade
Leonid Brezhnev during his May 1977 report to the Plenum of the
Central Committee of the CPSU,56 entitled "On the Draft Constitu-
tion of the USSR." 57 In that widely publicized report, Brezhnev
stated that the Soviet Union needed a new constitution because of
the phenomenal changes that Soviet society had undergone in the
four decades since the adoption of the then-current constitution.
In a litany of all imaginable changes in the Soviet Union since 1936
he specifically pointed to several. In 1936, he said, the Soviet Union
had just established the rudiments of a Marxian socialist state, the
collective farm system was still in its experimental stages, the na-
tional economy was at a low level of technical development, and the
relics of pre-revolutionary Russia were evident in virtually all
aspects of Soviet life. But in 1977, according to Brezhnev, the
5 Unlike with the 1936 constitution, which was formally referred to as "Stalin's
Constitution," the present USSR Supreme Soviet hesitated to officially designate the
1977 constitution as "Brezhnev's Constitution." But in an editorial article which
appeared in the Soviet government newspaper, Izvestiia-obviously with the blessing
of the political leadership-it was openly stated that the
Soviet people, with full justification, currently link the formation of the
new Constitution with the name of Leonid Brezhnev. By so doing, they
express their deepest gratitude to him for his exceptional personal contri-
bution to the preparation of this major document of the contemporary
times, this charter of advanced socialism.
Editorial, Zakon Obshchenarodnogo Sotsialisticheskogo Cosudarstva (The Law of a
Socialist State of All the People), Izvestiia, October 9, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
56 The "Plenum" of the Central Committee of the CPSU refers to the full mem-
bership of the Central Committee. For a discussion of the structure of the Soviet
Communist Party, see A. ULAM, supra note 4.
57L. Brezhnev, 0 Proekte Konstitutsii SSSR: Doklad na Plenume Tsentral'nogo
Komiteta KPSS (On the Draft Constitution of the USSR: A Report to the Plenum of
the Central Committee of the CPSU), May 24, 1977 [hereinafter cited as Brezhnev,
On the Draft Constitution].
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Soviet Union had succeeded in building an advanced Marxian
socialist society. In 1977, he continued, the socialist form of owner-
ship had become the dominant form of ownership in the Soviet
economy, the working class now comprised more than two-thirds of
the Soviet population, the constituent nationalities and ethnic
groups of the Soviet Union had become equal not only under the
law, but also in fact, and the economies of the constituent union re-
publics of the USSR had successfully blended into one unified
national economic complex, thus transforming the economy of the
USSR into one true economic unit. Most important, according to
Brezhnev, the differences between the various Soviet nationalities
and ethnic groups had disappeared, resulting in the formation in
the USSR of an historically unique common bond among people,
that is, the formation of "one Soviet people." 58 This, he added,
had been accompanied by the evolution of "the dictatorship of the
proletariat" into a "state of all the people.
'" 59
On the international scene, Brezhnev proudly pointed out,
the position of the USSR had changed radically since the adpotion
of the 1936 constitution. The issue of the formation of a "cap-
italist ring" around the USSR had become a concern of the past,
and the question of "who surrounds whom" had been resolved in
favor of the socialist camp. 0 He further noted that former western
colonies had joined forces with the Marxian socialist countries to
form an anti-imperialist coalition under the leadership of the
USSR .6  Now, said Brezhnev, the Soviet people, acting under the
leadership of the CPSU, were ready to confront a new set of chal-
lenges: the creation of the material-technical base for a truly com-
munist society, the transformation of the present socialist relation-
ships into communist relationships, and the creation of a new
communist man out of the present imperfect "homo sovieticus." 62
All of the factors cited by Comrade Brezhnev reflect only one
side-the objective aspect-of the true reason for the Soviet Union's
desire to adopt a new constitution, however. The other side of the
same argument-the subjective aspect-may be found in the nature
of Soviet law and the political system of the USSR. The need for
58 Id. This last phrase appears in the 1977 constitution. KoNsaT=Urr (Con-
stitution) preamble, para. 7 (USSR).
5 9 Brezhnev, On the Draft Constitution, supra note 57. This notion also ap-
pears in the 1977 constitution. KoNsTrruTsiHA (Constitution) art. 1 (USSR).
6 0 Brezhnev, On the Draft Constitution, supra note 57.
61 Id.
62 Id. All of the above arguments, as adduced by Brezhnev, were echoed in an
editorial in Pravda. See Editorial, Vazhnaia Vekha Nashei Zhizni (An Important
Era of Our Life), Pravda, May 26, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
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periodic changes in the law is inherent in the Soviet socialist legal
system. In adopting a Marxian socialist-state constitution, the in-
tention is not to create a basic law to last for all ages or to hand
down an immutable supreme law of the land, but to draft a docu-
ment that will change and develop as the society itself evolves
through the stages of socialism to true communism. 3 The realities
of the uncertain processes of governmental succession in Marxian
socialist countries have added emphasis to this characteristic political
malleability of such constitutions. Built into every socialist consti-
tution is the expectation that within a few years it will be replaced
by the new political overlords with a document befitting the new
image of the incoming regime. The truth of the matter is that the
Soviet political system contemplates a government of men, not of
laws; it is left to the men who rule at any given time to fashion to
their own taste the laws by which they propose to govern.4 A new
state constitution invariably comes at the beginning or towards the
end of any communist regime. Thus, the surest way to crown
a communist political leadership is for the leaders to engineer the
adoption of a new state constitution.6 In this sense the 1977 USSR
Constitution marks the beginning of the end of the reign of Leonid
Brezhnev in the Soviet Union.
As to why the government of the Soviet Union chose 1977 to
unveil its new constitution one can only speculate. One highly
knowledgeable student of Soviet politics and law, Professor John
Hazard of Columbia University, suggests that there are two pos-
sible reasons for this choice.66 The first reason, which he regards
as sentimental, is that 1977 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the
Bolshevik Revolution.67  The second reason he attributes to "the
phenomenon of old age," pointing out that most members of the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU are old and ailing,
6s3 See CoNsTrrToNs OF THE COMMUNIST PAnTY-STATES xii (J. Triska ed.
1968); Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of Communist Party-States, 3
R v. SOCIALIST L. 155, 156 (1979). See also A. ULma, supra note 14, at 61-63; A.
VYsiaNsEY, THE LAw OF = SovIET STATE 87-89 (1948).
64 See CONSTrTONS OF TE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES xi (J. Triska ed.
1968). See also J. AumSTmONG, supra note 19, at 130, 156; M. FAINSOD, supra note
19, at 291-92.
65 In a thoroughly documented argument, Professor John Hazard takes the
position that successive communist leaders, upon approaching their inevitable retire-
ment from the political scene, have always sought to bind their successors to policies
that they revered by putting them into a constitution. See Hazard, A Constitution
for "Developed Socialism," 20 LAw lIN EASTERN EUROPE pt. 2 at 1-33 (1978). See
note 69 infra.
66 Hazard, supra note 65, at 16-19.
67 Id.
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including Brezhnev himself, who is in his seventies and not in very
good health.68 As a result of this age factor, the "old gang" wishes to
consolidate its imprint on the Soviet system before its members
depart from the scene. To support this argument, Professor Hazard
notes that the late Chinese leader, Mao Tse-tung, left the People's
Republic of China with a new state constitution just before his death
in his eighties.6 9 Similarly, Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, also
in his eighties, has forced a new state constitution on the people
of Yugoslavia, perhaps in anticipation of his impending departure
from the Yugoslav political scene.70 Based on the comparison to
these other Marxian socialist countries, Professor Hazard concludes
that age is becoming a factor in decisionmaking in the Kremlin.
Professor Hazard's conclusion is basically sound. It should be added,
however, that if the Chinese experience is indicative of what may
happen in other Marxian socialist countries, both the Brezhnev
constitution of 1977 and the Tito constitution of 1974 will be
swept away immediately following the departure of these men
from office.
The answer to the last of the three basic questions posed above
is that the 1977 USSR Constitution does not in any way purport to
break with the tradition of previous Soviet constitutions. The pre-
amble to the new constitution specifically provides that it "preserves
the continuity of the ideas and principles of the first 1918 Soviet
Constitution, the 1924 USSR Constitution and the 1936 USSR Con-
stitution." 71 In the words of a leading American authority on the
political history of Soviet constitutions, the Brezhnev constitution
is "a moderate middle-of-the-road document, neither anti-stalinist
nor neo-stalinist in its thrust, but rather a generally pragmatic state-
68 Id.
69 The last constitution of the People's Republic of China to be engineered by
Mao Tse-tung was adopted in 1975. See id. One writer believes that the adoption
of the 1975 constitution, barely a year before Mao Tse-tung died, was an attempt
by Mao and his followers to "legalize the changes brought about by the Cultural
Revolution, which had uprooted the State and Party hierarchy and reestablished
Mao's dominant position in China's political life." deHeer, The 1978 Constitution
of the People's Republic of China, 4 REv. SOCIAST L. 309, 309 (1978). The
National People's Congress has since adopted a new constitution--on March 5, 1978.
70 To date Yugoslavia has had four constitutions, adopted in 1946, 1953, 1963,
and 1974. It is expected that, because of the advanced age of President Tito, the
1974 constitution will be the last Yugoslav state constitution to be adopted under
his tutelage.
71 Ko NsTI=rsU. (Constitution) preamble, para. 17 (USSR). The point that
the 1977 constitution represents a continuation of the general principles of the
previous Soviet constitutions was made by virtually all the groups and individual
commentators who took part in the national debate on the draft constitution. For
a representative view on this question, see the position taken by Professor N. P.
Farberov in Discussion of the Draft Constitution I, supra note 9, at 4.
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ment of already existing practice and principle." 72 This char-
acterization of the 1977 constitution is accurate, as the following
sections of this Article will demonstrate.
II. Tim JURIDICAL NATURE OF SOVIET SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONS
The, Soviet constitution is one of fourteen Marxian socialist
constitutions in force in the world today,73 all of which have certain
common features.74 But the Soviet constitution is a reflection of
the history, culture, psychology, and social mores of the Soviet
people, and as such contains provisions that are peculiarly Soviet.
The following discussion draws upon the common elements of so-
cialist constitutions 75 and the unique national characteristics of So-
viet basic laws. Only by considering both of these factors can the
emergence and content of the 1977 USSR Constitution be fully
understood.
To the Soviet legal mind, a state constitution performs two
dialectical functions within the legal system: first, it serves as the
supreme law of the land, providing an element of stability to Soviet
law; and second, it is the supreme codification of the social, eco-
nomic, political, and cultural development program of the Soviet
state. In this latter capacity the state constitution is intended to be
inherently dynamic. This dual role of a Marxian socialist-state
constitution was recognized by Soviet Communist Party leader,
Leonid Brezhnev, in a major policy speech delivered in 1977.76
Referring to the draft constitution of 1977, he said,
72 R. SHA.LET, supra note 1, at 6.
73 The fourteen countries in the world with Marxian socialist constitutions are
People's Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian People's Republic, German Democratic
Republic, Polish People's Republic, Socialist Republic of Rumania, Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, People's Republic of
Albania, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, People's Republic of Korea, People's
Republic of China, Republic of Cuba, Mongolian People's Republic, and Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.
7 4 See I. s'INSmo, KONSTTrUTSH MIA I SoTsLumi (The Constitutions of
Peace and Socialism) 99-172 (1967); N. IVANISHCHEVA, OSNOVNzE CEaMT1 KONST-
rrrsuI ZARIUBEZMXNYH SOCTSIALIICnxsnxpm STRAu (The Basic Features of the Con-
stitutions of Foreign Socialist States) 40-116 (1973); V. KoTox, 0 PEDmITE i
ISTOCNAM KONSn'TSIONNOGo PRAVA SOTSLaSTnISxmH STRAW: KoNsrrru-
TSIONNOE PAvo SovSLsTIxsXcMxH SRAW- (On the Subject and Sources of Consti-
tutional Law of Socialist States: The Constitutional Law of Socialist States) 5-66
(1963); SOVIET CorsTrrutmoWAL LAw, supra note 5; Ambartsimov, Borisov,
Kpemnev, & Kondrashov, Sotsialisticeskaia Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kuba (The
Socialist Constitution of the Republic of Cuba), 10 Soy. Cos. i PAvo (1976);
Osakwe, supra note 63, at 155. A concise analysis of the Marxist-Leninist political
theory of socialist constitutions may be found in Mikhaleva, Leninskoe Uchenie 0
Konstitutsii: Metodologicheskie Aspekty (Lenin on Constitutions: Methodological
Aspects), 10 Soy. Gos. i PnAvo 12 (1977).
75 See generally Osakwe, supra note 63.
76 Brezhnev, On the Draft Constitution, supra note 57, at 5-6.
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Following the true Leninist tradition, the CPSU operates
on the assumption that a state constitution is not just a
juridical act, but also a major political document. The
Party looked upon the constitution as a consolidation of
the achievements of the revolution and at the same time
as a proclamation of the fundamental tasks and goals of a
socialist construction. Such was our first Constitution of
RSFSR of 1918, which consolidated the achievement of the
October Revolution and articulated the class orientation
of the Soviet state as the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Such was the Constitution of the USSR of 1924, which
articulated the general principles of the construction of a
new socialist state. In the same vein, the Constitution of
1936 legislatively consolidated the victory in the USSR
of socialist social relationships. The new Constitution re-
tains many of the principal provisions of the current
[1936] Constitution to the extent that these continue to
reflect the essence of our system and the character of its
development. In other words, the new Draft Constitution,
on the one hand generalizes the entire constitutional ex-
perience of Soviet history, while on the other hand it
enriches this same experience with its reflections of the de-
mands of the contemporary era.77
In other words, a Marxian socialist-state constitution is not just a
formalistic legal instrument, but also "a mighty instrument for the
construction of communism." 78
As the supreme law of the land, the Marxian socialist-state
constitution serves as the litmus by which the legality of subordinate
legislation is tested. Two leading Soviet commentators articulated
this principle of Soviet constitutional law very well:
In a socialist state . . . among the category of basic laws
may be included such acts the significance of which is re-
flected in their very designations, e.g., the fundamental
principles of legislation of the USSR and the union-
republics. The Constitution, however, is not just a basic
law, but rather a special juridical act which is distinguish-
able in terms of its legal force from all the other laws.
The legal force of a juridical act is generally determined
by another juridical act of superior legal force. Being an
act of the highest legal force, the Constitution does not
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the peculiarity of the Constitution in terms of the legal
basis for its legal force.7 9
The authors then proceed to elaborate further:
Ordinary legislation may not conflict with the Constitution;
they must fully conform to it, and in the case of a discrep-
ancy between such legislation and the Constitution, the
norms of the Constitution shall prevail; international
agreements (treaties) concluded by the Soviet government
may not conflict with the Constitution. They must con-
form to it. In case of a discrepancy between an interna-
tional agreement (treaty), concluded in accordance with
the established procedure, with the Constitution, the com-
petent [Soviet] organs have no authority to ratify such
agreements. The Constitution, in its turn, may not con-
flict with a generally recognized norm of international
law; all other legislative acts promulgated in the Soviet
Union may not conflict with the Constitution, and, if they
were adopted in contravention of the Constitution, they
may not be deemed to have any legal force.8 0
The statement that the Soviet state constitution is the supreme
law of the land needs qualification, however. Under Soviet consti-
tutional theory, all state and social organizations and all indi-
vidual citizens must conform their activities to the provisions of
the state constitution. Taken at face value, this principle would
create the impression that the supremacy of the Soviet constitution
is universal and absolute. In reality, however, this is not the case;
the Program of the CPSU is the actual supreme law of the land in
the USSR. Any specific provision of the state constitution that is
inconsistent with a general provision of the Program of the CPSU
must yield to the latter. Speaking generally of all Marxian socialist
constitutions, Professor Triska of Stanford University states:
Communist party-state constitutions do not limit the re-
spective governments; instead, they are themselves limited
by the ruling party's decision-makers, whether in govern-
ment or not. Men are supreme, not law; hence, the com-
munist party-state constitutions are not the symbols of
freedom they are in Western democracies .... And because
they serve the rulers rather than limiting them, the norms
which they contain are interpreted from the sole point of
79 SovIT CONSTITTONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 46.
sold. 47.
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view of the interests of the state as determined by the
rulers.81
As applied to the Soviet constitutional system, the conclusion
reached by Professor Triska in the passage quoted above is sup-
portable on two grounds. First, Soviet constitutional-law doctrine
takes the position that the state constitution is merely a normative
concretization of the general policies articulated in the Party pro-
gram.82 As such, under the doctrine of lex generalis derogat
specialis, the constitutional provisions, qua the specific law, must
yield to the provisions of the party program, qua the general law.
Second, the state constitution is what the Communist Party says it
is. As the self-appointed guardian of the state constitution, the
Communist Party has the task of first attempting to construe its
provisions strictly. If such strict construction fails, the Party has
the choice of engineering either an amendment to,8 3 or a political
exorcism of, the state constitution. The process of political exor-
cism 8 is resorted to if the Party feels that a particularly trouble-
some provision of the state constitution could be read out of the
document or allowed to lapse into disuse. Through such exorcism
the Party finds it possible to reconcile the provisions of the more
static state constitution with those of the relatively more dynamic
Party program, without going through the formal procedures of
amendment or revision.
The constitution itself is silent on the question of its specific
relationship to the CPSU Program, but a careful analysis of Soviet
doctrinal sources suggests the conclusion reached in the foregoing
paragraph. Thus, two leading Soviet commentators aptly note:
A close link exists between the Soviet [state] Constitution
and the Program of the CPSU. The CPSU Program is a
theoretical document of the [Communist] Party, the force
81 CONSTIIITIONS OF COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES xi (J. Triska ed. 1968).
82 For a general synthesis of modem Soviet constitutional doctrine on the
relationship between norms of the state constitution and provisions of the CPSU
Program, see Osakwe, Book Review, 51 Tu.. L. REv. 411, 419-21 (1977).
83 See note 5 supra.
84 An illustration of resort to political exorcism as a method of expunging unde-
sirable provisions from the state constitution is the Soviet government's decision to
repeal articles 23 and 29 of the 1936 constitution. At the highest level of political
power in the post-Stalin USSR, it was decided that the new regime could not live
with the provisions of these two articles. The official reason given for their repudia-
tion was the fact that they glorified Stalin's personality to a sickening degree, thus
leaving the Party with no choice but to drop them entirely from all subsequent
editions of the 1936 constitution. In the case of these two articles, neither amend-
ment nor revision would have served the intended purpose.
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of which lies in its in-depth and accurate analysis of the path
of development, in its infallibility in predicting the goals
of future development, i.e., in its scientific analysis of
social life and historical progress . . . . Emphasis in the
Party Program is placed on the ultimate goal of social
development in a given historical formation. The Con-
stitution, by contrast, does not and cannot contain the de-
tailed analysis of the paths gone by and of a scientific
explanation of the ultimate goals, merely because it is es-
sentially a legislative act and not, in the strict sense of the
term, a theoretical document. The state Constitution
places emphasis on those political and economic forms
which already now and in the future guarantee the prog-
ress towards the ultimate goal proclaimed under the Con-
stitution, albeit in a most generalized sense. The
Constitution in this regard operates on the basis of the
Party Program and utilizes those ready-made analyses con-
tained in the Program.85
It is perhaps equally noteworthy, however, that even though
the state constitution ultimately is subordinate to the CPSU Pro-
gram, it is nevertheless the supreme law of the land until it is
actually amended, revised, or exorcised at the instigation of the
Party. Accordingly, until the federal constitution itself is amended,
the provisions of subordinate laws, that is, the decrees of the Presid-
ium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the fundamental principles of
federal legislation, federal statutes, the constitutions of the indi-
vidual union republics, union-republican codes and statutes, and
federal and union-republican administrative rules and regulations,
must conform with its peremptory norms. For example, an amend-
ment of a union-republican code of criminal procedure may not
resurrect a principle of criminal procedure that had been aban-
doned in the current federal constitution. Similarly, a govern-
mental reorganization statute promulgated by either the federal or
union-republican government may not abandon a principle of allo-
cation of powers specifically contemplated in the federal constitution
in force. In short, all legislative reforms in the USSR must fall
within the boundaries established by the federal constitution.
Thus, the state constitution provides stability and predictability
to the entire Soviet legal system. This element of stability in the
constitution, however, is counterbalanced by the built-in element
of dynamism. If the state constitution is truly and effectively to
85 SOViET CONSTrruTONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 52.
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reflect the evolving Soviet social, economic, and cultural develop-
ment program, it must change with the times. Some of these
changes can be adequately accommodated through the technique of
constitutional amendment. But once amendments to the constitu-
tion have reached a saturation point,s the extreme solution of
constitutional revision becomes necessary. This point is made by
Professor Triska in the following passage:
[C]onstitutions function both to legitimize the role within
the state and to socialize the citizens into their political and
social roles. In the communist party-states, the constitu-
tions formulate the theory of state and law current at the
time of enactment among the leadership, and periodic
changes in official theory demand repeated periodic
changes in constitutions. As the bases of both legitimation
and socialization functions change, constitutional amend-
ments become insufficient for the purpose. The need for
complete rewriting of the constitutional document be-
comes imperative. Hence the sustained need for con-
stant rewriting of communist party-state constitutions that
will conform to new demands.
87
The essence of this is that the Soviet state constitution is essen-
tially a legal instrument that has been purposefully placed at the
generous disposal of the CPSU. The interpretation of the provi-
sions of this instrument is a recognized political, not legal, function.
This means that the interpretation of the constitution that will
prevail is the view of the CPSU and not that of the USSR Supreme
Court. Supervision of the observance of the provisions of the con-
stitution has been placed squarely in the political department of
government and not in the courts. Thus, the Soviet constitution
affords the CPSU a legal platform for the execution of its political
designs for the entire Soviet society.
88
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
1977 USSR CONSTITUTION
In addition to performing the two functions discussed in the
foregoing sections, the 1977 USSR Constitution serves as a glossary
of modern Soviet law. It deals with virtually every branch of
s6 For example, between 1937 and 1974 the USSR Constitution of 1936 was
amended 250 times, affecting 73 of the original 146 articles. See id. 81-85; note 5
supra.
S7 CONSTrTUONS OF COMMUNIST PAmrY-STATEs xi-xii (J. Triska ed. 1968).
88 See A. Ura.v, Tm RussmN Por.,ucAx SYsTEM 59 (1974).
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modern Soviet law. Consequently, its provisions are not limited to
legal norms. Discussing the topology of constitutional norms, a
leading Soviet expert, Dr. Iu. A. Tikhomirov, identifies several gen-
eral categories in the 1977 constitution: (1) self-executing norms;
(2) general norms, that require implementation through the adop-
tion of organic statutes or executing regulations; (3) structural
norms, that define the structure and authority of the various gov-
ernmental and non-governmental agencies; and (4) aspirational
norms, that articulate the general orientation of the development of
the state's responsibilities to its citizens.89
In addition to these four broad categories of provisions, the
Soviet constitution contains a broad range of political declarations.
For the purpose of this analysis, all the provisions, legal and non-
legal, of the 1977 constitution may be treated under ten major
structural headings: 0 the preamble; the political and economic
system of the USSR; social development and culture; foreign policy
and national defense; equal protection of law; the bill of rights and
duties; problems of federalism; separation of powers; the electoral
system; and the amendment procedure. The following discussion
provides a commentary on the provisions that fall under each of
these headings.
A. The Preamble: Spirit of the Constitution
For the first time in the history of Soviet constitutionalism, the
1977 constitution contains a preamble. Like most of the other pro-
visions, the preamble catalogues past achievements of the Soviet
state and announces new goals for the future. Yet it differs signifi-
cantly from other provisions in that it articulates the spirit and the
philisophical underpinnings of the constitution. By so doing, it
serves as a helpful tool in interpreting substantive provisions of the
constitution. In the words of an editorial in the prestigious Soviet
law journal Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, "the significance of the
Preamble lies in the fact that it serves as a sort of 'key' to the con-
stitutional text; in it are restated the achievements of the past, as
well as the projected goals of future development." 91
89 Tikhomirov, Problemy Teorii Sotsialisticheskoi Konstitutsii (Theoretical Prob-
lems of a Socialist Constitution), 2 Soy. Gos. i PntAvo 3, 6 (1978).
90 Some of these headings directly correspond to similarly designated chapters
in the 1977 constitution, but others are thematic consolidations of two or more
chapters.
91Editorial, Konstitutsiia SSSR 1977-Vazhnaia Vekha v Razvitii Nauki o
Sotsialisticheskom Gosudarstve (The USSR Constitution of 1977-A Major Milestone
in the Development of the Science about a Socialist State), 12 Soy. Gos. x PnAvo
5 (1977).
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The preamble reminds all that Soviet society is the embodi-
ment of the Marxist progression to communism. The Bolshevik
Revolution of 1917 dealt a fatal blow to capitalism in Russia and
ushered in a new form of government-a dictatorship of the pro-
letariat-that marked mankind's historic turn from capitalism to
socialism; during the sixty years of its existence the Soviet society
has developed into a state of all the people. 92 The preamble con-
cludes that in 1917 the Soviet society was in a transitional stage
from capitalism to socialism, whereas today it has attained the status
of a "society of advanced socialism" and is steadily advancing towards
communism. 93 The preamble makes the strong point that in this
national movement toward communism the moving force is the
CPSU-the self-ordained vanguard of the Soviet people. As one
would expect in a society of advanced socialism, the preamble notes
that through the guidance of the CPSU the USSR has attained
social, political, and ideological unity among its people, as well as
high levels of ideological conviction and class consciousness. 94 Ac-
cording to the preamble this unity is evidenced by the willingness
of Soviet citizens to act as their brothers' keepers, showing sincere
concern for the welfare of fellow citizens. 95 Finally, the preamble
proclaims the attainment of a classless communist society as the
ultimate goal of the Soviet state.9
Without specifically saying so, the preamble thus elevates the
ideology of scientific communism almost to the level of a Soviet
state religion. Since this "religion" is characterized by the continu-
ing economic, social, and moral development of the society and its
citizens, the preamble provides that the 1977 constitution is not
only a quantitive statement, but also a dynamic continuation of the
92
KoNsTnTusnA. (Constitution) preamble, para. 4 (USSR). An editorial in
Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo defines a "state of all the people" as "an historical
successor to the dictatorship of the proletariat and a stepping stone in the direction
of full communism." Soviet State and Law, supra note 52, at 6.
93 The meaning of "society of advanced socialism" is spelled out in three major
CPSU documents adopted prior to the unveiling of the 1977 constitution: the reso-
lution of the 25th Congress of the CPSU; the Postanovlenie (Decree) of the Central
Committee of the CPSU entitled "0 Shestideciatom Godovshine Velikoe Oktiab'rskoi
Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii (On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist
Revolution); and the Materials of the May (1977) Plenum of the Central Com-
mittee of the CPSU. All three documents are cited in Soviet State and Law, supra
note 52. According to this article, the 1977 constitution merely codified the prin-
ciples already expressed in these Party documents. See id. 5.
94 KoNSnrUsnA (Constitution) preamble, para. 8 (USSR).
95 Id. preamble, para. 9.
96 Id. preamble, para. 12.
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traditions of past Soviet constitutions.9 7 To understand fully the
provisions of the preamble, one has to look to the substantive pro-
visions contained in the main body of the constitution. It is to
these provisions that this analysis now turns.
B. The Political and Economic System of the USSR
The quintessence of the Soviet system may be gleaned from
the provisions of chapters one and two of the new constitution. At
a glance, these opening provisions reflect both the balance of politi-
cal power in the USSR and the foundations of the Soviet economic
system. As in the preamble, the major provisions of these two
chapters are essentially declarations of political and economic prin-
ciples. Whatever legal principles one may find in them are secreted
in the interstices of the general social and political pronouncements.
Article 1 of the new constitution proclaims the USSR to be "a
socialist state of all the people," 98 a society in which the two friendly
classes-the proletariat and the peasantry-share political power in
97 Id. preamble, paras. 13-18.
98 KoNsTrsrJT (Constitution) art. 1 (USSR). Some western commentators
have attacked the new constitutional designation of the USSR as a "state of all the
people" as being incompatible with the teaching of Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin.
According to these western critics, Lenin foresaw the dictatorship of the proletariat
as the last phase before the advent of communism. Therefore, the argument con-
tinues, Lenin would condemn from his grave any interposition of a qualitatively
different state of affairs between the dictatorship of the proletariat and communism.
These western sources point out that Marx essentially took the same position as that
of Lenin, believing that dictatorship of the proletariat would give way only to "an
association of free workers." Editorial, Der Spiegel, cited in Editorial, Dialektika
Razvitiia Sovetskoi Gosudarstovennosti i Konstitutsiia SSSR (The Dialectics of the
Development of the Soviet State and the Constitution of the USSR), 4 Soy. Gos. i
Pnvo 3, 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dialektikal.
One example of western concern over the dilution of Marxism-Leninism in the
Soviet Union came from a West German newspaper, which stated:
[A]ccording to the teaching of Marx and Engels a dictatorship of the
proletariat shall be followed by a community of free persons devoid of any
forms of governmental authority. However, according to the new USSR
Constitution, the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia even though
ended, is now being replaced, as announced in the Preamble, by a state of
all the people.
Id. 4 n.2.
Apologists of the Soviet system, on the other hand, defend the Soviet position
by arguing that Marx and Lenin used the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" to
characterize the political orientation of the government of workers, while using the
term "an association of free workers" to refer to the socioeconomic structure of the
working-class society. Thus, to Marx and Lenin, the term "association of free
workers" could refer both to a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and to a stage of
communism. In other words, the rationalizers of Soviet government policies take
the position that the concept of the "state of all the people" is the CPSU's creative
contribution to the objective theory of scientific communism. For a Soviet doctrinal
defense of the Soviet constitutional theory of a "state of all the people," see
id. 4-5.
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collaboration with members of the progressive intelligentsia.9 9 It
is highly doubtful, however, that the Soviet peasantry is in fact an
equal partner in this political alliance. It is equally doubtful that
the role of the intelligentsia in this partnership is merely that of a
faithful servant of the two political masters. Data on the class com-
position of the last Supreme Soviet of the USSR, elected in 1979,
indicate that of a total of 1500 deputies, 34.8% (522 deputies) were
members of the industrial proletariat; 16.3% (244 deputies) were
peasants; and 48.9% (734 deputies) were "others," including mem-
bers of the intelligentsia.100 Clearly, not only is the leadership role
of the intelligentsia still pervasive, but the interests and opinions of
this class are disproportionately represented in the Soviet govern-
ment. Thus, the Soviet government today is neither a dictatorship
of the proletariat, nor a state of all the people. 01 It is a dictator-
ship of the CPSU, the stronghold of the elite intelligentsia of the
USSR. Whether or not this is viewed as a bad thing in itself, it is
an inescapable fact of Soviet life.
To demonstrate the popular democratic base upon which the
Soviet government purports to operate, article 2 proclaims that
"[a]l1 power in the USSR belongs to the people." 102 Since it is
9 9 KoNsrruTsirA (Constitution) art. 1 (USSR).
300 Editorial, Pravda, March 7, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
101 See A. ULAm, supra note 88.
In his report to the Special (Constitutional Ratification) Session of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev attacked all those western writers who refer to the
present arrangement in the USSR as a dictatorship of the CPSU, or as reflecting the
supremacy of the Party over the state apparatus. In response to such western
"inventions" he stated,
What can one possibly say in this regard? The reasons for such [western]
attacks on our system are well known. The CPSU is the vanguard of the
Soviet people. It is society's most politically conscious and progressive
segment. It is inseparable from the people as a whole. To attempt to
counterpose the Party against the people or vice versa, to speak in terms
of a "dictatorship of the Party," is tantamount to an attempt to counterpose
the heart to the rest of the human organism.
L. Brezhnev, Report to the USSR Supreme Soviet, cited in Editorial, Osnovnoi Zakon
Razvitogo Sotsializma (The Basic Law of Advanced Socialism), Pravda, October 9,
1977, at 1, col. 2.
l102 KoNsTrrTrrsuA (Constitution) art. 2 (USSR). The phrasing of the concept
of popular sovereignty as "[a]ll power in the USSR belongs to the people," is in-
tended to reflect a certain degree of maturity in the class relationships that exist in
Soviet society. The phrase itself suggests that the USSR has now attained the status
of a "state of all the people." By contrast, article 10 of the 1918 RSFSR Constitu-
tion stated that "all power belongs to the working people of the country." KoNsnj-
=uTsHA (Constitution) art. 10 (RSFSR 1918). The 1918 choice of terms reflected
the status of a society in transition from capitalism to socialism. By the same token,
article 3 of the 1936 constitution stated that "all power belongs to the workers re-
siding in the cities and villages," KoNsTrrUTsIIA (Constitution) art. 3 (USSR 1936),
a wording which, as interpreted by Soviet commentators, reflected the fact that even
though the USSR at that time had achieved the irreversible victory of socialism, it
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practically impossible for the people to govern directly, however,
they delegate their political power to elected representatives who
remain under their effective control. 1°0 This statement, taken at
face value, suggests that there is true popular sovereignty in the
USSR. But the realities of Soviet life suggest that the true sovereign
in the Soviet Union is the CPSU, not the people.104
What all of this amounts to is that the new constitution pro-
jects an erroneous image of the Soviet government as a government
of the people, by the people, for the people. In reality, however,
the Soviet government is nothing more than a government of the
people, by the Party, for those who have secured the highly coveted
blessings of the Party. The original sovereignty vests in the people,
but the people, in the interest of orderly government as perceived
by the Party, have delegated virtually all of their original powers
to the self-appointed guardians of the Soviet society: the CPSU.
The scope of the delegation as well as the manner in which the
delegated authority will be exercised is determined exclusively by
the Party in its capacity as the sole administrator of the affairs of
the people. For all practical purposes this arrangement renders
the people legally incapacitated.
Article 4 provides that all Soviet state agencies and social or-
ganizations shall operate on the basis of Soviet laws.1 05 It further
provides that these agencies shall ensure the protection of law and
order, the interests of society, and the rights and liberties of Soviet
citizens.106 There is no reason to question the likelihood of good
faith observations of these provisions. It should be added that it is in
the interest of the CPSU that the laws of the Soviet state be uni-
formly observed by all Soviet state agencies, social organizations, and
individual citizens.107 A degree of stability is essential in any large,
modem state to maintain order. The extralegal powers of the
CPSU do not interfere with the daily functioning of the Soviet
system. The exercise of these powers is only rarely apparent where
non-political issues are concerned.
was still a dictatorship of the proletariat. For a general discussion of the political
content of Soviet constitutions, see Stepanov, Konstitutsionnye Osnovy Sovetslkoi
Politicheskoi Sistemi (The Constitutional Foundation of the Soviet Political System),
9 Soy. Gos. i P~t~vo 33 (1977).
10 3 See KoNsnTsuA (Constitution) arts. 2 & 3 (USSR).
3
0 4 See note 101 & text accompanying notes 99-101 supra
105 KoNSIsutJT5TA (Constitution) art. 4 (USSR).
106 Id.
.0 7 See note 101 supra.
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Pursuing the general theme of popular sovereignty articulated
in article 2, article 5 provides that the most important questions of
state life shall be submitted to the people by national referenda.'0 8
What article 5 fails to spell out, however, is that the responsibility
for deciding when to call a referendum and what questions to put
before the people rests solely with the government. Article 5 does
not grant to the Soviet citizens any right of initiative. It is never-
theless interesting that the principle of article 5 is new to the Soviet
constitution. Up to this point it had been a rarely invoked princi-
ple of Soviet constitutional practice. 10 9 If the history of referenda
in the USSR is a reliable guide to what to expect in the future, the
referendum provisions of article 5 are doomed to relative obscurity.
Article 6 marks a radical departure from previous Soviet con-
stitutions: it explains at length, for the first time in Soviet consti-
tutional history, the role of the CPSU in the Soviet political sys-
tem. 110 It provides in unequivocal language that the CPSU is "the
leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its politi-
cal system and of all state and public organizations." 111 For all
practical purposes the CPSU operates as the mind, the conscience,
and the brain of the Soviet body politic. It is the only "thinking"
108 KoNsT TJumA (Constitution) art. 5 (USSR).
019 The Soviet attitude toward the referendum as a form of direct government
may be understood only in historical perspective. During the phase of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, V. I. Lenin, in a speech delivered to an extraordinary All-
Russian Congress of Railroad Workers in 1918, openly took the position that the
referendum was an unacceptable form of direct government in light of the political
situation at that time. In a subsequent policy statement, Lenin conceded, however,
that the referendum could be suitable during the phase of transition from capitalism
to socialism. Since then, the CPSU has taken the position that in appropriate cir-
cumstances there is nothing wrong with resorting to a referendum in order to solicit
public opinion, as long as the decision to call a referendum and the determination
as to the issues to be presented to the people are made not by the people, but by
the state authorities. The referendum in Soviet constitutional practice has no statu-
tory basis. It is founded solely on Party policy statements. For a thorough dis-
cussion of the historical evolution of the institution of the referendum in the USSR,
see SOvIET CoNsTrrroNAL LAw, supra note 5, at 173-77.
11OKoNsTrTusnA (Constitution) art. 6 (USSR). During the discussion of the
draft constitution of 1977, Professor A. V. Mitskevich called for a further clarification
of the role of the CPSU. In his view it was not enough to say that the CPSU is the
leading force In society. He would have stressed that the CPSU does not strive to
displace or compete with the state agencies in the administration of Soviet socialism.
In other words, he wanted included in the new constitution a provision that would
emphasize the leadership role of the CPSU without giving the impression that the
government agencies are totally dispensable bodies. His suggested wording of article
6 was not adopted, but it is abundantly clear that the Party not only leads, but also
works through, the state agencies. For a summary of Professor Mitskevich's com-
ments, see Discussion of the Draft Constitution I, supra note 9, at 7-8.
III KoNSTrrunsn& (Constitution) art. 6 (USSR).
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organ in the Soviet society.112 Consequently, when Party leaders
signal what is to be done, all appendages of the Soviet political
being must carry out their wishes."13 As the ultimate sovereign in
the Soviet political system, the CPSU is essentially infallible be-
cause it is the final authority on what is best for the Soviet people."14
In the true sense of the term, the CPSU is the keeper of the Soviet
political conscience. Article 6 of the 1977 constitution merely legiti-
mizes the general practices in the area of Soviet party-state relation-
ships.
Given the position of the CPSU in the Soviet system, it is
extremely intriguing to read in the last paragraph of article 6 that
all organizations of the CPSU shall operate within the framework of
the USSR Constitution.:" 5 It is perhaps too early to piece together
what this new provision will mean in practice. It appears that this
particular provision is intended to be binding upon the local, re-
112 The Statute (Ustav) of the CPSU refers to the Party as the combative and
fully tested vanguard of the people, the leading and guiding force of the Soviet
society, which unites in its ranks the most conscious members of the working class,
the peasantry, and the intelligentsia of the USSR. As such, the Party is regarded
as the highest form of socio-political organization of the people. The Statute further
provides that the Party, armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, is the sole pilot
of the Soviet society's coordinated march toward its ultimate goal-communism.
Statute (Ustav) of the CPSU, adopted by the 22d Congress of the CPSU on October
31, 1961, preamble (version printed by Political Literature Press, Moscow 1977).
An English language version of the statute may be found in W. BUTLER, supra note
1, at 361-77. These provisions of the Statute of the CPSU have since been incor-
porated into article 6 of the 1977 constitution.
"3 Article 6, paragraph 1 of the 1977 constitution, in describing the role of the
Party, refers to it as the nucleus around which all the other social, political and
legal institutions revolve. As such, the Party determines the general direction of the
movement of the entire "solar system," and assigns roles to the constituent institutions
of the system. See A. ULAm, supra note 88, at 59-61.
114 Since the Party is regarded in its Statute as an association of the most con-
scious members of the Soviet society, see note 112 supra, and in article 6, paragraph
1 of the 1977 constitution as the epicenter of the entire Soviet political system, see
note 113 supra, it may reasonably be inferred that no authority within this system is
hierarchically superior to the Party. See A. UrA., supra note 88, at 59-61.
115 KoNsTrosA (Constitution) art. 6 (USSR). The Statute of the CPSU
lists as the organs of the Party the local party organizations, including those at the
level of the union republic, the region, the province, and the city, see Statute
(Ustav) of the CPSU, art. 41, adopted by the 22d Congress of the CPSU on October
31, 1961 (version printed by Political Literature Press, Moscow 1977), and the
central organs of the Party, including the Congress, the central committee, the
central revision commission, the committee on party control attached to the central
committee, the politburo, the secretariat, and the general secretary, see id. arts. 30-
40. In his report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU (February 24-March 5, 1976),
Brezhnev supplied the following figures on the membership of the central organs of
the CPSU as of February, 1976: 15,694,000 members of the Party; 5,000 delegates
to the 25th Congress; 287 full members and 139 alternate (non-voting) members of
the central committee; 16 full members and 6 alternate (non-voting) members of
the politburo; and 11 members of the secretariat. L. Brezhmev, Report to the 25th
Congress of the CPSU, reported in Editorial, Pravda, March 6, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
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gional, and union-republican organizations and officials of the
CPSU, but not upon its central organs or its national officials. Fur-
thermore, even if one accepts arguendo that the provisions of the
constitution are binding on all levels of the CPSU, the constitution
is what the CPSU says it is. This makes the CPSU a truly supra-
constitutional body. Any contrary interpretation of article 6 would
violate the spirit of the constitution itself, as reflected in its pre-
amble.""
Articles 7 and 8 of the new constitution grant to the various
other social organizations the right to participate in the administra-
tion of Soviet socialism.117 There is nothing new in these provi-
sions-they merely elevate to the constitutional level what pre-
viously had been principles of Soviet laws on trade-union
organizations and on the activities of economic cooperatives and
social organizations." s
Article 9 embodies a governmental promise to maximize pro-
gressively the participation of Soviet citizens in the administration
of the affairs of state and society."19 Such a vague and imprecise
promise, however, is incapable of legal enforcement. Thus, arti-
cle 9 is at best only of psychological value to Soviet citizens.
The economic philosophy of the USSR is set forth in the 1977
constitution beginning with article 10. Without departing from
constitutional tradition on this question, article 10 proclaims social-
ist ownership to be the cornerstone of the Soviet economic sys-
tem.12 0  Generally, socialist ownership manifests itself in two
unequal forms-state property and the property of socialist organi-
zations such as collective farms and trade unions. Taken together
articles 10 and 12 provide that socialist organizations are free to
own any property necessary to the performance of their statutory
tasks, including buildings, machines, and cattle. Article 11 spe-
cifically lists those items that come within the state's exclusive right
316 The relevant provision of the preamble on this question is paragraph 4,
which assigns to the CPSU the leadership role in Soviet society. Paragraph 4 sug-
gests that this leadership role tends to grow as the society advances towards com-
munism. See KoNsTrrm'sn (Constitution) preamble, para. 4 (USSR).
117KoNSTTSnA (Constitution) arts. 7, 8 (USSR).
118 The role of the trade-union organizations in the administration of Soviet
labor law and related social legislation is enshrined in the labor codes of the union
republics. See, e.g., RSFSR KoD. ZAx. o TatRE (Labor Code) arts. 225-235 (1971).
Workers may also participate in the administration of Soviet enterprises by operating
through social organizations other than the trade unions. See id. art. 228.
319 KONsrrrusuA (Constitution) art. 9 (USSR). See id. art. 48.
120 Id. art. 10. Article 10 virtually reproduces the provisions of article 4 of the
1936 constitution. Compare id. with KoNsTrruTsA (Constitution) art. 4 (USSR
1936).
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of ownership.12' These include land, mineral wealth, the waters,
and the forests. It is provided in article 12, however, that the land
occupied by the collective farms is assigned to them in perpetuity
by the state free of all rent.122 The only obligations of the collec-
tive farms that receive such land from the state are to use it effec-
tively, to take proper care of it, and to take positive measures to
increase its fertility.
The constitutional provisions governing ownership of personal
property did not undergo any radical changes. 23 Article 13 recog-
nizes the right of personal property over such items as household
goods, articles of personal consumption and convenience, a dwelling
house, earned income, and savings. 24 Whatever items an individual
citizen owns by virtue of the right of personal property may, under
article 13, be transmitted to other persons by inheritance.,
25
Like all other Soviet constitutional rights, 12 the right of per-
sonal ownership is not and was never intended to be absolute.
There are two specific qualifications of this right in the 1977 con-
stitution. First, under article 13 the right of personal ownership
attaches only to property acquired with earned income. This means
that any individual property right that might have been acquired
with unearned or speculative income is null and void ab initio.
Such property is subject to forfeiture to the state on the theory that
the putative owner had, at best, an imperfect right to it.127 Second,
article 13 provides that "[p]roperty in the personal possession or
use of citizens shall not serve as a means for the derivation of un-
earned income or be used to the detriment of the interests of
society." 128 In other words, since the purpose of the individual
ownership right is to satisfy the personal needs of citizens and mem-
bers of their families, any use of personal property for an undesig-
321 KoNsTrru.-SA (Constitution) art. 11 (USSR).
=22 Id. art. 12.
123 Article 13 of the 1977 constitution virtually reproduces article 10 of the 1936
constitution. Compare id. art. 13 with KONSTrruTSHA (Constitution) art. 10 (USSR
1936).
1
24 KoNsJuTiA (Constitution) art. 13 (USSR).
125 Id.
126 See the general discussion of the nature and scope of the constitutional rights
of Soviet citizens at text accompanying notes 173-268 infra.
1
2 7 For a general discussion of the Soviet law of forfeiture of property, see
Osakwe, Forfeiture, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDiA OF Sovmr LAw 288-90 (F. Feldbrugge ed.
1973). Modem Soviet law draws a distinction between forfeiture of property and
requisition of property. For a general discussion of the Soviet law of requisition, see
Osakwe, Requisition, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDI& OF SoViET LAw 484-86 (F. Feldbrugge
ed. 1973).
12 8 KoNsTTUrTsA (Constitution) art 13 (USSR).
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nated purpose would constitute an abuse of that right. Depending
on the specific form of such abuse of right, the legal sanction may
be criminal, civil, administrative, or a combination of two or all of
the three. 2
9
The application of Soviet political and economic philosophy
to an issue of central concern to Marx and Lenin-the labor of
human beings-begins with article 14. Article 14 merely elevates to
the level of a principle of constitutional law what previously had
been principles of Soviet labor law: the labor of Soviet citizens shall
be free from exploitation, and individual labor shall be compen-
sated according to a state-approved graduated wage scale that takes
into consideration the social value of such labor. 30 This constitu-
tionally based freedom from involuntary servitude is, however,
subject to many statutory exceptions. Thus, for example, that pro-
vision of article 14 would not be deemed to be violated if a court
of law imposed a sentence of compulsory and uncompensated labor
on a person adjudged to be criminally or administratively liable.
Article 17 permits individual citizens to engage in certain types
of carefully selected "private" entrepreneurial activities, as long
as in so doing they do not exploit outside labor.13' This means that
individual labor activities in the spheres of handicrafts and agricul-
tural and consumer services are permissible as long as the entre-
preneur does not hire the services of persons outside his immediate
family. The spirit of this law would also prohibit the formation
of a business partnership consisting of the members of separate
families or households for the purpose of engaging in any of the
activities listed therein.
12 9 For example, a homeowner may not convert his home into a den of de-
bauchery, or into a place for narcotics use or gambling. Any such unlawful use of
personal property is criminally punishable under union-republican law. See, e.g.,
RSFSR UCOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) art. 226 (1960). RSFSR law also provides,
for example, that religious societies have the rights to acquire religious articles and
means of transportation, and to lease, build, or buy buildings to be used for religious
purposes. RSFSR Law on Religious Associations art. 3 (1929), amended by Decree
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, June 23, 1975, 27 VED.
Vmua . Soy. RSFSR item 572 (1975). (An English translation of this law appears
in 1 lrv. SociLkisT L. 223 (1975).) The law also provides, however, that a
properly registered religious society may designate and use only one building or
complex for prayer purposes, id. art. 10, and may not generally use property at its
disposal for non-religious purposes, id. art. 17, para. (a). Any church building used
for an unlawful purpose is subject to forfeiture under the general laws of forfeiture.
See note 127 supra. Furthermore, the law on religious associations requires that all
buildings held by religious societies be maintained in full compliance with technical
building and sanitary regulations. Id. art. 10. Failure to comply may subject the
property to requisition under the general laws of requisition. See note 127 supra.
1 3 0 KoNsTsuA (Constitution) art. 14 (USSR).
131 Id. art. 17.
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The final provision of the introductory chapters of the 1977
constitution, article 18, expresses overt Soviet concern for environ-
mental protection "in the interests of present and future genera-
tions." 132 It does not, however, expressly impose a legal duty on
the state to protect the Soviet environment. The provision merely
recites that the necessary steps are being taken in the USSR to
protect the environment by making scientifically substantiated and
rational use of the land and its mineral wealth, flora, and fauna,
and that the state has taken measures "to preserve the purity of the
air and water, to ensure the reproduction of natural resources, and
to improve man's environment." 133 In sharp contrast to article
18's declarative language with respect to the duty of the state to
preserve the environment, article 67 imposes a specific obligation on
Soviet citizens "to protect nature and to safeguard its riches." 134
C. Social Development and Culture
The dedication of a special chapter to the treatment of matters
of social development and culture is one of the many structural in-
novations of the 1977 constitution, but most of the provisions
included in this chapter are by no means new to Soviet constitu-
tional law. To a great extent the chapter is merely declaratory of
present Soviet governmental practice. Some of these provisions are
so amorphous and vague that they do not amount to anything more
than an unenforceable state promise to give effect to the Leninist
notion that culture belongs to the people. 35
Article 19 begins by declaring that "the social foundation of
the USSR is the indestructible alliance of workers, peasants and
the intelligentsia." 136 It then goes on to express the Soviet govern-
ment's promise to wipe out, at some unspecified future date, the
present differences between mental and physical labor, as well as
the present differences between the city and the countryside. 37 In
132 Id. art. 18.
133 Id.
134 Id. art. 67.
135 The Program of the CPSU states that artistic and cultural creations in a
socialist society should reflect socialist realism-the "principle of partnership and
kinship with the people'; that art should "embody the versatility and richness of the
spiritual life of society and the lofty ideals of humanism of the new world"; and
that access to the cultural and artistic wealth of the country should be facilitated
for all citizens. Program of the CPSU 117-19, 22d Congress of the CPSU, Oct.
31, 1961 (Foreign Language Publishing House edition, Moscow 1961).
l3 GKoNsTnrTIsnA (Constitution) art. 19 (USSR).
'37Id. See V. I. LENn, THE STATE AND REVOLuToN ch. I (1932); K. MAnx
& F. ENGELS, THE COMMUNIT MANUFSTO ch. 1 (S. Moore trans. 1967).
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article 21 the state promises to eliminate physical labor in the
USSR by fully mechanizing the production processes at some in-
definite time in the future. 138
Other political guarantees contained in this chapter include
promises to raise the level of workers' wages and to increase workers'
real spendable income. 39 The program of the CPSU has identified
the elimination of the individual income tax 140 as one way to raise
the real income of Soviet citizens.' 4 ' To give effect to this Party
policy, the 24th Congress of the CPSU adopted a resolution elimi-
nating all income tax on the wages of workers who earn up to
seventy rubles per month. 142 The provisions of article 23 are a
reaffirmation of this long-standing promise made to Soviet workers
by the CPSU and the Soviet government.
For the first time in the history of Soviet constitutions, article
26 raises to the constitutional level the idea of state control of
science. Under article 26, the Soviet state will not only "ensure
the planned development of science and the training of scientific
cadres," 143 but also will use its oversight powers to see that scientific
research serves the interest of the national economy. 44 Like all the
other provisions of chapter 3, article 26 is merely a codification of
Soviet governmental practice since the inception of the Soviet state.
State control over scientific research, manpower training, and the
utilization of scientific inventions and discoveries has always been
viewed as essential.
D. Foreign Policy and National Defense
Like the chapter on Soviet development and culture, the chap-




KoNsTrrUTSIA (Constitution ) art. 21 (USSR). See generally V. I. LENwn,
TiE STATE AND REVOLUTION clc. V (1932).
139 KoNsTISA (Constitution) art. 23 (USSR).
14o While pushing to eliminate the individual income tax on workers' earnings,
the Party Program does not seek to do away with the other forms of individual
taxation, such as the childlessness tax imposed on single adults and families with
less than the minimum number of children. See text accompanying notes 243-44
infra. The continued retention of the childlessness tax is defended by Dr. 0. N.
Gorbunova in her published individual commentary on the draft constitution. See
Discussion of the Draft Constitution II, supra note 9, at 27.
141 This CPSU Program policy was analyzed by Dr. 0. N. Gorbunova in her
commentary on the draft constitution. See id.
142 See DOCUMENTs OF THE 24TH CONGHESS OF THE CPSU: MAucH 30-ApmL 9,
1971, at 192 (1971).
143 KONSTUTrsiA (Constitution) art. 26 (USSR).
144 Id.
145 In addition to the general provisions of Chapter 4, other provisions dealing
with the regulation of foreign policy matters may be found in KoNsTrruTsua. (Con-
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visions of chapter 4, however, do not reflect any changes in Soviet
foreign-policy posture. Once again these provisions are more a
declaration that established policies rise to a constitutional level,
rather than a statement of new guiding principles. For example,
"the USSR steadfastly pursues a Leninist policy of peace"; 146 Soviet
foreign policy "is aimed at ensuring favorable international condi-
tions for the building of communism in the USSR, for protecting
the Soviet Union's state interests [and] for strengthening the posi-
tions of world socialism." 147 These policies are familiar to any
knowledgeable student of Soviet foreign policy. A third provision
-that "war propaganda is forbidden in the USSR" '148-was formerly
a provision of Soviet criminal law.1
49
Article 29 lists the following as the ten pillars of Soviet foreign
policy: sovereign equality of states; mutual renunciation of the use
of force or the threat of force; the inviolability of state borders;
respect for the integrity of state territory; peaceful settlement of
disputes; noninterference in the internal affairs of another state;
equality and the right of peoples to decide their own fate; peaceful
cooperation among states, regardless of differences in their social
and economic system; and pacta sunt servanda.50 The leading
Soviet writers take the position that although all states agree that
all of these principles are principles of general international law,
there is no universal agreement among states as to the specific con-
tent of each one of them. The Soviet Union is noted for its per-
sistent unwillingness to submit to international adjudication in any
form. When it signs international agreements it does so very se-
lectively, always with an eye to avoiding coming under the opera-
tion of any built-in procedure for settlement of disputes that would
stitution) arts. 80, 121, paras. 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, & 131, para. 6 (USSR).
For a general analysis of the provisions dealing with foreign policy matters, see
Mironov, Konstitutsionnye Printsipi Vneshnei Politiki SSSR (The Constitutional
Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy), 3 Soy. Gos. i PRAvo 13 (1978); Hazard,
Foreign Policy and the 1977 Soviet Constitution, 72 Am. J. hr'fL L. 350 (1978).
146]KoNsnTrsiu (Constitution) art. 28 (USSR).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Under article 71 of the RSFSR criminal code, for example, it is a crime to
engage in any form of war propaganda. RSFSR UcOL. Kon. (Criminal Code) art.
71 (1960).
15 0 KoNsTrruTsuA (Constitution) art. 29 (USSR). For a detailed analysis of
Soviet doctrinal interpretations of these general principles of the contemporary law
of nations, see G. TuNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (English language
trans. 1974); 2 Kuas MEZHDuNAoDNOGo PRAVA (Treatise on International Law)
5-329 (F. Kozhevnikov, D. Levin, N. Ushakov & U. Shurshalov eds. 1967).
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involve submission to third-party adjudication. 151 It therefore fol-
lows that for the purpose of the day-to-day conduct of Soviet foreign
policy, each of the principles enunciated in article 29 means what
the government of the Soviet Union says it means.
The next section of chapter 4 emphasizes the special relation-
ship of the USSR to other socialist countries. For the first time in
Soviet constitutional law, article 30 announces to the world that the
Soviet Union "is a component part of the world socialist system and
of the socialist commonwealth of nations." 152 The fact that Soviet
foreign relations with other members of the socialist commonwealth
of nations are governed by the principles of socialist international
law-which is what article 30 says in a roundabout way-is hardly
anything new. 153 Article 30 concludes with the provision that the
relationship between the Soviet Union and all the other socialist
countries is governed by the principle of socialist internationalism.15
Chapter 3 concludes with a statement that appears to be a
political concession to the Soviet military machine: article 32 ex-
presses the promise by the Soviet state to "outfit the USSR armed
forces with everything they need." 155 Here again, the Soviet gov-
ernment's commitment to maintaining the military preparedness of
its armed forces at any cost is hardly a new element in the overall
East-West military equation. 56
3
51 For general discussions of the official Soviet attitude toward international
agreements, as well as an analysis of the strategy of Soviet participation in inter-
national organizations, see C. OsAxwE, THE PATicIPATION OF MrE SOVIET UNION
IN UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF SOVIET STmRTEGIEs AND ASPIRATIoNS INSIDE ILO, UNESCO, AND WHO (1972);
A. Ru mNSTEIN, THE SovIETS IN INTEmATIONAL ORGAN=ATIONS-CHANING POLICY
TowARD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1953-1963 (1964); Osakwe, Soviet Pactomania
and Critical Negativism in Contemporary International Law-An Inquiry into the
Soviet Drive for a Comprehensive Codification of General International Law, 19
LAW EAsTEFN EuloPE 291 (1975).
152 KONsn rruTsu (Constitution) art. 30 (USSR).
153For a general discussion of the question whether or not there still exists a
concept of "socialist international law," see Butler, "Socialist International Law" or
"Socialist Principles of International Relationships"? 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 796 (1971);
Hazard, Renewed Emphasis Upon a Socialist International Law, 65 AJ. INT'L L.
142 (1971); Osakwe, Socialist International Law Revisited, Am. J. INT'. L. 596
(1972).
1
54 KoNsTITOruTsA (Constitution) art. 30 (USSR).
155 Id. art. 32.
156 Rather than commit itself to providing more and cheaper consumer goods to
its citizens, the Soviet Union has elected to channel all its efforts into outfitting the
USSR armed forces with everything they need. Based on national average take-
home pay in January 1976, a Soviet worker required 37.5 months of work time in
order to earn enough money to buy a compact car in Moscow. By contrast, his
American counterpart required 6.9 months of work time in order to earn enough
money to buy a compact car in Washington, D.C. Also in 1976, a Soviet worker
had to work 190 minutes to earn enough money to buy 10 gallons of regular gasoline;
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E. Equal Protection of Law
The 1977 constitution continues the tradition of the 1936 con-
stitution with respect to equal protection of law. 157 It provides,
inter alia, that all Soviet citizens are equal before the law regard-
less of their national origin, social or property status, race or na-
tionality, sex, education, language, religious beliefs, nature or type
of employment, place of residence, or any other personal charac-
teristic.15  On its face this provision means, among other things,
that in the eyes of Soviet law a Russian or Ukrainian citizen has the
same rights and obligations as does the Uzbek or Lithuanian. It
means that the worker (the industrial proletarian) will receive the
same treatment under law as the peasant or member of the intelli-
gentsia. Read literally, this provision also means that no citizen
may be discriminated against on account of his religious beliefs. 159'
It is particularly worth noting that this nondiscrimination
clause of the new constitution, like that of the past Soviet constitu-
tions, applies not only to state actions, but also to actions by indi-
vidual citizens and social (non-state) organizations. 160 Accordingly,
a U.S. worker required 91 minutes of work time. It is estimated that real income
in the Soviet Union now averages $208 a month per person. Russia's 60 Years of
Communism: Success or Failure?, U.S. NEws AND Wo=RL REPORT, October 24,
1977, at 42, 53, cited in Osakwe, Automobilization and Soviet Law: Reflections on
Certain Aspects of Soviet Automobile Law, 20 LAw EAsTERN EUROPE pt. 2, at 139,
180 n.109 (1978).
15 7 For a general discussion of equal protection of law in the Soviet constitu-
tional system, see Osakwe, Equal Protection of Law Under the Soviet Constitutional
System in CONS~rSUTIONAL PROTECTION OF EQUAIl 159 (T. Koopmans ed. 1975).
1 5 8 KONSTITUTSI1A (Constitution) art. 34 (USSR).
159 It is estimated that there are 150 national and ethnic groups in the USSR
today. See sources cited in note 274 infra. See generally Pipes, "Solving" the
Nationality Problem in MAN, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN THE SOVIET UNION 503 (1970);
IN QuEsT OF JUsTICE: PsoTmsT AND DIssENT N THE SOVIET UNION TODAY 183
(A. Brumberg ed. 1970).
In practice, Soviet treatment of ethnic and religious minorities is not without
blemish. The fact that persons of Russian origin dominate the key Party and state
offices is common knowledge. A Soviet Jew who is dismissed from his or her job
for expressing a desire to emigrate will hardly find consolation in the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of law to all citizens regardless of religious preference.
Western studies on the status of ethnic minorities and religious groups in the USSR
abound. The following works discuss the subject from a legal perspective: V.
CHAI&mzE, To DEFEND THrsE ERiTs: HuuANi RHTS ar SOVIET UNION
(1974); Boim, Human Rights in the USSR, 2 REV. SocIALIsT L. 173 (1976); Boim,
The Passport System in the USSR, with Special Reference to the Status of Jews, 2
REv. Soc AusT L. 15 (1976); Feldbrugge, Criminal Law and Traditional Society:
The Role of Soviet Law in the Integration of Non-Slavic Peoples, 3 REv. SOciAlisT
L. 3 (1977); Uibopuu, The International Legal Status of Soviet Minorities Today,
2 REv. SocIALISTL. 217 (1976).
16 0 For example, article 134 of the RSFSR criminal code makes it a crime to
violate substantially a woman's equal protection under the law by obstructing her
participation in state, social, or cultural activity. RSFSR UcOL. Ko. (Criminal
Code) art. 134 (1960). A violation of a woman's right to vote, run for elective
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no state agency, social organization, or private citizen may discrimi-
nate against any Soviet citizen on the basis of any of the above
criteria.
To understand fully the proper meaning of the equal-protection
provision of article 34, one must bear in mind several other relevant
principles of modern Soviet constitutional law. 16 1  First, because
equal treatment under law can be truly equal only if the individuals
so treated are in fact equal, article 34 does not prohibit any form
of governmentally designed policy of remedial or preferential treat-
ment in favor of an historically disadvantaged social, racial, or na-
tional minority group, as long as the purpose of the policy is to
offset an identifiable past discrimination against the group. Such
remedial treatment does not amount to "reverse discrimination"
against the historically preferred majority groups. It simply is an
attempt to equalize opportunities for all members of society by
tilting the scale of social justice in favor of the historically disad-
vantaged groups. Under this policy the Soviet government may,
for example, design an affirmative action program to enable citi-
zens of the Soviet central asiatic republics or the children of peasants
to be admitted to prestigious Soviet universities.1 2
office, receive free education and housing, or to work would be covered under this
provision. On its face, it is not clear whether article 134 requires "state action" as
a prerequisite for the crime contained therein. Soviet commentators, however, have
interpreted this article to apply to the actions of any person. See KOMMENTAII XK
UCo.LovNomy KODESKY RSFSR (A Commentary on the RSFSR Criminal Code)
298-99 (G. Anashkin, I. Karpets & B. Nikiforov eds. 1971).
161 What follows is a distillation of the prevailing viewpoints in modem Soviet
constitutional doctrine. General discussions of each of the principles enumerated in
this section of the study may be found in SOVIET CONSTrrUTiONAL LAw, supra note 5;
A. DENisov & M. KRucHmNKo, SovETsxoE CGOSUDABSTVENNOE PRAvo (Soviet State
Law) (1957); B. ScHcBETENN AND A. GoasBENxv, Kuss SOVETSKOGO GOSUDAaST-
VENNOGO PEAVA (Treatise of Soviet State Law) (1971); GOSUDASTVENNOE PRAvo
SSSR (State Law of USSR) (S. Kravchuk ed. 1967).
162 As a student at the Moscow State University Law School, I observed that
women were noticeably underrepresented in the student body. The same situation
obtained at other leading Soviet law schools. By contrast, I also observed that in
Soviet medical schools men were noticeably underrepresented. Such underrepre-
sentation of one sex is neither the result of a governmental policy to limit the ad-
mission of women into law schools or of men into medical schools, nor is it the result
of a discriminatory admissions policy on the part of the respective professional
schools. Rather, it is the result of the cultural upbringing of Soviet youth. The
enduring myth among the Soviet people is that women generally lack the "killer
instinct" to become good lawyers and that men generally lack a sufficient degree of
humaneness to become good medical doctors. If and when the Soviet government
decides that affirmative action would be required in order to remedy the de facto
imbalance in the representation of the sexes in the law and medical schools, even
though such imbalance was not the result of any exclusionary governmental policy,
I foresee no constitutional impediment to such an action. In other words, the Soviet
government may order remedial affirmative action whenever it establishes that a
social inequity exists, regardless of the causes of such injustice. A finding of past
discrimination by the schools would not be a prerequisite for ordering such affirma-
tive action.
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Second, the Soviet constitution does not prohibit certain exclu-
sive gender-based rights as long as those rights are associated with
biological or anatomical considerations and do not result in in-
vidious discrimination against members of the other sex. For ex-
ample, it is not a violation of the equal-protection provision of
article 34 for the state to grant maternity leave with pay to ex-
pectant or nursing mothers. Maternity privileges are seen as pe-
culiarly gender-based and as such do not discriminate against men.
By the same reasoning, it is not viewed as violative of the spirit of
article 34 for the state to lower the age of retirement for women
or to impose military duty solely on male citizens of the USSR. In
these three cases, the legislative choice of unequal treatment of the
sexes may not successfully be challenged under the equal protection
clause of the USSR Constitution. 63
Third, the equal-protection provision of article 34 elevates to
the constitutional level protection of illegitimate children and
unwed mothers against discrimination. It does not preclude pref-
erential treatment of such people under certain circumstances, how-
ever.,- Soviet law operates on the unarticulated assumption that
all children, including illegitimates, are children of the state and
that the state is the supreme father of all of its children. Since the
single mother has no lawful husband to help her bring up her child
the state comes to her rescue through a package legislation designed
to secure her equal treatment under law.
Fourth, the equal-protection clause of article 34 applies pri-
marily to Soviet citizens. Under article 37, aliens 10 5 and stateless
163 The principle discussed here refers only to exclusively gender-based benign
discrimination where the privilege so conferred is rationally related to the biological
peculiarities of the sex favored. It is doubtful, however, that a governmental de-
cision to exclude men from the medical professions would be justifiable under this
principle. On the other hand, a governmental decision to exclude women from
working in underground mines or from working in any job in which the working
conditions would be detrimental to their health would be justifiable. Such an
exemption is specifically granted to women under the RSFSR labor code. See
RSFSR KOD. ZAX. o TAuDE (Labor Code) art. 160 (1971).
164For example, if iwo children are applying for only one available slot in a
day care center, kindergarten, or youth camp, and if one of the applicants is the
child of a single mother, Soviet policy requires giving the available slot to the single
mother's child. The rationale for this action is that the other child comes from a
home in which there are at least two parents to take care of him or her, whereas
the second child, through no fault of his or her own, is deprived of such home care.
It is the Soviet policy in this case to come to the aid of the disadvantaged child.
165 See Zakon SSSR "0 Grazhdanstve SSSR" (Law of the USSR "On the
Citizenship of the USSR") arts. 3, 9 (1978) (effective July 1, 1979), published in
full in Pravda, December 2, 1978, at 1, col. 1. The law classifies all persons resident
in the USSR into three groups: citizens of the USSR (persons who are citizens as
of July 1, 1979 and those who acquire Soviet citizenship pursuant to the provisions
of the new law); citizens of foreign states (aliens); and stateless persons (persons
who reside in the USSR and have no proof of citizenship of any nation). The new
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persons who are residents of the USSR are also entitled to equal
protection of the law, but only to the extent that statutes do not
place specific limitations on their rights. Among the rights that
aliens and stateless persons enjoy in the USSR are the right to sue
and be sued in Soviet courts, and the right to assert and defend their
rights under Soviet law in any agency of the Soviet state.' 6 Among
the rights they do not have are the right to vote or be voted
for, the right freely to enter or leave the territory of the USSR, and
guaranteed freedom of movement within the territory of the
USSR.167 Invariably, the scope of the rights and privileges en-
joyed by aliens in the USSR is governed by the principle of re-
ciprocity, 68 but under article 38 the right of asylum is granted to
aliens who are "persecuted for defending the interests of the work-
ing people and the cause of peace, for participating in a revolu-
tionary or national-liberation movement, or for their progressive
sociopolitical, scientific, or other creative activity." 169
Regardless of the scope of the rights they enjoy, all aliens and
stateless persons who are residents of the USSR are obligated to
respect and observe all Soviet laws in force. This means that in
those instances in which Soviet law imposes on the alien a general
duty not imposed on him by the laws of his home country, he is
obligated to respect and observe the Soviet law in question.170 Fur-
thermore, incompatibility of the demands of Soviet law with those
of the national law of an alien's home country is not an acceptable
defense in an action against the alien for his failure to observe
Soviet law.' 71 Therefore, any alien who willfully takes up tempo-
law does not deal specifically with the issue of the legal status of foreigners and
stateless persons. Their status may be inferred from, inter alia, articles 37 and 38
of the 1977 constitution. KONSTTTSA (Constitution) arts. 37, 38 (USSR).
166 See, e.g., RSFSR GRAzH. KOD. (Civil Code) arts. 562, 563 (1964).
16 7 See Polozhenie o Vyborakh v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR (Statute on Elections
to the USSR Supreme Soviet) arts. 2, 3 (1950). Regarding travel restrictions, see,
e.g., RSFSR UGOL. KoD. (Criminal Code) art. 197-1 (1960).
168 See, e.g., RSFSR GnAzH. KoD. (Civil Code) art. 562, para. 2 (1964).
169 KoNsTrTTsn (Constitution) art. 38 (USSR).
170 Among the general obligations imposed on aliens as well as citizens by Soviet
criminal law are the duties to rescue persons in danger, RSFSR UGOL. KoD. (Crimi-
nal Code) art. 127 (1960), to render aid to sick persons, id. art. 128, and to report
knowledge of the commission of certain crimes by other persons, id. arts. 88-91, 190.
17' See, e.g., RSFSR UcoL. KOD. (Criminal Code) art. 4 (1960). Under this
article, all persons who commit crimes on the territory of the RSFSR are subject to
criminal liability in accordance with RSFSR law. This is known as the principle of
territoriality in Soviet criminal law. An act that is criminal under Soviet law, and
is committed on Soviet territory, is a crime even if it would not be a crime under
the laws of the foreigner's home state. For a general commentary on article 4 of
the RSFSR Criminal Code, see Osakwe, Contemporary Soviet Criminal Law: An
Analysis of the General Principles and Major Institutions of Post-1958 Soviet Criminal
Law, 6 GA. J. oF IN'Lr AND Comi'. L. 437, 445 (1976).
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rary or permanent residence in the USSR waives all his rights under
his own national law, to the extent that the latter is incompatible
with Soviet law. The waiver, however, is subject to those general
principles of international conventions and customs recognized by
the USSR as binding upon it. In other words, the legal personality
of an alien in the USSR is determined, not by the national laws of
the alien in question, but by Soviet law, as well as by the norms of
any applicable international convention or international custom
which is recognized as binding by the USSR. An alien, just like
a Soviet citizen, 172 cannot predicate his rights upon an unassimilated
principle of natural law or upon the so-called general principles of
the law of "civilized nations," unless these principles have been rec-
ognized by the Soviet Union as binding upon it.
F. The Bill of Rights and Duties
The section of the 1977 constitution dealing with the bill of
rights is considerably more extensive than the corresponding sec-
tions of the earlier Soviet constitutions; Chapter 7 contains thirty
separate provisions."1 3 This does not mean that the Soviet citizen
possesses new substantive rights or that he has been saddled with
new obligations. Rather, those rights which in the past had been
treated merely as statutory rights have now been elevated to the
constitutional level. It is true, however, that some of the old con-
stitutional rights have now been broadened.
Some of the individual liberties listed under the bill of rights
are referred to as "rights," while others are categorized as "free-
doms,"-suggesting that there might be a substantive difference be-
tween the so-called "rights" and "freedoms." Professor Voevodin of
Moscow State University Law School, a leading Soviet constitutional
scholar, dispels the notion of any intended difference between
the two groups of enumerated liberties with the following explana-
tion:
By individual rights or freedoms, in a strictly legal sense,
one means the legally recognized opportunity of an indi-
172 For a general discussion of the nature and scope of the constitutional rights
of Soviet citizens, see text accompanying notes 173-268 infra.
173 During a joint session of the Section of State and Law of the Academy of
Social Science of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Section of State
Constitution and Law of the High Party School attached to the Central Committee
of the CPSU, devoted to a discussion of the draft constitution of 1977, academician
D. A. Kerimov suggested that the expansion of the provisions on individual rights
and civil liberties in the new constitution was motivated in part by the determination
of the Soviet government to rebut the baseless western charges that human rights of
individual citizens are being violated in the Soviet Union. See Discussion of the
Draft Constitution I, supra note 9, at 5-6 (1977).
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vidual to choose the form or mode of his conduct, to utilize
those blessings afforded him by law both in his self-interest
as well as in the interest of society at large.... Such legally
recognized opportunities sometimes are traditionally re-
ferred to as "rights," whereas at other times they are referred
to as "freedoms." Between these two concepts, it is diffi-
cult to draw any meaningful distinction, because the same
opportunity may be interchangeably characterized both as
right and as freedom.... In other words, there are two
forms which express the legally recognized opportunity of
an individual to choose his mode of conduct. When such
an opportunity is linked with the exercise of a specific
social blessing the law traditionally speaks of a "right,"
whereas when the reference is to a degree of choice of mode
of conduct the law speaks of "freedom." Compare, for ex-
ample, the right of education, the right of medical care,
with the freedom of conscience and the freedom of cre-
ativity.17 4
In discussing the rights and duties of Soviet citizens under Chap-
ter 7, as in the case of the equal-protection provision of article 34,
it is imperative to bear in mind the related fundamental principles
of Soviet constitutional law.175 First, Soviet law is essentially posi-
tive law, but it does not recognize natural law as a source of law.
This means that the Soviet constitution does not recognize the
concept of inalienable rights of man. Accordingly, all of the rights
that Soviet citizens have are those that are granted to them either
in the constitution or in other organic statutes that are not incom-
patible with the constitution. A right not specifically granted to a
citizen may not be deemed to be an inherent right.
1
74 Voevodin, Rozhdennye Velikim Oktiabrem i Garantirovannye Sotsializmom
Prava i Svobody Sovetskogo Cheloveka (The Rights and Liberties of the Soviet
Citizen as Created by the Great October Socialist Revolution and Guaranteed by
Socialism), 9 Soy. Gos. i PRAvo 131, 132 (1977). As an illustration, Professor
Voevodin gives the following example. Article 40 of the draft constitution speaks of
the right to choose one's profession and occupation, but the opportunity embodied
in this right may very well be referred to as the freedom to choose one's profession
and occupation. Conversely, the freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic creation
which is proclaimed in article 47 of the draft constitution may be categorized as the
right of scientific, technical, and artistic creation. Id.
175 What follows in the text is a distillation of the prevailing viewpoints in
modem Soviet constitutional doctrine. A general discussion of each of the principles
enumerated in this section of the study may be found in the Soviet constitutional-law
treatises cited in note 160 supra. See also G. ANAsmi, PliAvA i OB'rAzAu'NosnZ
GBAzHDANiNA SSSR (The Rights and Duties of a Soviet Citizen) (1977); V.
PATIa'wu , GosunwT svo I LscnNosT' v SSSR (The State and the Individual in the
USSR) (1974); L. VoEvoDn, KoNsTrrurrmN'nE PRAVA i OB'1AZNNAsn SoVETs-
xKnc GRASZEDAN (The Constitutional Rights and Duties of Soviet Citizens) (1972).
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Second, Marxist-Leninist theory regards individual rights and
freedoms as historical categories with social content and meaning
determined by the social, economic, and political structure of a
given society in which the rights in question exist and function.
Individual rights and freedoms are not abstract categories; therefore,
they may not be deemed to have universally applicable meanings or
contents. A leading Soviet authority on Soviet constitutional law
articulates this underlying principle in the following passage:
On the basis of historical generalizations Marxism-Leninism
demonstrates that the essence of individual rights and free-
doms is rooted in the nature of the Society in which such
rights originated and exist, in the character of the social
relationships that exist in our society. Accordingly, rights
and freedoms cannot be anything but the product of the
concrete development within a given historical type of
society.... to the extent that socialist and capitalist coun-
tries are radically different, the one from the other, by
virtue of their social and state structure, it follows that the
social contents of the rights and freedoms of citizens within
these societies cannot be the same.1
T6
Third, it is the position of Soviet law that rights and duties con-
stitute two sides of the same coin. In the language of article 59 of
the 1977 constitution, "the exercise of rights and liberties [under
the constitution and laws of the USSR] is inseparable from the
performance by citizens of their duties." 177 Prior to the adoption of
the 1977 constitution, a Pravda editorial articulated this general
principle in the following passage:
The rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens are inseperable
from their obligations, from those duties which they owe
to society at large. Each Soviet citizen, on the one hand
exercises the gifts of our democratic society on equal terms
with all the other members of the society, but also, on the
other hand, bears certain responsibilities on equal terms
with all the others, both in his own self interest as well as
in the interest of society. This is a fundamental law of
life. Each time a citizen behaves irresponsibly with regard
to his civil obligations he at the same time violates the
democratic principles of the socialist way of life.
178
176 L. VoEvoDn, supra note 174, at 132-33.
177 KONSTrIOTSiI (Constitution) art. 59, para. 1 (USSR).
17sEditorial, Demokratiia i Ditsiplina (Democracy and Discipline) Pravda,
May 19, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
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In what amounts to a stern warning to those individual Soviet
civil libertarians who are willing to assert rights under the Soviet
constitution while at the same time neglecting their constitutional
duties, Leonid Brezhnev stated
It is essential that each individual should realize that the
real guarantee of individual rights, in the final analysis,
is provided by the strength and prosperity of the father-
land. In order to lend support to this proposition each
citizen must feel a sense of responsibility before society at
large and must conscientiously carry out his duties before
the state and before society.179
This boils down to the proposition that for every right there is a
concomitant duty. It is presumed that any citizen who accepts a
right granted under the law enters into a social compact with the
Soviet state to fulfil the reasonable obligations that go with the right
he seeks to exercise. If the citizen fails to live up to his side of the
compact, the state may subject him to one or a combination of the
following legal sanctions: it may prevent him from any prospective
exercise of the right in question; it may demand full reparation
for the rights already enjoyed by such citizen, if it is felt not to do so
would be tantamount to an unjust enrichment of the citizen at the
expense of society; 180 it may subject the citizen to criminal punish-
ment if the breach of the social compact violates any rule of Soviet
criminal law; and finally, the state may subject the individual to
the appropriate administrative sanctions for his wrongful breach of
his contractual obligations to the state.
Fourth, Soviet law adopts the Marxist-Leninist position that
constitutional rights can be fully realized only if there are exercised
responsibly. As applied, this principle means that every Soviet
citizen has a constitutional duty to reconcile and subordinate his
individual rights to the overriding interests of society at large. The
Central Committee of the CPSU crystallized this principle in a
recent policy statement: "socialist democracy presupposes the unity
of rights and duties, of genuine freedom and civil responsibility,
179 L. Brezhnev, Report to the May (1977) Plenum of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, cited in Kudriavtsev, Konstitutsiia Obshchenarodnogo Gosudarstva
(The Constitution of the State of All the People); 11 Soy. Gos. i PRAvo 16, 17-19
(1977).
180 One example of the implementation of this rule was the passage in 1972 of
a law that required all Soviet citizens who wished to emigrate from the USSR to
repay the state a prorated portion of the amount incurred by the state in educating
them. See Ukaz (Decree) of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, On
Reparation by USSR Citizens Who Are Taking Up Permanent Residency Abroad for
State Expenses on Their Education, 52 VED. VMIEH. Soy. SSSR item 519 (1972).
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[and a] harmonious reconciliation of the interests of the society and
of the collective with those of the individual." 11 In a contempo-
raneous construction of this basic doctrine of Soviet constitutional
law, Professor Voevodin stated:
Whatever their form, freedom and responsibility constitute
an integral and indivisible unity. But freedom and re-
sponsibility necessarily co-exist in each individual freedom,
as well as in each individual responsibility . . . . Thus,
for example, it would be erroneous to interpret the free-
dom of speech and of the press in article 50 as an unre-
stricted freedom to exercise such a sharp weapon. The
opportunity to express one's opinion presupposes not only
freedom but also the responsibility of each individual who
elects to exercise such right. By the same token, the Draft
Constitution prohibits the prosecution of an individual
who exercises his right of criticism where such right is
exercised in the interest of the workers and with the aim of
strengthening the socialist system .... By the same token
the freedom (right) to choose one's profession or occupa-
tion (as contained in article 40 of the Draft Constitution)
must be exercised with due regard for the superior de-
mands of society at large.'8 2
Fifth, because the Soviet government is presumed to know
what is best for its citizens,:18 it grants to the citizens only a limited
right to pick and choose among the available constitutional and
statutory rights. Thus, whereas citizens are free to exercise certain
constitutional rights, they are not free to reject certain other rights
which the state deems essential to their individual well-being, as
well as the well-being of the society at large. As a reflection of this
philosophy, article 20 provides that "[t]he free development of each
181 Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, On the Occasion of the
60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, cited in Editorial, 11
Soy. Gos. i Pu~vo 3, 8 (1977).
182 L. VoEvoDiN, supra note 174, at 138. For useful discussions of the relation-
ship between rights and responsibilities in Soviet law, see sources cited in id. 141.
183 If one accepts the general premises of the Soviet legal system-that the
CPSU is the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its
political system, that the Soviet government acts merely as the agent of the Party,
that acts of the Soviet government are generally cleared with the Party before they
are promulgated, and that the Party is the self-appointed sole administrator of the
affairs of the entire Soviet society-it logically follows that the Soviet government is
presumed to know what best serves the interests of the Soviet people at large. Acts
of the Soviet legislature in furtherance of the interests of the people are presump-
tively correct unless they are rescinded by the Party. For a general discussion of
the role of the CPSU in the Soviet system, see notes 112-14 supra.
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is the condition for the free development of all." 184 This means
that the rights under the new constitution are divided into two
major categories-the peremptory rights and the dispositive rights.
Citizens are free to elect to exercise their dispositive 185 rights, but
they are not free to refuse to exercise peremptory rights.8 6
Sixth, the rights granted to Soviet citizens under the state con-
stitution, like all rights under Soviet statutory law, are not absolute;
they are conditional rights. The first general condition under
which these rights are granted is that they are intended to promote
the individual self-improvement of the recipient. As such, they
may not be used to promote any other goals not contemplated by
law. The second condition is that if there is an irreconcilable con-
flict between a contemplated exercise of an individual citizen's
rights and the interests of society at large, the citizen's rights must
yield. According to article 39, paragraph 2, "[t]he exercise of rights
and liberties of citizens must not injure the interests of society and
the state or the rights of other citizens." 's7
Seventh, the right of the Soviet state to grant, modify, or elim-
inate a particular right, either from the bill of rights or as applied
to a specific citizen, is absolute. This sovereign right of the Soviet
lawmaker flows from the fact that Soviet law does not recognize
any human right as inalienable. For example, a Soviet citizen has
no inalienable right to Soviet citizenship, since under article 33 of
the 1977 constitution, "[t]he grounds and procedure for acquiring
or losing Soviet citizenship are defined by the Law on USSR Citizen-
ship." 188 Under the principles of Soviet positive law,' 89 nothing
184 This famous line in article 20 of the 1977 constitution is lifted directly from
the Communist Manifesto of 1848. K. MAnx & F. ENreLs, Tbm COMMUNIST MANI-
FESTO 105 (S. Moore trans. 1967).
185 The great majority of the rights granted by the constitution are of a dis-
positive nature. See the general discussion of the rights of citizens at text accom-
panying notes 253-68 infra.
186 Examples of peremptory rights under the 1977 constitution are the right to
work, KoNsrruTsrA (Constitution) art. 40 (USSR), which later becomes a duty to
work, id. art. 60, and the right to education, id. art. 46, which is enforceable against
all Soviet citizens who, under the compulsory primary and secondary education law,
must exercise their right of free education at least up to and including the secondary
level, id. art. 45, para. 2.
187 Id. art. 39, para. 2 (USSR).
188 Id. art. 33, para. 2.
189 For a general discussion of the legal aspects of Soviet citizenship, see V.
SnmvTsov, SOvETSKOE GP nzHANsTvo (Soviet Citizenship) (1965); Ginsburgs,
Citizenship, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAw 108-11 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973);
Shevtsov, Grazhdanstvo (Citizenship), in EN'rrsTxoPmDicEmszn SLovaa" PnAvovYvc
ZNA1---SovETSKOE PP~vo (Encyclopedia of Soviet Law) 90-91 (S. Bratus, N.
Zhogin, P. Kovanov, V. L Terebilov, N. Tumanova, & V. Chkhikvadze eds. 1965).
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could prevent the appropriate agency of the Soviet state from strip-
ping a particular Soviet person of his citizenship as a measure of
political sanction.190 The Soviet lawmaker, acting under the guid-
ance of the CPSU, determines not only the rights that Soviet
citizens may enjoy, and the scope of these rights, but also who may
enjoy them and under what conditions the rights may be exercised
by their recipients.
Finally, within the hierarchy of constitutional rights, social and
economic rights take precedence over civil and political rights. The
Soviet constitutional system operates on the assumption that the
possession of social and economic rights is a prerequisite to any
meaningful exercise of civil and political rights. This notion mani-
fests itself in the fact that in practice the Soviet citizen actually
enjoys more social and economic rights than his American counter-
part, while the civil and political rights of a Soviet citizen are very
limited in comparison to those of his American counterpart. 91
For the purpose of orderly discussion of the specific provisions
of the Soviet bill of rights and duties, the following analysis divides
the provisions of chapter 7 into three major groups: social, economic,
and cultural rights; civil and political rights; and duties of citizens. :92
1. Social, Economic and Cultural Rights of Citizens
Under article 40 of the 1977 constitution all Soviet citizens
have a right to work.19 3 This is interpreted to mean the right to
190 The 1978 law "On The Citizenship of the USSR" provides that a Soviet
citizen may be deprived of his citizenship in extreme situations by decision of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet if such citizen engages in activities that are
derogatory to the esteemed honor of a Soviet citizen and either defame the prestige
of the USSR or damage the state security of the USSR. Zakon SSSR "0 Grazh-
danstve SSSR" (Law of the USSR "On the Citizenship of the USSR") art. 18
(1978). In recent years the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has invoked
this awesome power against Alexander Sozhenitsyn, Svetlana Alelueva (Joseph
Stalin's daughter), and a host of other Soviet dissidents. Upon stripping such
persons of their Soviet citizenship, the Soviet government usually repossesses their
Soviet passports, expels them from the USSR, and thereby places them in perpetual
exile from their native country.
191 See Berman, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, 11 HMAv. C.R.-C.L. L.J.
333, 334 (1965).
192 For a general discussion of the nature and scope of human rights granted
under Soviet law, see Berman, supra note 191; Towe, Fundamental Rights in the
Soviet Union, 115 U. PA. L. Buv. 1251 (1967). For a general discussion of the
nature and scope of the human rights enjoyed by aliens in the USSR, see Sherman,
The Civil and Political Rights of Aliens in the U.S.S.R.: A Survey of Soviet Legisla-
tion, 11 TFx. INT'L L.J. 571 (1976); Shevtsov, The Legal Status of Foreigners in the
U.S.S.R., 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 273 (1975). See also M. BorusIAvsmz &
A. RU3ANOV, PRAVOVOR POLOZHENM INosTaANTsEv v SSSR (The Legal Status of
Foreigners in the USSR) (2d ed. 1962); M. OzMr, lacmrosrn i PP(vo (The
Individual and the Law) (1975).
193 KONSvrrUTSM (Constitution) art. 40, para. 1 (USSR).
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receive guaranteed work and to be remunerated in accordance
with its quality and quantity, but not below the minimum wage
set by law. 9" In what amounts to a constitutional codification of a
principle of Soviet labor law, article 40 also provides that citizens
have a right to choose their occupations and type of employment
in accordance with their primary vocation, capabilities, vocational
training, and education. 195 Realizing that a decision by a great
majority of Soviet citizens to exercise this right could lead to a dis-
ruption of the state's plans for the equitable distribution of man-
power, article 40 immediately balances the citizen's choice with a
provision stating that the exercise of the above right is "subject to
[overriding] consideration for the needs of society." 196 The citizen's
right to work, of course, creates a duty for the state to provide work
for needy citizens. Article 40, paragraph 2, stipulates the ways in
which the Soviet state hopes to meet this obligation.197
The right to rest is secured for all citizens under article 41.198
This is guaranteed, inter alia, through "the provision of annual
paid vacations and weekly days off; the expansion of the network
of cultural-enlightenment and health-improvement institutions; the
large-scale development of sports, physical culture and tourism; the
creation of favorable opportunities for rest at one's place of resi-
dence and other conditions conducive to the rational use of free
time." 199 It goes without saying that the right to leisure may be
enjoyed only by those who exercise their right to work. Put
straightforwardly, article 41 contemplates that he who does not





197 Work is to be provided "by the socialist economic system, the steady growth
of productive forces [of society], free vocational instruction, the improvement of
labor skills and training in new specialties, and the development of the systems of
vocational and job placement." Id. art. 40, para. 2 (emphasis omitted).
98Id. art. 41, para. 1. The right to paid vacation is generally referred to in
Soviet law as the right to rest.
199 Id.
200 The Soviet constitution does not specifically provide that he who does not
work, neither shall he rest. Such a conclusion may reasonably be inferred, however,
from the general provisions of article 41, paragraph 1 (granting the right to rest
and leisure); article 41, paragraph 2 (listing forms of rest that obviously are avail-
able only to those who are working); article 41, paragraph 3 (establishing the
framework for collective-farm members' rest); article 40, paragraph 1 (granting the
right to work); and article 60 (imposing a general duty to work). It is interesting
to note that the phrase, "He who does not work, neither shall he eat," which was
contained in article 12 of the 1936 constitution, does not appear in the successor
article 60 of the 1977 constitution. The general notion persists under the new con-
stitution, however, that he who does not work, neither shall he eat.
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Under modem Soviet labor law,201 a worker may neither forego
his annual vacation nor demand monetary payment in lieu of his
vacation. The state's interest in each worker's rest and replenish-
ment of his working abilities supersedes the individual worker's
right to waive his annual vacation or to exchange it for money.
Also, Soviet labor law 202 severely limits overtime by making it ex-
tremely difficult for the worker to forego his weekend rest in ex-
change for overtime pay.
Article 42 secures for all Soviet citizens the peremptory right
to health care through the provision of free medical assistance by
state public-health institutions.2 0 3 Under the Soviet system of so-
cialized medicine all persons who need medical or psychiatric care
receive it free of charge.2 04 Because the state has a compelling in-
terest in the physical and mental health of its citizens, it is doubtful
if under Soviet law a citizen has a constitutional right to refuse
treatment for a diagnosed illness. It makes no difference whether
the person who has been diagnosed to be mentally ill is also deemed
to be dangerous either to himself or to society. The mere fact that
he is mentally ill is sufficient basis for his commitment to be
treated.
205
The article 42 right is complemented by the right to material
security, which entitles all citizens to "material security in old age,
in case of illness, and in the event of complete or partial disability
or loss of breadwinner." 200 The present Soviet social-security sys-
tem 20 7 covers virtually all Soviet citizens-workers, salaried em-
ployees, peasants, and members of their families.
201 Under articles 66 and 67 of the labor code of the RSFSR, each worker is
entitled to an annual vacation of not less than fifteen days at half pay. RSFSR KoD.
ZAK. o TRuDE (Labor Code) arts. 66, 67 (1971).
202 Under article 54 of the labor code of the RSFSR, it is unlawful for managers
to require overtime work. The exceptional situations in which overtime work may
be permitted are listed in article 55 of the labor code, subject to the further limitation
in article 56. Id. arts. 54-56 (1971).
203 KoNsTrrTsIIu (Constitution) art. 42 (USSR).
204 Id.
205 The criminal code of the RSFSR provides for commitment of insane persons
who commit crimes. RSFSR UGOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) arts. 58, 59 (1960).
The procedure for criminal commitment is spelled out in the code of criminal pro-
cedure. RSFSR KoD. UGoL. PRo. (Code of Criminal Procedure) arts. 403-413
(1960). The procedure for civil commitment of the mentally ill is stated in the
code of civil procedure. RSFSR KoD. GRAZU. PRo. (Code of Civil Procedure) arts.
258-263 (1964).
200 KoNsTrruTsuI& (Constitution) art. 43, para. 1 (USSR).
207 The statutory framework for the Soviet social security system Is contained in
arts. 236-243 of the RSFSR labor code, as well as in the corresponding provisions of
the labor codes of the other fourteen union republics of the USSR. See RSFSR
KoD. ZAK. o Tnuim (Labor Code) arts. 236-243 (1971).
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The right of citizens to guaranteed housing, formerly solely a
principle of Soviet administrative law, also has been elevated to the
level of a principle of constitutional law. Article 44 provides that
all USSR citizens have the right to housing.208 This right is se-
cured through construction of low-rent local council housing, en-
couragement of the construction of dwelling houses not only by
cooperative and other social organizations, but also by individual
citizens, and allocation of housing to citizens in local council houses
according to the principle of "fair allocation." 209 Article 44 also
provides that citizens must take good care of the housing provided
them.
A peremptory right of Soviet citizens to education is recognized
under article 45 of the 1977 constitution.2 10 On the one hand, it
provides that all USSR citizens have a right to education; on the
other hand, it makes primary and secondary education compulsory.
Education at all levels-from kindergarten through the university
-is free. Students at these institutions are issued free textbooks. 21
Moreover, students at post-secondary schools are paid monthly sub-
sistence allowance by the state.
212
The right of Soviet citizens to free education, however, does
not imply a right to be admitted to any particular educational insti-
tution of their choice. For example, an applicant for admission
to the Moscow State University School of Law who fails to pass the
required entrance examination and consequently is rejected by the
school may not claim that he has been discriminated against. The
right to free education merely means that anyone who meets all
the constitutionally valid admissions requirements and passes the
entrance examination may not be denied admission. It does not
mean, however, that a student admitted to the institution cannot
later be dropped for failure to meet academic requirements.
For the first time in Soviet history the new constitution grants
to Soviet citizens a user's right to all Soviet cultural achievements.
213
This right, according to article 46, is guaranteed by granting to
Soviet citizens general, although not necessarily free, access to the
rich art collections in all state museums, art galleries, and exhibits;
by using the radio, television, and newspaper networks as means of
208 KONSTJTUs (Constitution) art. 44 (USSR).
209 Id.
210 Id. art. 45.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. art. 46.
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cultural education; by holding the price of books and periodicals at
a level that can be comfortably afforded by all; by operation of a
network of libraries; and, finally, by promotion of cultural ex-
changes with foreign countries. All of this is consistent with the
Leninist idea that art and culture belong to the people.
214
In another new provision, article 47 grants to all citizens the
"freedom of scientific, technical and artistic creation." 215 This
right, however, is not absolute. The Soviet political system operates
on the philosophical premise that science, technology, and art must
serve the needs and interests of the people and promote the political
goals of the society. An artistic creation that does not project so-
cialist realism is not within the coverage of article 47. By the same
reasoning, research into dehumanizing technology or any nonsocialist
uses of science would not come under its protective umbrella.216
The state reserves the right to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether a particular trend in scientific and technological research
or any form of artistic expression is compatible with the spirit of
article 47.27
2. Civil and Political Rights of Citizens
The first of the numerous civil and political rights that the new
constitution grants to Soviet citizens is the right to participate in the
administration of the affairs of state.218 This right may be exercised
in one of many ways: participation in the discussion and adoption
of new laws and decisions of nationwide and local importance; vot-
ing in all elections and seeking to hold elective office at all levels
of government; participation in the system of people's control which
214 For useful discussions of the ideological linkage between art and socialism
and between culture and the masses, see Program of the CPSU 117-19, 22d Congress
of the CPSU, Oct. 31, 1961 (Foreign Language Publishing House edition, Moscow
1961).
2
15 KoNSTrruTsI& (Constitution) art. 47 (USSR).
216 The Program of the CPSU proclaims the attitude of the Party toward science
and scientific research in the following passage:
Under the socialist system of economy, scientific and technical progress
enables man to employ the riches and forces of nature most effectively in
the interests of the People. . . . Application of science in production
becomes a decisive factor of rapid growth of the productive forces of
society. Scientific progress and the introduction of scientific achievements
into the economy will remain an object of special concern to the Party.
Program of the CPSU 113-14, 22d Congress of the CPSU, Oct. 13, 1961 (Foreign
Language Publishing House edition, Moscow 1961). The practical implication of
this policy is that scientific investigations in the USSR must further one goal: the
construction of socialism.
217 Id.
218 KoNsrrum (Constitution) art. 48 (USSR).
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is designed to oversee the activities of all state agencies and public
organizations; and membership in social organizations that exercise
oversight powers over the activities of state agencies.219 This right
is not new to the Soviet legal system; it previously had been secured
under statutory law.
22 0
Article 49 grants to Soviet citizens the right to criticize con-
structively the actions of state and public organizations, as well as
the public actions of officials of these agencies.221 Any agency or
official publicly criticized is obligated by law "to examine proposals
and statements by citizens, to reply to them, and to take necessary
steps." 222 In an effort to encourage citizens to exercise this right,
article 49, paragraph 3, stipulates that no one shall be persecuted
for his constructive criticism of state and social organizations and
their officials. 223 It should be particularly borne in mind here that
the protection afforded by article 49 extends only to constructive
criticism. The protection, as can be expected, does not extend to
irresponsible, malicious, vindictive, or divisive criticism of the
actions of these agencies or officials. It is expected that the relevant
provisions of Soviet criminal law and the law of torts will provide
adequate sanctions against any such unprivileged criticism.2
Some of the broadest civil and political freedoms ever granted
in the USSR are contained in article 50. It grants to all Soviet citi-
zens freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly,
and freedom to hold mass meetings and public demonstrations.
2
2
Paragraph 2 of article 50 states that "the exercise of these political
freedoms is ensured by placing public buildings, streets, and squares
at the disposal of the working people and their organizations, by
219 Id.
220 The right of Soviet trade-union organizations to participate in the admin-
istration of the enterprise, factory, or institution is secured under articles 225 through
235 of the RSFSR labor code, as well as in the corresponding provisions of the labor
codes of the other fourteen union republics. See RSFSR KoD. ZAK. o TR D E (Labor
Code) arts. 225-235 (1971).
2 2 1 KONsTrrUTsrnA (Constitution) art. 49 (USSR).
222 Id. art. 49, para. 2.
223 Id. art. 49, para. 3.
224 For example, the RSFSR criminal code, RSFSR UGOL. KoD. (Criminal Code)
(1960), criminalizes anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, id. art. 70; defamation,
id. art. 130; insult, id. art. 131; circulation of fabrications known to be false which
defame the Soviet state and social system, id. arts. 190-191; insulting a representative
of authority or representative of the public fulfilling duties for the protection of
public order, id. art. 192; and insulting a policeman or a peopWs guard on duty, id.
arts. 191-192. By the same token, the RSFSR civil code, RSFSR GnAMz KOD.
(Civil Code) (1964), makes it a tort to slander, id. art. 7, para. 1, or libel, id. art.
7, para. 2, another. See the general discussion in note 228 infra.
2 25 KONSTr=rTsIU (Constitution) art. 50, para. 1 (USSR).
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the broad dissemination of information, and by the opportunity to
use the press, television and radio." 228
A critical qualification of these rights is contained in the first
phrase of paragraph 1 of article 50. It states that they are granted
"in accordance with the people's interests and for the purpose of
strengthening and developing the socialist system ... " It follows
that none of these rights is absolute either in theory or in fact.
Freedom of speech is subject to checks provided by norms of Soviet
criminal law and the law of torts. 228 Freedom of the press is sub-
ject to the exercise of editorial discretion by the newspaper.229 Free-
dom of assembly does not mean that those who plan to assemble are
exempt from any relevant state laws requiring the procurement of
an official permit before making use of public accommodations or
open spaces for public assemblies or meetings. 230 Freedom to dem-
226 Id. art. 50, para. 2.
227 Id. art. 50, para. 1.
228 Various provisions of Soviet law afford remedies to the victim of slanderous
statements. For example, article 7 of the RSFSR civil code affords a civil tort
remedy. RSFSR GRAZm. KOD. (Civil Code) art. 7 (1964). Similarly, articles 130
and 131 of the RSFSR criminal code make it a crime to defame or insult any person.
RSFSR UGOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) arts. 130-131 (1960). See note 224 supra.
Criminal prosecution under articles 130 and 131 of the RSFSR criminal code does
not preempt the right of the victim to bring a separate suit in tort to recover
damages.
It is also a crime to make a report known to be false charging someone with
the commission of a crime. Id. art. 180. These and other provisions of Soviet
statutory law are deemed to be limitations on citizens' constitutional right of free
speech. See KoNsTrrOTsuA (Constitution) art. 50 (USSR).
229 Pravda is the official organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The
editorial policy of the newspaper is established by the Central Committee of the
CPSU. The immediate implementation of that policy is entrusted to a board of
editors who serve at the pleasure of the Central Committee of the Party. As the
official mouthpiece of the Party, the newspaper serves as a formidable weapon for
propagating the Party line. The size of the newspaper (it generally has only six
pages per issue) and the need to maximize the educational impact of the informa-
tion contained therein of necessity compel the editorial board to print only all the
news that is ideologically fit to print. The same constraints operate over the edi-
torial decisions of Izvestiia, the newspaper that is the official organ of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR.
230 The authority to issue permits for the holding of public meetings, assemblies,
and conferences is generally vested in the local authorities or in special commissions
organized to oversee the activities of identifiable groups of private citizens. For
example, article 20 of the RSFSR Law on Religious Associations provides that
"religious societies and groups of believers may convene religious congresses and
conferences only with the permission, issued separately in each case, of the Council
of Affairs of the Religions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR". RSFSR Zakon
o Religioznykh Obedeneniiakh (RSFSR Law on Religious Associations) art. 20
(1929), amended by Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, June 23, 1975,
27 VED. Vxnam. Soy. RSFSR item 572 (1975). This means that even after a re-
ligious association has been properly registered as required under articles 2 and 4
of this Law, it would still need to seek and receive a permit to convene a conference,
a public meeting, a congress, or an assembly each time it plans to hold such
an event.
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onstrate does not mean freedom to demonstrate publicly against
the policies of the Soviet government or of the CPSU.231 Rather, it
means freedom to join with one's fellow workers to manifest public
support for the policies of the state and Party.232  Very simply,
Soviet law stresses an elementary fact of any Marxian socialist legal
system: the bill of rights in the constitution is not a suicide pact; 233
its guarantees do not extend to those who oppose the government of
the state.
Article 51 grants to all Soviet citizens the right of association.
2 34
This means only the right of citizens to form and associate with a
public organization whose goals are consistent with the purposes
of a socialist state and the construction of a communist society.
There is no constitutionally protected right to join or form an
organization whose goals are anti-Soviet or anti-communist. 235 The
laws on the registration of public organizations 23 16 are designed to
prevent abuses of the right of association.
2 31 Unauthorized public demonstration against the policies of the Soviet govern-
ment conceivably is prosecutable under the omnibus provisions of articles 190 through
193 (organization of, or active participation in, group actions which violate public
order) and/or article 206 (hooliganism, that is, intentional actions violating public
order in a coarse manner and expressing a clear disrespect toward society) of the
RSFSR criminal code. RSFSR UcoL. KOD. (Criminal Code) arts. 190-193, 206
(1960).
232 Soviet law does not tolerate any form of disruptive, even though civil,
disobedience or any public manifestation of dissatisfaction with the policies of the
Party or of the Soviet government in such a manner that it could play into the hands
of the "enemies of the Soviet state". (The latter phrase is a Soviet euphemism for
the western news media and their "collaborators"). Such actions conceivably could
be criminal. For a general discussion of the relevant criminal laws governing such
actions, see notes 230-31 supra. Article 49 of the USSR Constitution specifically
lists avenues that are available to those individuals who wish to criticize or make
suggestions regarding the operations of the government and/or the various social
organizations. KONS-nTusTA (Constitution) art. 49 (USSR). Strictly construed,
this provision would not condone a complaint to a foreign embassy or foreign news-
paper correspondent in Moscow, or, in fact, to any foreign organization that could
use such information for purposes of anti-Soviet propaganda. But, on the other
hand, Soviet citizens with legitimate complaints about the workings of the various
state or social organizations may express their feelings in the form of "letters to the
editor" in any of the national or local newspapers. Pravda and Izvestiia periodically
publish such letters. Obviously, the decision to publish any letter is subject to the
discretion of the board of editors of the newspaper in question.
233 For the general discussion of the scope and limitations of the bills of rights
in Marxian socialist constitutions, see Osakwe, supra note 63, at 190-204.
23 KorsTnrsrsurA (Constitution) art. 51 (USSR).
235 Under the RSFSR criminal code, it is a crime to form or join any anti-Soviet
organization under the guise of exercise of freedom of association. RSFSR UcoL.
KOD. (Criminal Code) arts. 70, 190-193 (1960). The criminal codes of the other
fourteen union republics contain similar provisions.
236 In an effort to exercise effective control over the operation of churches in
the RSFSR, a law was passed in 1929 requiring all churches, as a prerequisite to
operation, to register with a designated state agency. See RSFSR Zakon o Re-
ligioznykh Obedeneniiakh (RSFSR Law on Religious Associations) (1929), amended
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The freedom of conscience granted in article 52 is equally
laden with limiting qualifications.237 Jt grants to individual citizens
the right to profess any religious beliefs or none at all; the right to
conduct religious worship services; and the right to abet the propa-
gation of atheism. Article 52, however, does not grant the right
to engage in religious propaganda; the right to incite hostility and
hatred in connection with the exercise of one's religious beliefs; or
the right to operate religious or parochial schools on the territory of
the USSR.28 Anyone who, under the guise of practicing his re-




Article 52 provides that churches are separate from the state
and all schools are separate from the churches.241  Thus there may
be neither a state religion nor any type of religiously affiliated school.
Article 53 merely codifies what formerly had been a principle
of Soviet family law-that the family is the basic unit of the Soviet
society and as such is protected by the state.2 2 Article 53 further
by Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, June 23, 1975, 27 VD. Vmuxm.
Sov. RSFSR item 572 (1975). An English language translation of this law, as
amended, may be found in The RSFSR Law on Religious Associations of 1929, 1
REv. SocrAUST L. 223 (1975). A similar law exists in all other union republics.
For an English language translation of the Estonian statute, see Timmerman's The
Estonian Statute on Religious Associations of 22 April 1977: A Note, 4 REv.
SocirAir L. 91 (1978).
2
37KoNsruTsuA (Constitution )art. 52 (USSR).
288 The RSFSR Law on Religious Associations provides that "the teaching of
religious cults is admissible only in ecclesiastical educational institutions according
to the established procedure" and that "the teaching of any kind of religious cult
in educational institutions is inadmissible. RSFSR Zakon o Religioznykh Obe-
deneniiakh (RSFSR Law on Religious Associations) art. 18 (1929), amended by
Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, June 23, 1975, 27 VED. Vkanx. Sov.
RSFSR item 152 (1975). See note 236 supra.
239 See RSFSR UGOL. KoD. (Criminal Code) art. 227 (1960).
240 See RSFSR Zakon o Religioznykh Obedeneniiakh (RSFSR Law on Religions
Associations) (1929), amended by Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSB,
June 23, 1975, 27 VED. VniEu. Soy. ESFSR item 572 (1975); note 236 supra.
This law imposes many limitations on the exercise of the freedom of conscience by
properly registered religious associations. The essence of all of these limitations is
to compel the associations to conform their activities with Soviet public policy.
Violation may result in the removal of the offender from the list of registered re-
ligious associations. Id. art. 43.
2 41 KoNsrarrusn (Constitution) art. 52 (USSR).
242Id. art. 53. See Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the USSR and
the Union Republics on Marriage and the Family, as adopted by the USSR Supreme
Soviet, June 28, 1968, 27 VEn. Vmux. Sov. SSSR item 241 (1968). An English
language translation of this law may be found in W. BurxIM, supra note 1, at 451-
62. A similar recognition is accorded to the family in the family codes of all the
union republics. See, e.g., RSFSR KoD. o BRAxE i Simn. (Family Code) art. 1
(1969). This provision of the RSFSR, family code, like the corresponding pro-
visions of the family codes of the other fourteen union republics, is a verbatim
reproduction of article I of the 1968 Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the
USSR and the Union Republics on Marriage and the Family, supra.
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provides that marriage is the method of creating a family; that
marriage shall be based on the voluntary agreement of the prospec-
tive spouses; and that spouses shall enjoy equal rights throughout
the duration of their marriage. 243
Paragraph 2 of article 53 seems to suggest that the sole rec-
ognized purpose of a Soviet marriage is the procreation of children.
It stresses the concern of the state for the family and declares that
this concern is manifested in the following ways: creation and de-
velopment of an extensive network of children's institutions; pay-
ment of special childbirth allowances to the nursing mother; and
payment of an inducement allowance and benefits for persons with
large families. As further encouragement of population growth
through families, contemporary Soviet tax law levies a six per cent
income tax on single men and childless families.24
Three basic protections against unlawful actions of overzealous
law-enforcement agencies 2- are provided to Soviet citizens in ar-
ticles 54 through 56: protection against unlawful arrest; 26 protec-
tion against unlawful entry into the home; 247 and protection of the
confidentiality of correspondence, telephone conversations, and tele-
graphic communications.2a
The last of the individual rights granted by the 1977 constitu-
tion is the citizen's right to file a complaint against actions of state
or social organizations. 249  Article 58, paragraph 1, grants standing
to any citizen aggrieved by the actions of a state agency or social
organization to seek redress "according to the procedure and within
the time periods established by law." 25 Paragraph 2 of the same
2 43 KoNSTrroTs A (Constitution) art. 53, para. I (USSR).
244 Nalog na Kholostiakov, Odinokikh i Malosemeinykh Grazhdan SSSR (Tax
on Bachelors, Single Women and Childless Citizens of the USSR), 28 VED. VMUB.
Soy. SSSR item 45 (1957). The law was amended in 1957, effective the following
year, to exempt all single women from the tax. Other exempt groups are students,
until the age of 25; men over the age of 50; persons in active military service; war
invalids and their spouses; persons who lost their children in combat during World
War H; and persons who for medical reasons are incapable of producing children.
245 These protections, like all the others in the Soviet bill of rights, are enforce-
able against private citizens, as well as against social organizations and their officials.
For a discussion of criminal-law protection of individual rights in the Soviet Union,
see generally A. BEzrAvs=r & N. PianvoRov, OsaRaTA Crzsr i DosTOINSTVA
Lxcm, osT v SSSR (The Protection of the Honor and Dignity of the Individual in
the USSR) (1971); A. KuzNETsov, UcoLovN-PTAvovAA OXqHAA INTEnzsov
IrcHmosT v SSSR (Criminal Law Protection of the Interests of the Individual in
the USSR) (1969).
246 KONSTrrTSII (Constitution) art. 54 (USSR).
247 Id. art. 55.
248 Id. art. 56. See Osakwe, Due Process of Law Under Contemporary Soviet
Criminal Procedure, supra note 12.
249 KONSTnTrrsA (Constitution) art. 58 (USSR).
2z0 Id. art. 58, para. 1.
[Vol. 127:1350
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1977 USSR CONSTITUTION
article states that anyone aggrieved by an illegal or unauthorized
act of an individual official of such an organization may seek legal
redress in a court of law. x1  These provisions may be interpreted
to mean that redress of official misconduct may be sought under
paragraph 1 against the state or social organization that employs
the official, but redress under paragraph 2 must be sought directly
against the defendant officer. Article 58, paragraph 3, effectively
waives the immunity of Soviet governmental units from tort lia-
bility arising from the actions of state agencies or their officials.
12
3. Fundamental Duties of Citizens Under the Constitution
Among the fundamental duties imposed on all Soviet citizens
are the following: to observe the USSR Constitution and laws; 253
to respect the rules of socialist communal living; 2 to conduct one-
self in a manner that is becoming of the high honor and dignity of a
Soviet citizen; 255 to work; 256 to protect and enhance socialist prop-
erty; 257 to safeguard the interests of the Soviet state and to help
strengthen its might and prestige; 258 to defend the socialist father-
land; 259 to serve in the armed forces; 260 to respect the national
dignity of other citizens and to strengthen and promote friendship
among the peoples of various nationalities living in the Soviet
Union; 261 to respect the rights and legitimate interests of other
persons; 262 to show intolerance for any manifestation of antisocial
behavior by others; 263 and, finally, to help in every possible way to
safeguard public order.
264
Article 66 imposes a special duty on Soviet parents to rear their
children as worthy members of a socialist society.2M Conversely,
Soviet children have a constitutional duty to show concern for,
251 Id. art. 58, para. 2.
252 Id. art. 58, para. 3.
253 Id. art. 59.
254Id. art. 59, para. 2.
255 Id.
256 Id. art. 60.
2571d. art. 61.
258 Id. art. 62.
29 Id. art. 62, para. 2.
260 Id. art. 63.
261 Id. art. 64.
262 Id. art. 65.
263Id.
284 Id.
20 Id. art. 66.
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and render assistance to, their parents in need.2 66  Whereas article
67 obliges all Soviet citizens to protect nature and to safeguard its
riches, 267 article 68 imposes upon all citizens the constitutional duty
to preserve historical monuments and other objects of cultural
value.2 6 s Finally, article 69 imposes on Soviet citizens an "interna-
tionalist" duty to promote international friendship and cooperation
among nations.2
6 9
G. Problems of Federalism in the 1977 Constitution
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a union of inde-
pendent Soviet socialist republics, was formed in 1922. The original
members of the union were the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist
Republic (RSFSR),270 the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Trans-
Caucasian Federation, 271 which consisted of Soviet Azebaidjan, So-
viet Armenia, and Soviet Georgia.272 Other socialist states were
admitted to the union later.
273
The choice of the federal structure is the Soviet Union's solu-
tion to its nationality problem. It is estimated that there are over
150 national and ethnic groups in the USSR today.2 74  It is ex-
pected, however, that as the Soviet society advances towards com-
munism, there will be a fusion of all Soviet nationalities into one
Soviet people.275  The first stage of this two-step progression, in the
266 Id.
267 Id. art. 67.
268 Id. art. 68.
269 Id. art. 69.
270 Soviet Russia was reorganized into a socialist federation, the RSFSR, con-
sisting of the remnants of what was once tsarist Russia, in January 1918. For a
general discussion of the formation of a new Soviet state from the disintegrated
tsarist continental empire, see 0. CmsTrAxov, PROBLEMY DEmoIATn i FEDERALmA
V PEaVOI SOVETsKoi KoNsTnrrsui (The Problems of Democracy and Federalism in
the First Soviet Constitution) (1977).
2 71 The Trans-Caucasian Federation was reorganized in 1936 into the three
separate Soviet socialist republics of Azerbaidjan, Georgia, and Armenia. They were
admitted to the USSR in the same year.
272 For a general discussion of the formation of the USSR, see Kirichenko, Soiuz
Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics),
in ENTSIKLOPEDICHESKU SLOVAM" PRAVOVYEH ZNANH-SovETSKOE PRAvo (Encyclo-
pedia of Soviet Law) 435 (S. Bratus, N. Zhogin, P. Kovanov, V. Terebilov, N.
Tumanova & V. Cbkhikvadze eds. 1965).
273 Uzbekistan and Turkmenia were admitted in 1925, Tadjikistan in 1929,
Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Azerbaidjan, Georgia and Armenia in 1936, and Moldavia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in 1940.
2 7 4 See WoRLD ALANAC AND BOOK Or FACTs 585 (1979). See generally
G. CARTER, THE GOVERNMENT OF TIIE SOVIET UrIoN 17 (2d ed. 1967); D. LANE,
PounTics AND SocnETY nr TH USSR 426 (1970).
275 See KoNsTursnx (Constitution) preamble, para. 7 (USSR). The Program
of the CPSU, 22d Congress of the CPSU, Oct. 31, 1961 (Foreign Language Publish-
ing House edition, Moscow 1961), offers the most comprehensive and authoritative
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view of the drafters of the 1977 constitution, seems to have been
reached. As noted above,276 the preamble to the new constitution
proclaims that the USSR today "is a society of mature socialist
social relations, in which a new historical community of people-
the Soviet people-has come into being on the basis of the drawing
together of all classes and social strata and the juridical and actual
equality of all nations and nationalities and their fraternal coopera-
tion." 277 Thus, the Soviet federation will not be dismantled until
there has been a total fusion of all the nationalities and ethnic
groups in the USSR.
Accordingly, article 70 of the 1977 constitution declares that
the USSR is "a unitary, federal and multinational state, formed on
the basis of the principle of socialist federalism and as a result of
the free self-determination of nations and the voluntary union of
equal Soviet Socialist Republics." 278 In fact, the USSR is a federa-
tion of federations which is organized into a hierarchy of sov-
ereignties. It consists of fifteen union republics,2 7 9 twenty autono-
mous Soviet republics,2 0 and eight autonomous provinces.
281
Under article 86, an autonomous province, which is the lowest
level of sovereignty, is part of a union republic or of a territory.
The laws of an autonomous province are adopted by the Supreme
Soviet of a union republic on the basis of a representation sub-
mitted by the autonomous province's Soviet of People's Deputies.
28 2
Each autonomous republic is also part of a union republic,28 3 but
definition of communism. In its relevant provisions, it refers to communism as "a
classless social system with one form of public ownership of the means of production
and full social equality of all members of society." Id. 59. "Under communism
the nationalities [of the USSR] will draw closer and closer together in all spheres on
the basis of a complete identity of economic, political and spiritual interests, of
fraternal friendship and cooperation." Id. 61. As a "free association of socially
conscious working people," id. 59, it is expected that communism would fuse all
socially, economically, and culturally different groups into one. Economic classes
would disappear, and nationalities would converge.
276 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
2
77 KONSTIrorsr.& (Constitution) preamble, para. 7 (USSR).
278 Id. art- 70, para. 1.
279 The fifteen union republics of the USSR today are RSFSR, Ukraine, Byelo-
russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaidjan, Lithuania, Moldavia, Latvia,
Kirgizia, Tadjikistan, Armenia, Turkmenia, and Estonia. KoNsmrTrsuA (Constitu-
tion) art. 71 (USSR).
280 An autonomous republic is a part of a union republic. Id. art. 82, para. 1.
The following union republics have autonomous republics as subdivisions: RSFSR-
16; Uzbekistan-1; Georgia-2; Azerbaidjan-1.
281 An autonomous province is part of a union republic or a territory. Id. art.
86. The following union republics contain autonomous provinces: RSFSR--5;
Georgia-i; Azerbaidjan-1; Tadjikistan-1.
2 8 2 See note 309 infra.
2 8
3 KONSTIrTSiLU& (Constitution) art. 82, para. 1 (USSR).
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unlike the autonomous provinces, each autonomous republic has
its own constitution. The autonomous republic is the middle level
of sovereignty in the USSR. The allocation of power between the
national government and the first level of sovereignty in the USSR-
the governments of the fifteen union republics-has presented some
of the most difficult problems of federalism in the USSR. Over the
years there has been a noticeable expansion of the powers of the
union republics vis-A-vis the federal government, but this has not
resolved all of the difficulties. Generally speaking, three principles
of Soviet federalism must be borne in mind in understanding these
problems. First, the powers of the federal government are dele-
gated and enumerated. The majority of these federal powers are
listed in article 73 of the USSR constitution. They are delegated
to the federal government by the union republics, in whom ultimate
sovereignty theoretically resides. The enumeration of the delegated
powers is intended to curb any unintended intrusion by the fed-
eral government into the domain of the states. Nothing prevents
the federal government, however, from exercising those powers that
are necessary and proper to give effect to its delegated powers. By
contrast, under article 76, the union republic possesses general juris-
diction over all questions of state power in its territory,2 s subject
only to the limitations contained in article 73.25 This means that
powers that are not delegated to the federal government are reserved
to the respective union republics.
28 6
In theory, therefore, the federal government is an agency of the
state governments. Its sovereignty is secondary, in the sense that it is
based upon subrogation of authority from the states. Its functions
are limited to the preservation of the union and the coordination
of the separate activities of the constituent states. In practice, how-
ever, the Soviet federal government has abandoned its position as an
agent of the respective states and has become the virtual master of
the federation. Since the union republics do not have any formal
input into the USSR constitutional amendment processes, 287 nothing
would prevent the USSR from amending the provisions of article
73 to grant itself more powers at the expense of the union republics.
On its face, the amendment procedure in article 174-to the extent
that it excludes the union republics from formal participation-is
284 Id. art. 76, para. 2.
285 Id. art. 73, para. 1.
286 Id. art. 76, para. 2.
287 Id. art. 174. See notes 456-61 infra & accompanying text. See also note 9
supra.
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inconsistent with the spirit of article 73. 288 The practical effect of
article 174 procedure is to make the federal government into the
delegator, as well as the recipient, of authority.
Under the provisions of article 73, the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal government extends to the following: admission of new
union republics to the USSR; approval of the formation of new
autonomous republics or autonomous provinces within a union re-
public; determination of the national boundaries of the USSR, as
well as approval of changes in the boundaries between the union
republics; establishment of the general guiding principles of legisla-
tion of the USSR and the union republics; drafting and approval
of the USSR consolidated budget; administration of a uniform mone-
tary and credit system of the USSR; administration of the federal
tax system; all questions of war and peace; defense of the USSR
sovereignty and the protection of its borders and territories; all
questions of state security; representation of the USSR in foreign
relations; and coordination of the principles of foreign relations of
the respective union republics.
28 9
In addition to the general jurisdiction of the union republics
set forth in article 76, the integrity of the union republic is as-
sured through a series of other provisions: the territory of a union
republic cannot be changed without its consent; 290 a union republic
determines its own internal administrative divisions; 291 a union re-
public has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states
and with international organizations, including the authority to
conclude international agreements and exchange diplomatic and con-
sular representatives with foreign entities. 292 The ultimate man-
ifestations of the sovereignty of a union republic are its constitu-
tion 29 3 and its right to secede from the federation. 2 4
The second general principle of federalism under the 1977
constitution is the supremacy of federal laws over state laws. Since
28SCompare KoNsTnrrTsirA (Constitution) art. 174 (USSR) with id. art. 73.
289 Id. art. 73.
290 Id. art. 78.
291 Id. art. 79.
292 Id. art. 80.
293 Id. art. 76.
294 Id. art. 72. Finland, once a self-governing part of the vast tsarist continental
empire, is the only territory that has successfully seceded from Soviet Russia.
Finland, however, seceded in 1918, before the formation of the RSFSR. It is highly
doubtful that Moscow would allow any portion of the contemporary USSR to follow
the much-regretted example of Finland. For all practical purposes, therefore, the
provision of article 72 of the 1977 constitution which grants the right to secede is a
dead letter.
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the sovereignty of the USSR extends to all parts of the USSR,295
and since the laws of the USSR have the force of law throughout the
territory of the USSR,296 it follows that "in the event of a discrep-
ancy between a union republic law and an all-union law, the USSR
law shall prevail." 297 The constitution of the USSR is thus the
supreme law of the land; all subordinate laws, general statutes, state
constitutions, state statutes, and the constitutions of the autonomous
republics, must conform with the provisions of the federal constitu-
tion.29s The responsibility for overseeing the conformance of state
constitution and laws with the federal constitution is vested in the
federal government by article 73, paragraph 11.299
The third general principle of Soviet federalism is that the laws
of one union republic must be given full faith and credit in the
other union republics. This means, for example, that a valid mar-
riage entered into in one union republic shall be recognized in
another union republic; that a divorce perfected in one union re-
public shall be recognized in another; that a judgment entered by a
court of one union republic shall be given full effect in another
union republic; that legal documents issued or notarized by the
governmental authorities of one union republic, such as birth or
death certificates, labor cards, and acts of sales, shall be given the
same legal effect as if they were issued by the authorities of the
union republic in which they may be tendered.
On balance, it appears that the USSR is a federation, but a fed-
eration held together through the exercise of federal police powers.
A Soviet union republic exercises its sovereign right to join the
union at the outset. Once such election has been made, however,
the constitutional obstacles to its subsequent rescission are virtually
insurmountable. The right of secession under such circumstances
is tantamount to a constitutional farce. As long as the union repub-
lics agree to subordinate their parochial interests to those of the
union as a whole, their sovereign existence is guaranteed by the
federal government. Thus, the primary sovereignty theoretically
exercised by the union republics in practice becomes a secondary
sovereignty, the powers and limitations of which are determined by
the federal government.
2 95 KoNsTrru'siA (Constitution) art. 75 (USSR).
296 Id. art. 74.
297 Id. art. 173.
298 Id. arts. 72, para. 3 & 86, para. 3.
299 Id. art. 73, para. 11.
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H. Separation of Powers
For ideological reasons, Soviet constitutionalism is not premised
on the doctrine of separation of powers. In its stead the USSR
adopts the doctrine of unity of powers. According to this latter prin-
ciple, Soviet state power in its totality is one and indivisible.3°°
The doctrine further postulates that in order to achieve the ultimate
goal of Soviet constitutional development-the construction of a com-
munist society-it is imperative that all instruments of Soviet state
power work together under the leadership of the CPSU. To the
Soviet legal mind, operation of the doctrine of separation of powers
is bound to be inefficient in the short run. Any such arrangement,
it is argued, is wasteful of governmental energy and is inherently
unprogressive. One is further told by Soviet apologists for the
doctrine of unity of powers that one of the underlying purposes of
the doctrine of separation of powers is to prevent the exercise of
arbitrary powers by any one branch of government. To that end
one branch of government is designed to act as a check upon, as
well as a balance to, the powers of the other departments of govern-
ment. Soviet constitutional doctrine rejects the idea and the prac-
tice of checks and balances, and so repudiates the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers as a model for governmental organization.
While rejecting the doctrine of separation of powers in prin-
ciple, the Soviet constitution of 1977 adopts a structural separation
of state functions into three authorities: the legislature, executive,
and judiciary. To understand fully the operation of these three
authorities under the Soviet system, one should bear in mind the
following relevant principles of Soviet constitutional law doctrine.
First, all three departments of government operate under the lead-
ership of the CPSU. The CPSU, however, does not seek to com-
pete with or to displace these governmental agencies. Rather, the
CPSU uses them as instrumentalities for carrying out Party policies.
In other words, the CPSU prefers to function as the invisible hand
operating from behind the scenes. This fundamental principle of
Party-state relationship was adopted back in 1919 at the 8th Party
Congress of the Bolshevik Party. Noting the considerable overlap
between Party and state functions, the 1919 Program of the Bol-
shevik Party stated:
It certainly does not follow that the functions of the Party
organs shall be merged with those of state organs. Rather,
the Party shall seek to implement its decisions by work-
300 See A. MEyE, THE SOVMT Por.rTcAL SysTrE 200 (1965).
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ing through the state organs, within the limits of the Soviet
Constitution. The Party shall strive to direct the activities
of the state organs, but not to replace them.
30 1
Second, the three departments are by no means co-equal; there
is a clearly discernible hierarchy. At the pinnacle of state power
is the legislative authority.302 This is followed by the executive
branch.3°3 At the bottom of the ladder is the judiciary, which, for
all practical purposes, is literally the least dangerous branch of the
Soviet state.3°4 This means that once Party policies have been
made, they are channelled to the legislature for enactment into gen-
eral legislation. The essence of the executive department's functions
is to execute and administer the statutory schemes enacted by the
legislature.30 By the same token, the sole function of the judiciary
is to enforce laws and regulations as adopted by the legislative and
executive branches, as well as to adjudicate disputes arising there-
from.306 In performing its functions, not only is the judiciary not
co-equal with the legislature, but it is subject to legislative oversight
and various forms of control.30 7
The third general observation one may make about the func-
tional separation of authority in the USSR is that the Soviet pro-
curacy is slowly but clearly emerging as a fourth branch of the
Soviet state. Technically speaking, the functions of the procuracy
are executive in nature, but the office of the Procurator General of
the USSR is responsible directly to the USSR Supreme Soviet (the
legislature) rather than to the Council of Ministers of the USSR
(the federal executive branch). Also, the supervisory jurisdiction
of the procuracy covers organs of both the executive and the judicial
301 I KPSS v REzoLIuTsAxH i REsENIAXH S'EzDov, KoNEVENTSU I PL.ENTMOV
TsK (CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of the Congresses, Conferences and
Plenums of the Central Committee) 77 (8th Russian ed. 1970), quoted in Dialektika,
supra note 98, at 11.
This provision of the 1919 Bolshevik Party Program has been retained in all
subsequent Programs of the CPSU, including the latest Party Program. See Program
of the CPSU, 22d Congress of the CPSU, Oct. 31, 1961 (Foreign Language Pub-
lishing House Edition, Moscow 1961).
302 KoNsTrrUTsff. (Constitution) art. 108, para. 1 (USSR).
303 Id. arts. 128-136.
304 Id. art. 153. See note 307 infra.
3 05 KONsTITUTsuA (Constitution) art. 131 (USSR).
306 J. HAzkD, ThE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 168-69 (3d ed. 1964).
307 KoNsTrrUTsxA (Constitution) art. 153, para. 3. In addition, the procurator
general, see text accompanying notes 430-46 infra, exercises supervisory jurisdiction
over all USSR courts. See Statute on Procuracy Supervision in the USSR, in 9
VED. VERH. SoV. SSSR item 222. For an English translation, see BAsIc LAws ON
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE 183-96 (H. Berman & J. Quigley, Jr. trans. &
eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as BAsIc LAws].
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branches of the Soviet state. But because its powers of oversight
do not extend to the higher organs of the executive branch or even
to the lowest level of the legislative branch of state power, the
procuracy has not yet attained even approximate equality with
these branches of government. 308 Nevertheless, it is possible that
the procuracy will eventually emerge as the fourth branch of the
Soviet state.
Against this general background the following sections of this
Article will move on to an in-depth analysis of the nature, powers,
and functions of the four functional instruments of Soviet state
power.
1. Legislative Authority
There are four levels of legislative authority in the Soviet
Union: the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the supreme soviets of
the union republics, the supreme soviets of the autonomous repub-
lics and the local soviets of people's deputies.30 9 Referring to all of
these levels of legislative authority, Leonid Brezhnev characterized
them as "the omnipotent collective brain of Soviet power, which
undertakes and will continue to undertake even more complex and
varied tasks." 310 This section of our study focuses attention on the
federal legislative authority.31'
Under article 108 the Supreme Soviet is the supreme lawmak-
ing body in the USSR. 12 As such it exercises all the powers dele-
gated to the federal government under article 73,313 with the excep-
tion of those powers that have been specifically assigned to other
organs of the federal government. Among the powers exclusively
vested in the USSR Supreme Soviet by article 108 are the powers
308 See the general discussion of the scope of procuratorial supervision at text
accompanying notes 437-40 infra.
309KoNsTrrrsn1 (Constitution) art. 96 (USSR). The term "local Soviet of
People's Deputies" is a generic name for all the legislative bodies at the level of the
territory, province, autonomous province, autonomous region, district, city, borough,
setlement, and rural community. See id. art. 145; text accompanying note 27
supra. The term of office of members of the supreme soviets of the USSR, the
union republics, and the autonomous republics is five years. KoNsTrrTUssIA (Con-
stitution) art. 90 (USSR). The term under the previous constitution was four years.
KoNsTirrrirAs (Constitution) arts. 36, 58, 90 (USSR 1936). By contrast, the term
of office of the local soviets, two years under the 1936 constitution, id. art. 95, is
now two and one-half years. KoNsrrr sA (Constitution) art. 90, para. 2 (USSR).
31oL. Brezhnev, Report to the May (1977) Plenum of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, cited in Soviet State and Law, supra note 52, at 7.
311 The constitutional regulation of the structure, powers, and functions of the
other levels of legislative authority may be found in KoNsrrrutsuA (Constitution)
arts. 137-150 (USSR).
312 Id. art. 108.
313 See id. art. 73.
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to admit new members into the USSR; to ratify the formation of
new autonomous republics and autonomous provinces within the
union republics; and to enact the laws of the USSR.314 All laws,
once passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, are signed by both the
chairman and secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet and published in the fifteen languages of the union re-
publics.8 15
Under article 109 the USSR Supreme Soviet consists of two
co-equal chambers, the Council of the Union and the Council of
Nationalities,31 6 each of which has the same number of deputies.317
Enactment of a law requires the approval of a simple majority of
each chamber. 18 If there is a disagreement between the two
chambers on any legislative matter, the bill is referred for settle-
ment to a conciliation committee consisting of an equal number of
deputies from each chamber.319  If the committee fails to reach
agreement,32 0 the matter is held over until the next session of the
Supreme Soviet.321 Alternatively, the Supreme Soviet may choose,
after the conciliation committee has failed to reach a decision, to
submit the dispute to the people in a national referendum. 322
314 Id. art. 108.
15 Id. art. 116.
31 Id. art. 109.
317 Id. art. 110, para. 1. The two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet differ
only in apportionment of representation. Deputies of the Council of the Union are
elected from election districts with equal populations. Representation in the Council
of Nationalities is apportioned according to a formula under which each union
republic elects 32 deputies, each autonomous republic elects 11, each autonomous
province five, and each autonomous region elects one. KoNs-rursiA (Constitution)
art. 110, paras. 1, 2 (USSR).
318 Id. art. 114, para. 2.
319 Id. art. 115.
32 0 Article 115 does not specify what majority is needed for a bill to be adopted
by the Conciliation Committee, but it is likely that a simple majority vote is
contemplated.
321 Id. art. 115.
322 Id. The new procedure established under article 115 is substantially dif-
ferent from the procedure under article 47 of the 1936 constitution. The latter
provided that
[i]n the event of a disagreement between the Soviet of the Union and the
Soviet of Nationalities, the question is referred for settlement to a Con-
ciliation Commission formed by the Chambers on a parity basis. If the
Conciliation Commission fails to arrive at an agreement or if its decision
fails to satisfy one of the chambers, the question is considered for a second
time by the chambers. Failing agreement between the two chambers, the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR and orders new elections.
KoNsnTuvsHA (Constitution) art. 47 (USSR 1936).
One is tempted to add, however, that the chances that one chamber will dis-
agree with the other on a legislative bill are virtually non-existent. For this reason,
this provision of article 115 of the 1977 constitution, just like that of article 47 of
the 1936 constitution before it, is for all practical purposes a dead letter.
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Under article 111 each chamber of the Supreme Soviet elects
a chairman and four vice chairmen.3 23  At any joint session of the
two chambers the two chairmen alternately chair meetings.3 24 Ses-
sions of the Supreme. Soviet are held twice a year,325 but if the need
arises, an emergency session may be convened at the initiative of
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at the request of the
government of one of the union republics, or at the request of at
least one-third of the membership of either one of the constituent
chambers. 326 The Supreme Soviet also has standing committees of
each chamber, and joint standing committees of the USSR Supreme
Soviet. 327 The standing committees are organized in such a way
as to be able to meet between sessions of the chambers. Article 125
authorizes the Supreme Soviet to create ad hoc committees when
the need arises to perform certain tasks.
3 28
Even though article 114 vests exclusive 329 legislative authority
in the USSR Supreme Soviet, right to initiate legislation is vested in
a number of bodies and individuals.330 These include each of the
chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet; the USSR Council of Min-
isters; the respective union republics, acting through their supreme
soviets; the standing committees of the respective chambers of the
USSR Supreme Soviet; deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet acting
alone; the USSR Supreme Court; and the Procurator General of
the USSR.331 Article 113 also grants the right of legislative initia-
tive to the central (national) organs of the various social organiza-
tions. 832
a. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in effect serves as
the Soviet collective head of state. Because the Supreme Soviet
32 3 KONsTrTsiuA (Constitution) art. 111, para. 1 (USSR).
324 Id. art 111, para. 3.
325 Id. art. 112, para. 1.
326 Id. art. 112, para. 2.
3 27 The structure and jurisdiction of the standing committees are defined in id.
art. 12.
328 Id. art. 125, para. 2.
329 Id. art. 114. For a representative Soviet view on the role and functions of
legislation in the Soviet legal system, see A. MrrsKm--c , PnuVorvoncHEsvvo v SSSR
(Law Maling in the USSR) (1974); ZAXoNoDATrL'sTvo i ZAxONODATEL'NAIA
DuAT-o'NOsv' v SSSR (Legislation and Legislative Activity in the USSR) (P.
Gureev & P. Sedugin eds. 1972).
330 KoNsTrirsm (Constitution) art. 113 (USSR).
331 Id. art. 113, para. 1.
S32 See id. art. 113, para. 2.
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meets only twice a year 333 and is too large to engage in any meaning-
ful deliberation, in the interest of maintaining continuity of the
legislative processes the USSR Constitution vests certain legislative
powers in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Presid-
ium is elected by and accountable to the USSR Supreme Soviet.334
Its members are elected from among the deputies of the Supreme
Soviet. The body consists of thirty-nine members at the present
time: the chairman, the first vice chairman, fifteen vice chairmen
representing fifteen union republics, a secretary, and twenty-one
ordinary members.3 35
The powers of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet are
enumerated in articles 121 through 123.336 Some of these are
original powers; the others are caretaker powers. The original
powers relate to those matters over which the Presidium has exclu-
sive jurisdiction. 3 7 In exercising its caretaker powers the Presidium
is merely acting in behalf of the recessed Supreme Soviet.33 8 All
decisions made by the Presidium in the latter capacity must be sub-
mitted to the reconvened Supreme Soviet for ratification.3 39  Prior
to ratification, the interim caretaker decisions of the Presidium have
the force of law.340 Should the reconvened Supreme Soviet fail to
ratify such interim decisions of the Presidium, they are voided, but
only prospectively.341
Among the original powers of the Presidium listed in article
121 are the following: to set the date for elections of representatives
to the USSR Supreme Soviet; to convene the newly elected Supreme
333 Each session of the Supreme Soviet lasts only two to five days. This means
that during the entire five-year term of a Supreme Soviet, the full membership is
convened only for approximately twenty to fifty days.
33 4 KoNsTruTsnA (Constitution) art. 119 (USSR).
335 Id. At its session on June 16, 1977 the USSR Supreme Soviet elected
Leonid Brezhnev to the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet. See PosTNovLENm VsnunovNoGo SOVETA SSSR (Decree of the USSR
Supreme Soviet), in Pravda, June 17, 1977, at 1, col. 6. With this appointment,
Leonid Brezhnev became the first Soviet leader simultaneously to hold the two most
powerful positions in the Soviet system: General Secretary of the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet.
3 3 KoNsTrruTsir (Constitution) arts. 121-123 (USSR).
337 See id. art. 121.
338 See id. art. 122.
339 Id.
340 Id. art. 122, para. 1.
341 Soviet constitutional scholars uniformly assert that caretaker decrees of the
Presidium operate as law until the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet See
SOVmT CONSTr=0TONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 373; note 340. The logical implica-
tion of this theory is that decrees not ratified by the Supreme Soviet simply cease
to have the force of law at the time of the Supreme Soviet's action.
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Soviet; to coordinate the activities of the standing committees of
the chambers of the Supreme Soviet; to exercise political control
over the observance of the constitution as well as to ensure con-
formance of union-republican constitutions and laws with the fed-
eral constitution and laws; to render a supreme interpretation of the
laws of the USSR; to ratify and abrogate international treaties 
3 42
of the USSR; to annul resolutions, orders, and regulations promul-
gated by the Council of Ministers of the USSR if the latter are
found to be inconsistent with federal laws; and togrant, deny, and
determine the validity of any unilateral renunciation of, Soviet
citizenship.
H3
Prominent among the new original powers granted to the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet by article 121 are the au-
thority to form the Defense Council of the USSR and to appoint its
members and the power to appoint and dismiss the high command
of the armed forces of the USSR.344
The caretaker powers of the Presidium are set forth in article
122. These include the powers to amend general statutes; to ratify
changes in the boundaries between union republics; to create, re-
organize, or abolish ministries and state committees of the USSR,
at the recommendation of the USSR Council of Ministers; and to
appoint individual members of the USSR Council of Ministers, on
the recommendation of the chairman of the USSR Council of
Ministers.3 5
Although the Presidum is an agency of the Supreme Soviet,
the tenure of Presidium members continues even after that of the
Supreme Soviet that elected them terminates. Under article 124,
the Presidium continues in office until a new Supreme Soviet is
342The 1977 constitution draws a subtle distinction between "international
treaties" and "intergovernmental international agreements." Only the Presidium
of the USSR Supreme Soviet may ratify or denounce an international treaty of the
USSR. KONsTrrtsmiA (Constitution) art 121(6). Under article 131(6), the
Council of Ministers of the USSR (the highest executive and administrative body of
state authority, id. art. 128; see note 360 infra) may ratify or denounce inter-
governmental agreements with a foreign government. Id. art. 131(6). Such
intergovernmental agreements do not require ratification by the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet Generally, however, they are designed to implement either out-
standing international treaties of the USSR or non-self-executing provisions of the
constitution or federal legislation. Article 121(7) makes intergovernmental agree-
ments subordinate to international treaties of the USSR. Id. art 121(7). Thus,
in order to be valid under Soviet domestic law, intergovernmental agreements must
be consistent with the international treaties currently in force.
3431d. art. 121.
344Id. art. 121(14).
345 Id. art. 122.
1979]
1418 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
elected and convened, at which time the newly elected Supreme
Soviet dissolves the current Presidium and elects a new one.
346
In light of the foregoing factors-that the CPSU is the de
facto super-legislature, that the Supreme Soviet meets only twice a
year, that the sheer size of the Supreme Soviet makes it impossible
for it to function as a deliberative body, and that when it convenes,
it routinely ratifies all interim decisions made in its behalf by its
Presidium-it would be misleading to think of the USSR Supreme
Soviet as the real legislature. The USSR Supreme Soviet is neither
supreme, nor is it a soviet.34 7 It is, at best, a surrogate legislature.
Whether or not this is a desirable state of affairs is beside the point.
b. The Soviet Deputy
Recent Soviet legislation has bolstered the status of the Soviet
deputy3sS The adoption of the 1977 constitution seems to continue
this trend in Soviet Law. Chapter 14 of the new constitution is
devoted to an explanation of the status of the Soviet deputy349 The
thrust of the provisions of this chapter may be stated as follows.
The deputy is a plenipotentiary representative of the people in the
legislature.350 In performing his legislative tasks, he is not guided
solely by the parochial interests of his electoral district, but rather
by the interests of the USSR as an indivisible unit.351 The deputy
is not a professional lawmaker, but a 'working legislator." While
serving in the legislature he retains his regular job, for which he
continues to draw his regular salary.352 As a lawmaker he receives
no extra compensation, except that he is reimbursed for all inci-
346 Id. art. 124.
347In the Russian language, the term "soviet" means a "council," a "de-
liberative body." The USSR Supreme Soviet is anything but a deliberative body,
and the title "soviet" does not correspond any better to the true functions of the
other bodies so designated by the USSR Constitution. This is especially true in the
case of the three top levels of soviets. In contrast, the local councils, because they
meet more frequently and are much smaller than the supreme soviets, may con-
ceivably truly be "soviets." Pursuant to the 1978 RSFSR Constitution, the local
soviets of people's deputies meet from four to six times a year. See KoNsTrurs IA
(Constitution) art. 141 (RSFSR 1978).
348 In 1972 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a law spelling out the duties,
privileges, and status of the deputy. Law on the Status of Deputies of Soviets of
Working People's Deputies in the USSR, as Adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet
on September 20, 1972, in 39 VED. VEnxH. Soy. SSSR item 347 (1972). An
English language translation of this law may be found in W. BUTaE, supra note 1,
at 111-20.
349 KoNsrrrTrrsm (Constitution) arts. 103-107 (USSR).
35od. art. 103.
351 Id.
32 Id. art. 104.
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dental expenses connected with his legislative work. While attend-
ing the sessions of the legislature, as well as while performing his
other functions as a legislator, he is given time off from his regular
job. Even though article 101 permits the same individual to be
elected to two different levels of legislatures (for example, to the
USSR Supreme Soviet and to the supreme soviet of either a union
republic or of an autonomous republic), this rarely happens in
practice. Certain top members of the Presidium of the USSR Su-
preme Soviet may, from time to time, choose to maintain simultan-
eous but essentially symbolic membership in the supreme soviet of
one of the union republics.353
Among the powers and privileges of a deputy of the Supreme
Soviet are the right to request and receive within a reasonable time
any and all appropriate information from government agencies or
officials,853 4 and freedom from any criminal prosecution, administra-
tive action, or civil suit without the prior consent of the Supreme
Soviet or its Presidium.355
As a form of popular control over the activities of the deputy,
article 107 requires each deputy to give a periodic account of his
stewardship to his electors.356 The same article reserves to the
electors the right to recall a deputy who has failed to fulfill his
responsibilities as a lawmaker.
3 57
c. People's Control Committee of the USSR
Exercising its power to control the activities of all state agencies
that are constitutionally accountable to it, the USSR Supreme So-
viet has formed a federal People's Control Committee.3 5 This
committee coordinates the activities of all subordinate agencies
353 Certain leading members of the CPSU, notably Leonid Brezhnev and
Alexei Kosygin, are simultaneously members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.
354 KoNsTrruTsIiA (Constitution) art 117 (USSR). A similar right is granted
to deputies of other soviets in article 105. Id. art. 105.
355 Id. art. 118. This conditional immunity applies to actions taken outside, as
well as within, the scope of the deputy's legislative activities.
A similar conditional immunity is accorded members of other soviets of
people's deputies under article 106, id. art 106, which incorporates by reference
relevant statutory law, see Law of the USSR on the Status of Deputies of Soviets
of Working People's Deputies in the USSR, arts. 10, 33, 39 VED. VMEBH. Soy. SSSR
item 347 (1972).
356 KoNsmirsuA (Constitution) art 107 (USSR).
357 Id. art. 107, para. 2. For some reflections on the theory and practice of
electoral recalls in the Soviet Union, see Siekmann, The Development and Practice
of the Right of Recall in the Soviet Union Since 1917, 3 REv. SOCILaST L. 423
(1977).
358KoNsTrrUTsnA (Constitution) art. 126 (USSR).
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that compose the People's Control System of the USSR. The eleva-
tion of the People's Control Committee to the level of a constitu-
tional creature is an innovation of the 1977 constitution. The
structure, jurisdiction, and rules of procedure of the organs of the
People's Control System of the USSR are governed by general
laws.35
9
2. Executive Authority 860
In the theoretical hierarchy of Soviet federal power the execu-
tive is inferior to the legislature, but superior to the judicial
branch. The official designation of the federal executive authority is
the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It is charged with executing
and administering the laws of the USSR.8 61 The Council of Min-
isters is formed 62 by the joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet;
it consists of a chairman, constitutionally unlimited numbers of first
vice chairmen and ordinary vice chairmen, ministers of the USSR,
3 59 In 1968 the USSR Council of Ministers, acting jointly with the Central
Committee of the CPSU, adopted a statute that defines the organizational structure,
jurisdiction, and rules of procedure of the organs of the People's Control System of
the USSR. Statute on People's Control Agencies in the USSR, as jointly Adopted
by a Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of
the USSR on December 19, 1968, 1 SBonNm POSTANOvLEN PRAvrrEL'STvA SSSR
(Collection of the Decrees of the Government of the USSR-S.P.) item 2 (1969).
An English language translation of this statute may be found in W. Bu M, supra
note 1, at 319-27.
360 There are four levels of executive authority under the Soviet constitution:
the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the councils of ministers of the union
republics, the councils of ministers of the autonomous republics, and the executive
committees of the local soviets of people's deputies. The discussion in this section
of the Article focuses attention on the federal executive authority. General consti-
tutional regulation of the powers and structure of the other levels of executive
authorities in the USSR may be found in KoNsrrrtrrsuA (Constitution) arts. 137-
150 (USSR).
861 Id. art. 128.
862 It is not clear from the use of the term "formed" in the 1977 constitution
whether the USSR Supreme Soviet actually elects or merely appoints members of
the Council of Ministers. A similar confusion is caused by the use of term "forms"
in article 126 with respect to the creation of the USSR People's Control Committee.
See id. arts. 126, 129. The 1936 constitution of the USSR used the term "appoints"
in reference to the method of formation of the USSR Council of Ministers.
KoNsTrruTsrA (Constitution) art. 70 (USSR 1936). I believe that the unfortunate
choice of the term "forms" in the 1977 constitution is not intended to indicate a
departure from the past practice of appointing, rather than electing, members of the
Council of Ministers by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The choice of the term
"forms" in article 129 of the 1977 constitution is, however, particularly cryptic in
light of the fact that in other relevant provisions of the same constitution a clear
choice between "appointed" and "elected" is made. Compare id. art. 129 with id.
arts. 120, 152, 165. Under article 152, justices of the USSR Supreme Court are
elected by the USSR Supreme Soviet; under article 165, the Procurator General of
the USSR is appointed by the USSR Supreme Soviet; and under article 120, members
of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet are elected by the USSR Supreme
Soviet. Id. arts. 120, 152, 165.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1977 USSR CONSTITUTION
and the chairmen of all the USSR state committees.36 The chair-
men of the union republican councils of ministers are ex officio
members of the USSR Council of Ministers.64 At the request of
the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, heads of other
federal agencies and state organizations may be appointed to the
council by the USSR Supreme Soviet.34 Even though it is a crea-
ture of the Supreme Soviet, the tenure of the Council of Ministers
exceeds that of the Supreme Soviet. Like the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers stays in office until a new
Supreme Soviet is elected and convened. 366 At that time the out-
going ministers formally tender their resignations en masse, allow-
ing the Supreme Soviet to form a new Council of Ministers.
67
Members of an outgoing Council of Ministers are eligible to serve
in the newly formed Council of Ministers.368
Once the ministers have taken office, the council forms its own
presidium, consisting of the chairman of the Council of Ministers
(who also serves as chairman of the presidium), the first vice chair-
men, and the vice chairmen of the Council of Ministers. 69 This
inner working group functions as a permanent executive organ of
the Council of Ministers. The notion of a presidium for the Coun-
cil of Ministers is an invention of the 1977 constitution.
Under article 130, the Council of Ministers is responsible and
accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, or to its presidium
(during the recess of the Supreme Soviet).370 The USSR Supreme
Soviet may change the composition of the Council of Ministers at
any time during the latter's five-year term.371 The general authority
of the USSR Council of Ministers is spelled out in article 131.
According to its provisions, all executive powers that are vested in
the federal government by the constitution and laws of the USSR
accrue to the USSR Council of Ministers, to the extent that such
powers have not been otherwise delegated to the Supreme Soviet or
363 Id. art. 129, para. 1.
364 Id. art. 129, para. 2.
365 Id. art. 129, para. 3.
366 Id. art 129, para. 4.
367 Id.
368 A look at the present membership of the Council confirms this. Among the
most prominent holdovers from previous terms are Alexei Kosygin, Andrei Gromyko,
Nikolai Patolichev, and Viacheslav Eiutin.
369 KONSTraUTSnA (Constitution) art. 132 (USSR).
370 Id. art. 130.
371Id, art. 122(4).
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to its presidium by other limiting provisions of the constitution or
laws.
3 7 2
Among some of the general powers and responsibilities of the
executive branch are overall guidance of the national economy and
the program for the social and cultural development of the Soviet
society; formulation of long-range policies for the development of
science and technology and for the rational utilization and conserva-
tion of natural resources; administration of the Soviet monetary
and credit system, wages and price policy, and social-security policy;
administration of a uniform state statistical system; formulation and
submission to the USSR Supreme Soviet of both short-range and
long-range plans for the economic and social development of the
USSR; implementation of measures designed to safeguard state se-
curity; and conduct of Soviet foreign relations.
373
Among the special powers of the federal executive in the area
of foreign affairs are the power to oversee the fulfillment of Soviet
treaty obligations within the USSR, and the power to ratify or de-
nounce intergovernmental agreements without the advice and con-
sent of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.37 4
In the exercise of its executive authority, the USSR Council
of Ministers issues implementing orders and regulations. Like all
other federal acts, orders and regulations issued by the council have
the force of law throughout the USSR.375  In theory, this means that
if the constitution, statutes, or regulations of a union republic are
inconsistent with an order or regulation promulgated by the USSR
Council of Ministers, the former must yield to the latter. This in-
terpretation of article 133 is consistent with the general spirit of the
372 Id. art. 131.
.373 Id.
374 Id. art. 131(6). See note 342 supra. On its face this may seem like an
expansion of the foreign-affairs power of the Soviet executive, but in reality it is not.
The powers granted under article 131(6) of the 1977 constitution had long been
exercised by Soviet government under the general authorization granted by specific
Soviet legislation. Postanovlenie (Decree) of the Central Executive Committee
of the USSR Entitled "O Poriadke Zakliucheniia i Ratifikatsii Mazhdunarodnykb
Dogovorov Soiuza SS" (On the Procedure for the Conclusion and Ratification of
International Treaties of the USSR) of May 21, 1925, 35 SBorjnK ZAKONOV SSSR
(Collection of USSR Statutes SZ-SSSR) item 258 (1925) [hereinafter cited as
SZ-SSSR]; Postanovlenie (Decree) of the Central Executive Committee of the
USSR Entitled "0 Poriadke Predstavleniia Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov i
Soglashenii, Zakliuchernykh ot Imeni SSSR na Odobrenie, Utverzhdenie i
Ratifikatsiiu Pravitel'stva SSSR" (On the Procedure for the Submission of Inter-
national Treaties and Agreements Entered into in the Name of the USSR, for
Adoption, Affirmance and Ratification by the Government of the USSR) of October
2, 1925, 68 SZ-SSSR item 503 (1925).
375 KoNsrrrtrrsHA (Constitution) art. 133 (USSR).
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federal supremacy clauses of articles 74 and 173 of the constitution.3 76
Article 134 specifically grants the USSR Council of Ministers the
authority to suspend the execution of the order of the council of
ministers of a union republic if the latter is inconsistent with an
order of the USSR council.3 77
Finally, article 135 classifies USSR ministries into two groups,
all-union and union-republican ministries.378 Unlike the 1936
constitution,379 however, the 1977 constitution makes no attempt to
specify which ministries belong to each of these two groups. Each
USSR ministry is responsible for the administration of state policy
in one single area or in a group of related areas. 380 To ensure
uniformity in the operations of the ministries of the USSR, article
135 charges the Council of Ministers with the responsibility of
coordinating the work of the individual ministries. 38
1
3. Judicial Authority
The 1977 constitution does not in any meaningful way en-
hance the traditionally lowly position of the judiciary in the Soviet
system. Chapter 20,382 however, does two things. First, it per-
petuates the status of the courts as embodied in the 1936 constitu-
tion.38s This in itself could be seen as a major feat, given the basic
premise of Soviet political philosophy that laws and the courts are
destined to wither away as the Soviet society advances towards
communism. 38 Soviet society, however, has leaped from its 1936
status as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" 38 to its new 1977 status
as a "state of advanced socialism," 386 without showing any signs of
376 See id. arts. 74, 173.
377Id. art. 134.
378Id. art. 135.
379 Articles 77 and 78 of the 1936 constitution contained the lists of all-union
and union-republican ministries, respectively. KONsTrrUtsIA (Constitution) arts.
77, 78 (USSR 1936). This meant that any routine reorganization of a ministry,
from a union-republican to an all-union ministry or vice versa, would automatically
call for an amendment of the pertinent provision of the constitution. This apparently
proved to be an awkward arrangement, as evidenced by its abandonment in the
1977 constitution.
380 J. HAzARD, Tim Sovr SYsTEm OF GOvEmNumNT 103-06 (3d ed. 1964).
381 KoN,-sTrtrsi (Constitution) art. 135, para. 1 (USSR).
382 Id. arts. 151-163.
83See KoNsvrrtrrs (Constitution) arts. 102-117 (USSR 1936). See also
note 388 & accompanying text.
3 8 4 See V. I. LENIN, State and Revolution (August-September 1917): The Marxist
Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution, in Lmss
ON PoxMcs AND BEvoLTJToN (J. Connor ed.).
385 See KoNSnTursnA (Constitution) art. 2 (USSR 1936).
386 See KoNsTrruTsuA (Constitution) preamble, paras. 4, 5 (USSR).
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an impending dismantling of the courts. This is a major boost
not only for the stability of the court system, but, perhaps more
importantly, for the morale of Soviet judges.
The second accomplishment of the 1977 constitution concern-
ing the judicial system respects the delivery of legal services. In
articles 161 and 163 it elevates to the constitutional level two in-
stitutions of Soviet statutory law-the college of advocates and state
arbitration system, respectively.38
7
With the exception of these two cosmetic changes, the status
of the Soviet courts remains the same as under the 1936 constitu-
tion. 18 Judges of the USSR Supreme Court and judges of the
supreme courts of the union republics are elected by, responsible
to, and removable by the legislature, and even decisions of the
USSR Supreme Court sitting en banc may be reviewed and over-
turned by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.389 The
USSR Supreme Court is not authorized to render universally bind-
ing interpretations of Soviet laws; its decisions have no preceden-
tial value; and it has no power to review the constitutionality of acts
of the legislature.390 The content of Soviet federal law is not de-
termined by the interpretations placed on it by the USSR Supreme
Court, but rather by the decisions of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, acting in its ultimate review capacity. It is thus
misleading to speak of the USSR Supreme Court as "supreme"; it is
3 87 See id. arts. 161, para. 1 & 163.
388 The 1936 constitution diminished the powers the USSR Supreme Court bad
exercised since Its establishment in 1924. For instance, as originally constituted,
the court, at the request of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee
(CEC) of the USSR, had the authority to recommend that the Presidium of the
CEC suspend or repeal any acts of the central organs of the USSR-including acts
of the CEC and of the Council of People's Commissariats of the USSR-that were
deemed by the Supreme Court to be inconsistent with the constitution. KoNSrr-
rsUIrA (Constitution) arts. 43(c), 47 (USSR 1924). Pursuant to this authority,
between 1924 and 1929 the court sent to the Presidium of the CEC eighty-six
recommendations to suspend or repeal individual acts of the central organs of the
USSR and issued eleven advisory opinions on the unconstitutionality of individual
acts of the central and union-republican governments. This power of the USSR
Supreme Court to render advisory opinions on the constitutionality of federal acts
was eliminated in the 1936 USSR Constitution. A general discussion of the regret-
table shrinkage of the powers of the USSR Supreme Court may be found in Kulikov,
Verklhovnyi Sud SSSR-Vyschee Zveno Sovetskoi Sudebnoi Sistemi (The USSR
Supreme Court-The Highest Level in the Soviet Judicial System), 11 Soy. Gos. i
PRAvo 91 (1977). For an in-depth discussion of the structure, jurisdiction, and
history of the Court, see M. SHALAmov, SuD x Pnovosunm v SSSR (The Court and
the Administration of Justice in the USSR) (1974); VEmgovNXI Sun SSSR (USSR
Supreme Court) (B. Nikiforov, L. Smimov, V. V. Kulikov eds. 1974).
3 8 9 KoNsTUTsnA (Constitution) arts. 152, 153 (USSR).
39o Regarding proposals for the reinstitution of the judicial power of constitu-
tional review, see note 10 supra; Osakwe, supra note 82; Discussion of the Draft
Constitution II, supra note 9, at 13 (proposal of M. A. Mogunova, professor at the
Moscow State University Law School).
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far from supreme in the sense that the United States Supreme Court
is supreme.
Against this background we may proceed to analyze the major
provisions of the 1977 constitution relating to the role and status
of the courts. Article 151 reiterates a settled principle of Soviet
constitutional law: "in the USSR justice is administered only by
the courts." -91 In the USSR there are two categories of courts-
federal courts (including the USSR Supreme Court and the military
tribunals) and union-republican courts (including the supreme courts
of the union republics, the supreme courts of the autonomous
republics, and the local people's courts at the level of the territory,
the province, the autonomous province, the autonomous region,
and the district or city).392
Regardless of the level of the court on which they sit, all judges
in the USSR are elected. With the exception of the supreme courts
and the inferior appellate courts, all courts are composed of panels
comprising one judge and two lay assessors. The latter are lay
persons who sit with the law judges during trial; they also are
elected. 893 The only difference between the levels of courts is that
the judges, as well as the lay assessors, of the higher courts are
elected by the corresponding supreme soviets,3 95 whereas the judges
of the district (city) courts are elected directly by the people.
3 96
The lay assessors who sit on the district courts are elected "by
meetings of citizens at places of work or residence by open ballot."3 97
The judges of the military tribunals are elected by the Presidium
of the USSR Supreme Soviet; the lay assessors who sit on these
military tribunals are elected by meetings of servicemen.398
The term of office of the judges is uniform for all levels of
courts, but the tenure of the lay assessors varies with the level of
the court on which they serve. Thus, judges of all courts, including
the military tribunals, are elected for five-year terms; 399 the lay
391 KoNsarruTsu& (Constitution) art. 151 (USSR).
3
92 The structure, jurisdiction, and rules of procedure of these courts are defined
by union-republican law. For a representative Soviet view on the proper role and
appropriate functions of courts in the Soviet legal system, see V. BoLDYRnEv, SoVET-
szx SuD (The Soviet Court) (1966).
3 9 3 KoNsTrrrsimu (Constitution) art. 152 (USSR).
94 Within the meaning of article 152, the term "higher courts" refers to all
courts above the level of the district (city) courts.
895 KoNsnnTSruA (Constitution) art. 152 (USSR).
396 Id. art. 152, para. 2.
397 Id.
898 Id. art. 152, para. 4.
399 Id. art. 152, paras. 2, 3.
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assessors of the district courts and the military tribunals are elected
for two and one-half-year terms; 400 and the lay assessors of the
higher courts are elected for five-year terms.401
The closing paragraph of article 152 provides that all judges
and lay assessors are accountable to and removable by those who
elect them to office.4 2 It requires judges to give periodic reports
of their stewardships to their electors. If found not to merit the
trust placed in them, the judges may be recalled by their electors.
403
It is important to point out at this juncture that in practice
the Soviet judge is neither independent in the same way that his
American counterpart is nor is he free to dispense abstract or class-
less justice. Decisions handed down by a Soviet judge must not
be politically neutral. Since the laws a Soviet judge is required to
apply are themselves not blind to class interests, a judge cannot apply
them without regard for class interests. The Soviet judge must apply
the relevant laws to the case before him, but only against the back-
drop of Marxist-Leninist ideology and articulable CPSU policy.
He is supposed to administer socialist justice, and socialist justice
is essentially class justice. Accordingly, only a judgment that fur-
thers the cause of communism is just. It is against this background
that the provision of Article 155 of the new constitution should be
understood.4
04
Article 155 provides that judges and lay assessors are inde-
pendent and subordinate only to the law.405 This in itself is a
very significant principle of Soviet constitutional law. It means
that judges and lay assessors may be neither dictated to nor unlaw-
fully influenced by an outside body with regard to a pending case.
Strictly speaking, not even the CPSU organs or Party officials are
exempt from the application of this general provision. It may be
conceded that Party officials do not, as a matter of policy, exert
pressure on Soviet judges with regard to pending non-political cases,
but the same cannot be said when a case has an arguably political
400 Id. art. 152, paras. 2, 4.
401 Id. art. 152, para. 3. Article 152 of the 1977 constitution represents a
minor change in the terms of lay assessors. Under the 1936 constitution, lay as-
sessors of the higher courts served for five years, KoNsTItUTsn& (Constitution) arts.
105-108 (USSR 1936), and lay assessors of the district courts served two-year terms,
id. art. 109.
402 KoNsTrru-rsuA (Constitution) art. 152 (USSR).
40a See Osakwe, note 63 supra.
404 See Narodnyi Sudia (The People's Judge), Izvestiia, April 10, 1976, quoted
in id. 183.
405 KoNsTrrusAr (Constitution) art. 155 (USSR).
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undertone.4 1 For reasons that are perhaps inherent in the Soviet
political and judicial systems, the administration of socialist justice
in political cases is more of a political than a legal process. 407
What this means in practice is that the political defendant is
regarded as a non-person for purposes of those due-process protec-
tions which modern Soviet law accords to all other criminal de-
fendants. At all stages of the criminal process he is subjected to
flagrant violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. The
situation is even more terrifying when one realizes that modem
Soviet law does not establish guidelines for determining which
crimes are political for due-process purposes and which are not.
It seems that the, ultimate decision to treat a criminal case as po-
litical is within the absolute discretion of the state security police-
the K.G.B. It is regrettable that on this sensitive issue of due-
process protection for political criminals, Soviet law has not cleansed
itself of its much-despised Stalinist past.
At the top of the Soviet judicial pyramid is the USSR Su-
preme Court,408 which administratively supervises the activities of
all the other courts, including the supreme courts of the union
republics. 409 The role of the USSR Supreme Court as the supreme
judicial body in the USSR, however, does not mean that it is the
highest court of appeals in the USSR. The USSR Statute on the
Supreme Court leaves open the possibility of a procuratorial pro-
test of a ruling of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court to the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.410 As stated in the discus-
4 0
8 See H. BEBmAN, JusTiCE iN TmE U.S.S.R. 369-70 (rev. ed. 1963); Osaklwe,
Due Process of Law and Civil Rights Cases in the Soviet Union, supra note 26.
407 For a general discussion of due process of law applicable to political cases
in the Soviet Union, see Osakwe, Due Process of Law and Civil Rights Cases in the
Soviet Union, supra note 26, at 179.
408 The composition, structure, and jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Court are
defined in the 1957 law on the USSR Supreme Court. Statute on the Supreme
Court of the USSR, Adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, Feb. 12, 1957, 4 VED.
Vmam. Soy. SSSR item 84 (1957), amended by Decree of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet, Sept. 30, 1967, 40 VED. VEaWm. Soy. SSSR item 526 (1967).
The English language translation of this statute may be found in BAsic LAws, supra
note 307, at 199. Article 153 of the 1977 constitution merely provides that the
USSR Supreme Court consists of a chairman, vice chairmen, members of the court,
and lay assessors. The chief justices of the supreme courts of the union republics
are ex officio members of the USSR Supreme Court. KoNs.rruTSurA (Constitution)
art. 153 (USSR).
409 Statute on the Supreme Court of the USSR art. 1, Adopted by the USSR
Supreme Soviet, Feb. 12, 1957, 4 VED. Vmar. Sov. SSSR item 84 (1957), amended
by Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Sept. 30, 1967, 40 VEa.
Vzarn. Sov. SSSR item 526 (1967).
410 Id. See note 438 infra & accompanying text.
The Soviet tradition of allowing review of a decision of the USSR Supreme
Court by another agency of the federal government dates back to the court's enabling
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sion above,411 the 1977 constitution grants to the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet the authority to issue binding interpretations
of the laws of the USSR.412  Thus, the Presidium of the USSR Su-
preme Court is the true supreme court of the USSR.
Article 154 addresses itself to a related aspect of the administra-
tion of justice, requiring that all trials be conducted with the par-
ticipation of lay assessors who have the same procedural rights as
the law judges.413 This means that whenever a higher court,414
sits as a trial court, it is required to include lay assessors on its
panel.415 Article 156 bases the administration of justice on the
principle that all citizens are equal before the law and the courts. 416
Articles 157 through 162 provide the framework upon which
the entire Soviet system of criminal procedural due process417 is
built. These articles provide that court proceedings must be open
to members of the general public, unless it serves an overriding
public interest to conduct the proceedings behind closed doors; 418
that the defendant has a right to counsel; 419 as well as the right to
an appointed interpreter if he does not have full command of the
language in which the proceedings are conducted; 420 and that the
defendant is presumed innocent until his guilt has been established
by a court of competent jurisdiction.42 1 Colleges of advocates pro-
acts. The Supreme Court was established under articles 43 through 48 of the 1924
constitution. KONSTrruTsir (Constitution) arts. 43-48 (USSR 1924). The rules of
procedure for the new court were promulgated in two separate acts: Polozhenie o
Verkhovnom Sude SSSR (Decree on the USSR Supreme Court), Nov. 23, 1923,
29-30 SBOBNIX UzAxoNENLiA RSFSR item 278 (1924), and Nakaz o Verkhovnom
Sude SSSR (Instruction to the USSR Supreme Court), July 14, 1924, 2 SZ-SSSR
item 25 (1924). Pursuant to article 46 of the 1924 constitution a decision of the
Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court was reviewable by the Presidium of the Central
Executive Committee of the USSR (CEC). KONsTIsTsI.A (Constitution) art. 46
(USSR 1924). This power passed to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
when the 1936 constitution changed the name of the CEC to USSR Supreme Soviet.
KoNsvrrusA (Constitution) art. 49(C) (USSR 1936).
411 See text accompanying note 342 supra.
412 KoNSTrrsn (Constitution) art. 121(5) (USSR).
413 Id. art. 154.
414 See note 394 supra.
415 By contrast, when the court sits as a court of cassation-to hear a cassational
appeal or cassational protest-lay assessors are not included on the panel of judges
hearing the appeal.
416 KoNsTrrursnA (Constitution) art. 156 (USSR).
417 Id. arts. 157-162. See Osakwe, Due Process of Law Under Contemporary
Soviet Criminal Procedure, supra note 26.
418 KONSTIrjTsirA (Constitution) art. 157 (USSR).
419 Id. art. 158.
420 Id. art. 159.
421 Id. art. 160.
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vide legal services to persons in need. 422 For those individuals who
cannot afford to retain counsel on their own, the law makes provi-
sions for court-appointed counsel.
423
The right of representatives of social organizations to appear
in court as social accusers or defenders is granted in article 162.424
This is one of the many ways in which the Soviet system involves
private citizens in the administration of criminal justice.425 Once
the court has decided to accept a case for trial,426 it must decide
whether to admit social accusers and/or defenders. Once admitted,
the social accuser or defender has exactly the same procedural rights
as all the other participants in the trial. He or she is not permitted
to participate in any pre-trial or post-trial proceedings, however.
427
During the national discussion of the draft constitution of
1977, the director of the Sverdlov Law Institute, Professor V. M.
Semenov, suggested that since the search for "objective truth" is
one of the fundamental principles of Soviet criminal procedure, it
should be accorded constitutional recognition. The suggestion was
not adopted, but the principle remains one of contemporary Soviet
statutory criminal procedural law.
428
As a form of limitation on the jurisdiction of the regular
courts, article 163 creates special economic courts-state arbitration
agencies- 42 9 to settle disputes among economic enterprises, insti-
tutes, and organizations. At the pinnacle of the economic court
system is the USSR State Court of Arbitration, presided over by the
4 Id. art. 161.
423 Id. The RSFSR criminal procedure code lists instances in which participa-
tfon of defense counsel is mandatory and requires court-appointment of counsel in
those cases if the defendant cannot afford his own. RSFSR KOD. UGOL. Nho. (Code
of Criminal Procedure) art. 49 (1960).
424 KoNsTrrusiu (Constitution) art. 162 (USSR).
425 See H. B nmAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR 271 (1963). The procedural status
of the social accusers and defenders is defined in the union-republican codes of
criminal procedure. See, e.g., RSFSR KoD. UGOL. Pao. (Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure) arts. 228, 250, 251 (1960).
426 The decision by the court to accept the indictment referred to it by the
prosecutor is one of the critical stages in the Soviet inquisitorial criminal proceeding.
For a general discussion of the stages of the Soviet criminal process, see Osakwe,
Due Process of Law Under Contemporary Soviet Criminal Procedure, supra note 26,
at 284-93.
427 See, e.g., RSFSR KoD. UGOL. Pao. (Code of Criminal Procedure) art. 325
(1960).
428 See Discussion of the Draft Constitution I, supra note 9, at 16.
4 2 9 KoNsTvUTsnIA (Constitution) art. 163 (USSR). Dr. V. M. Savitskii, in his
commentaries on the draft constitution, expressed dissatisfaction with the inclusion
of the state arbitration agencies in the same chapter with the regular courts. See
Discussion of the Draft Constitution I, supra note 9, at 18.
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Chief Arbitrator, who is appointed by the USSR Supreme Soviet for
a term of five years.430
4. The Procuracy as an Emerging Fourth Branch of the
Soviet State
The procuracy 43 1 is a unique institution of Soviet law. Among
the major legal institutions recognized under the 1977 constitution,
the procuracy, along with the military tribunals and the USSR
State Court of Arbitration, has no union-republican counterpart;
it is strictly an all-union institution. At the apex of the procura-
torial organization is the Procurator General of the USSR. The
subordinate procurators, who serve as the procurators of the union
republics, autonomous republics, territories, provinces, and autono-
mous provinces, are appointed by the Procurator General.432 The
procurators of the autonomous regions and districts are appointed
by the union-republican procurators, with the advice and consent
of the USSR Procurator General.
433
The procuracy shares many attributes with the other non-legis-
lative hierarchies of federal authority in the Soviet system, but at the
same time it has certain features that are peculiar to it. Chief among
the unique features of the procuracy is the system, just noted, of in-
ternal appointments and accountability. Subordinate procurators
are appointed by their superiors and accountable only to the Pro-
curator General; 434 in other branches of the Soviet government,
officers are appointed or elected by, and accountable directly to
the USSR Supreme Soviet. Among some of the attributes the
procuracy shares with all or some of the other non-legislative
branches of the Soviet state are the following: the Procurator Gen-
eral, like the head of the federal executive department, is appointed
by, accountable to, and removable by, the USSR Supreme Soviet,
or its presidium when the Supreme Soviet is in recess; 435 and the
4 3 o KONsnTUsn_ (Constitution) art. 163 (USSR).
431 See id. arts. 164-168. For an in-depth analysis of the historical evolution,
structure, and jurisdiction of the Soviet procuracy, see V. SAvrsKEI, OcBimx TEORxHr
PROKUaOnSXOGo NADZORA v UGOLOVNOM SnDOPROIZVODSTVE (Theoretical Essay on
Procuratorial Supervision over Criminal Procedure) (1975); SoVETsEATA PoxsuRA-
TUNA: ISTOnIA I SovnmamNNosT' (The Soviet Procuracy: Its History and Its Present)
(A. Rekunov & R. Rudenko eds. 1977). For a leading western analysis of the
procuracy as an institution of Soviet law, see G. Smn-rn THE SOVIET PaOCUACY AND
TE SUPERIsON OF ADMnI5TRATON (1978).
432 KONSTrTUTSI& (Constitution) art. 166 (USSR).
433 Id.
434 Id. art. 168.
435 Id. art. 165.
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terms of office of the Procurator General and his subordinate pro.;
curators, just like those of Soviet judges at all levels, is five years.436
A major portion of the procuracy's jurisdiction is supervisory.
Under article 164 of the 1977 constitution, these oversight powers
extend to all ministers at all levels, to all state committees and
departments, to all enterprises, to all state institutes and organiza-
tions, to all executive and administrative agencies of the local soviets
of people's deputies, to all collective farms, to all cooperatives and
other public organizations, to governmental officials, and to all
citizens of the USSR.437 The USSR Statute on the Procuracy
438
extends the supervisory jurisdiction of the procuracy to all federal
and state courts, including both regular and special courts.
The procuracy does not have supervisory jurisdiction over legis-
lative authorities at any level, from the USSR Supreme Soviet to
the lowliest local soviets of people's deputies. Arguably, the super-
visory jurisdiction of the procuracy does extend to the organs and
officials of the CPSU, since the Party is not specifically exempted.
In other words, the procuracy has "supreme power of supervision
over the strict and uniform observance of laws" in the USSR,
39
but it does not have any control over the strict and uniform making
of laws, even to ensure conformance with the constitution. Such
supreme supervisory jurisdiction over legislative activities in the
USSR is vested in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.440
Another major function of the procuracy is the handling of
all criminal prosecutions on behalf of the state. In this sense the
office of the procurator performs the functions generally reserved
436 Id. art. 167. Under the 1936 USSR Constitution, the term of office of the
Procurator General of the USSR was seven years, KoNszrr SuI& (Constitution) art.
114 (USSR 1936); that of his subordinate procurators was five years, id. art. 115.
It is not clear why the new constitution reduced the term of office of the procurator
general to five years. One can safely assume, however, that this equalization of
the term of office of the procurator general with that of the justices of the USSR
Supreme Court does not signal a diminution in the role of the procuracy vis-a-vis
the courts. If this reform means anything at all, it represents an unwillingness on
the part of the USSR Supreme Soviet to dignify the office of a USSR Supreme Court
Justice with a seven-year term. After all, deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet are
elected only for five-year terms.
4 3 7 KoNsTrrrusTr (Constitution) art. 164 (USSR).
438 Statute on Procuracy Supervision in the USSR, Adopted by the USSR
Supreme Soviet, May 24, 1955, 9 Van. VmunH. Soy. SSSR item 222 (1955), amended
by Decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Feb. 27, 1959, 9 Van. VMzau. Soy. SSSR
item 67 (1959), March 3, 1960, 10 VED. VM3EH. Soy. SSSR item 65 (1960), Feb.
14, 1964, 8 Van. Vamm. Soy. SSSR item 100 (1964), and Dec. 14, 1966, 50 Van.
VmEKH. Soy. SSSR item 1021 (1966). For an English language translation of this
statute, see W. Buri, supra note 1, at 241-51.
4 39 KoNsTrnrsiA (Constitution) art. 164 (USSR).
4401d. art. 121(4).
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for the district attorney in the United States. With the assistance
of the organs of the People's Militia (police department), it also
conducts preliminary investigations of all alleged crimes. On the
basis of the results of the preliminary investigation, it makes a de-
termination whether or not to indict a suspect. 4 1 But in order to
avoid any conflicts of interest that might otherwise arise from the
combination in one office of the functions of investigator, grand
jury and prosecutor, the office of the procurator assigns these tasks
to independent internal units.442
In sum, it may be said that the Soviet procuracy performs the
following functions: 443 executive ombudsman,44 4 judicial ombuds-
man,44 5 general ombudsman, 46 criminal investigator, grand jury,
and district attorney. The failure of the 1977 constitution to trans-
form the procuracy into a legislative ombudsman is regrettable.
This omission notwithstanding, the Soviet procuracy may very well
be regarded as an emerging fourth branch of the Soviet state.
I. The Electoral System
With the exception of a few minor changes, the general provi-
sions of the 1936 constitution regulating general elections in the
USSR have been preserved in the 1977 constitution. As in the
past, "elections of deputies to all levels of Soviet people's deputies
are conducted on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage
and by secret ballot." 4 7 This means that all persons who have at-
tained the age of eighteen have the right to vote and to run for
office. " 8 Only persons who have attained the age of twenty-one,
441 See, e.g., RSFSR KoD. UGOL. Pao. (Code of Criminal Procedure) arts. 116,
125, 199, 207, 213, 217 (1960).
442 A detailed discussion of the internal administrative divisions of the Soviet
procuracy may be found in G. SMIH, supra note 431, at 13-32.
443 Some of these functions are founded upon the constitution; others are of
statutory origin.
444 In this capacity, the procuracy oversees the activities of all agencies of the
executive department.
445 The procuracy performs this function by lodging procuratorial protests to all
court actions it deems to be substantively or procedurally unlawful.
446 In this capacity, the procuracy receives complaints from citizens who feel
that their rights have been violated by state organs, social organizations, officials of
these agencies or organizations, or private citizens.
447Kos'ru rsuA (Constitution) art. 95 (USSR).
448Id. art. 96, para. 1. This article denies the right to vote or be voted for to
"persons who have been certified as insane under the procedure established by
law." Id. The age of eligibility for election to soviets other than the USSR
Supreme Soviet had been twenty-one. See note 449 infra & accompanying text.
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however, may be elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet." 9 Each
Soviet citizen has one vote,450 which he casts directly for the candi-
date for deputy.451
Continuing the rule established in the 1936 constitution, the
new constitution grants the right to nominate candidates for the
office of deputy to all properly constituted social organizations, in-
cluding the CPSU, the Communist Youth League (Komsomol),
cooperatives and other public organizations, labor unions, and
general assemblies of servicemen in their military units.452 In an
effort to equalize campaign opportunities among candidates, the
law provides that all "expenses connected with the holding of elec-
tions to soviets of people's deputies shall be defrayed by the
State." 53 Again preserving the rule of the 1936 constitution, the
new constitution provides that an individual may be elected to
two different soviets of people's deputies. 54
Even though there is only one political party in the Soviet
Union today, one does not have to be a communist party member
in order to be a candidate for elective office. A non-member who
decides to run for office, however, must accept the communist party's
political principles and views. Even with the recent introduction
of multiple candidate arrangements into the Soviet electoral system,
all the competing candidates invariably run on the same platform.
Thus, when candidates A, B, and C campaign for the same seat
in the USSR Supreme Soviet, for example, their campaign essen-
tially amounts to nothing more than a personality contest. In
short, a Soviet electoral campaign is a low-key race among volunteers
to help implement what seems like a pre-determined legislative
platform.
This is not to suggest, however, that there are no political dis-
putes over the formulation of such platforms in the USSR. In the
Soviet political system the political fight over the formulation of
449 KoNsTrruTsiA (Constitution) art. 96, para. 2 (USSR). Under the 1939
constitution, the right to be elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet did not attach until
age twenty-three. KoNSTrruMsrt A (Constitution) art 135 (USSR 1936). The
changes in the ages of eligibility for election to USSR soviets have also been in-
corporated into the elections statute. Statute on Elections to the USSR Supreme
Soviet art. 2, Confirmed by Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet,
July 6, 1978, 28 VED. Vmxr. Soy. SSSR item 441 (1978). See note 448 supra &
accompanying text.
450 KoNsi'rursA (Constitution) art. 97 (USSR).
451 Id. art. 98.
452 Id. art. 100, para. 1.
453 Id. art. 100, para. 3.
454 Id. art. 101, para. 2. See note 353 supra & accompanying text.
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any developmental scheme or of a legislative calendar takes place
inside the Party organization.
Soviet citizens are not under any legal duty to vote, but citizen
participation in elections generally is very high.455 On election days,
various forms of social pressure are brought to bear upon citizens
to induce them to go to the polls.456
J. Amendment Procedure
If a Marxian socialist constitution is to perform its primary
task-to serve as a supreme codification of the social, economic and
political program of the state-its amendment procedure necessarily
must be flexible. On this critical question the 1977 constitution
follows the long-standing tradition of previous Soviet constitutions:
it concentrates the power of amendment in the USSR Supreme
Soviet, to the exclusion of all other institutions in the Soviet federa-
tion, 7 providing for adoption of an amendment by a two-thirds
majority vote of each chamber of the Supreme Soviet.458 In effect,
article 174 makes the federal legislature a continuing constitutional
convention 45 9 with the power to amend, modify, and revise the
constitution. In practice, however, there is informal consultation
with the union-republican legislatures on any proposed amendment
to the federal constitution.460 Like all the other contemplated
changes of major proportion in Soviet law, any proposed amend-
455 For example, 99.98% of the registered electors voted in the June 16, 1974
general elections of deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet. 25 VED. VMaI-. Soy.
SSSR items 467-471 (1974).
4560n election days, CPSU local prefects and members of the residential
(house) committees and block (neighborhood) committees go from door to door to
remind citizens of their moral obligation to vote. These committeemen and
prefects make as many house visits as are necessary during the election day and
continue to "remind" those citizens who have not yet voted of their civic duty to
do so. If after polls have closed an individual citizen still has not exercised his
right to vote, he may be singled out for other forms of "social censure." In a
society in which, from the standpoint of an individual citizen, the personal opinions
of the residential or block committeemen or local party prefects make all the
difference between being able to receive certain social services or not, such pressure
is a very effective method of securing high attendance at the polls.
457 KoNsTrrrrA (Constitution) arts. 108, 174 (USSR). See KoNsTrrtyrsr
(Constitution) art. 146 (USSR 1936).
4
58KoNSnyTUTs_ (Constitution) art. 174 (USSR).
459 Id.
460 Article 77 provides that "[U]nion Republics take part in decisionmaking in
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR, the Government of the USSR, and other bodies of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics in matters that come within the jurisdiction of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics." Id. art. 77. Other than by the informal consultation
mentioned in the text, it is not exactly clear how the participation referred to in
article 77 is accomplished.
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ment to the federal constitution must first receive the political bless-
ing of the CPSU.461
IV. SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The adoption and promulgation of the USSR Constitution of
1977 marks the culmination of a rugged process that formally began
in 1962.462 Prior to the formation of the Constitutional Drafting
Commission in that year, however, the real Soviet constitution had
already been adopted-the 1961 Program of the CPSU.463 The
document that was held out to the rest of the world in October
1977 as the new USSR Constitution merely legitimized the 1961
Party Program, as amended and updated by the resolutions of the
subsequent congresses of the CPSU.
4 "
The theories of the 1977 USSR Constitution do not fully re-
flect the realities of Soviet constitutionalism, as evidenced by the
following dichotomies. First, the 1977 constitution designates the
Supreme Soviet as the supreme lawmaking body, when in fact the
real lawmakers are the delegates to the Congress of the CPSU,
whose power rests in the members of the Central Committee of the
CPSU 465 during the intervals between the sessions of the Party
461 See, e.g., C. CARER, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION 39 (1967):
"But since no vote in the Supreme Soviet is ever less than unanimous, and since
the highly disciplined Communist Party is always in control, there is never any
doubt that an amendment desired by the country's political leaders will be adopted"
(emphasis added).
462 See note 8 supra.
463 The current Program of the CPSU was adopted by the 22d Congress of the
CPSU on October 31, 1961. The Program not only notes the economic, political,
and social changes that have taken place throughout the world since the inception
of the communist movement over one hundred years ago, but also lays down the
tasks of the CPSU in building a communist society in the USSR. See Program
of the CPSU, 22d Congress of- the CPSU, Oct. 31, 1961 (Foreign Language
Publishing House edition, Moscow 1961). The 1977 USSR Constitution reaffirms
the general principles of the CPSU Program as amended by subsequent CPSU con-
gresses, up to and including the 25th CPSU Congress held in February 1976. For
a collection of the major resolutions adopted during the 25th Congress of the CPSU,
see MATmraAL 25OGO S'EZDA, KPSS (Materials of the 25th Congress of the CPSU)
(1976).
464 In his report to the May 1977 Plenum of the Central Committee of the
CPSU on the draft constitution of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged that in
drafting its new constitution, the Soviets looked to the constitutional experience of
some of the other socialist countries, notably Bulgaria, the German Democratic
Republic, and Cuba, for ideas. See Brezhnev, On the Draft Constitution, supra
note 57, at 6.
465For instance, the Constitutional Drafting Commission was created not by
the USSR Supreme Soviet, but by the Central Committee of the CPSU. The draft
constitution of 1977 was discussed and approved by the Plenum of the Central
Committee before it was ever sent to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. And the
text and music for the new Soviet national anthem also was adopted by the Plenum
of the Central Committee before it was passed on to the Presidium for discussion
and pre-ordained adoption. In all these cases the state agency had to await the
appropriate signal from the CPSU.
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congresses. 466
Second, the designation of the supreme lawmaking body as a
"soviet" suggests that it is a deliberative body. A body with as many
members as the USSR Supreme Soviet that meets so infrequently
cannot afford to be deliberative in practice. The actual work of the
session of the Supreme Soviet consists of rubber-stamping the
recommendations of the Presidium.4 7  Thus, in fact, the USSR
Supreme Soviet is neither "supreme" nor a "soviet." The real
supreme soviet, as that term is formally used in the new constitu-
don, is the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and, as noted,
the power behind the Presidium is the CPSU.
Third, the 1977 constitution refers to itself as the supreme
law of the land,4 8 suggesting that there is no law beyond the con-
stitution. The reality, however, is that the Program of the CPSU,
as amended by the organic resolutions of the various organs of the
CPSU, such as the Party Congress, the CPSU Central Committee,
and the Party Secretariat, is the real constitution of the USSR. It
is the ultimate source of Soviet law. The provisions of the USSR
Constitution merely recodify and thereby legitimize the deliberately
omnibus declarations contained in the Party Program. For this
reason it may be said that the true Soviet state constitution is
secreted in the interstices of the Program of the CPSU.
Fourth, the 1977 constitution designates the USSR Supreme
Court as the supreme judicial body in the USSR. The fact of the
matter is that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet is the
court of highest appeal in the Soviet system. Thus, the Presidium
of the USSR Supreme Soviet is both the highest legislative and the
highest judicial authority in the USSR.
Fifth, the 1977 constitution expressly grants supreme super-
visory jurisdiction to the Procurator General of the USSR. Ana-
lyzed at close range, however, this supervisory jurisdiction appears
less than supreme. The only organ that can lay claims to supreme
supervisory jurisdiction in the USSR is the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet.
Finally, the enumeration of federal powers in article 73 and
the provision in article 76 that powers not specifically delegated
to the federal government shall be deemed to be reserved to the
states,469 erroneously suggests that the union republics are the re-
466 See J. HAzARD, supra note 306, at 245-62.
467 See KoNsnTrrSnA (Constitution) arts. 121, 122 (USSR); notes 333-35 &
accompanying text
4 68 See KoNsT rTSIs (Constitution) art. 173 (USSR).
469 See id. arts. 73, 76.
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positories of ultimate sovereignty. This ostensible protection of
union-republican sovereignty is vitiated by article 174, which em-
powers the USSR Supreme Soviet to change unilaterally the provi-
sions of the USSR Constitution. The practical result of this
arrangement is that even though in theory the sovereignty of the
federal government is limited in scope and derivative in nature, in
practice there are no definable limits on the exercise of federal
powers.
None of the above conclusions is intended to suggest that the
present Soviet constitutional arrangement is in any way bad or less
than desirable. There are no universal principles of constitutional
law against which the principles of Soviet constitutional law may
be judged. It is my belief that every country, including the Soviet
Union, has the constitution that it deserves. In the course of this
Article, some value judgments inevitably have been made. But
the primary purpose of this survey of the provisions of the new
USSR Constitution has been to study and understand, as objectively
as possible, the social, economic, political, and cultural context in
which the constitution operates. The 1977 constitution should be
seen, first and foremost, as a reflection of the sixty-year history of
the Soviet state, as a codification of the culture, traditions, and
psychology of the Soviet people. It is, in other words, a concen-
trated expression of the pains and sufferings, as well as the aspira-
tions, of the Soviet society.
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